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CHAPTER I
.
Introduction.
The problem of railway control has proved to be a thorny
one; much time has been devoted by leading statesmen to its
solution. At the present moment three countries, America,
Canada and India are conducting official inquiries into the
problem. England was prevented in 1914 by the great European
War from continuing the inquiry of the Royal Commission on rail-
ways. In the two most important countries, England and America,
where railways are privately owned and operated, the problem of
railway control has become expecially acute. Railway control
may involve many problems but none of them is more important and
more complicated than that of regulating railway rates and charge
The problem of regulating railway construction may be acute for
a certain period and the problem of regulating railway finance
concerns directly only a limited number of people. But the pro-
blem of regulating railway rates and charges extendsto all per-
iods and is of deep interest to almost every man and woman, for
in the modern state there is no business so interwoven as is the
railway business with the trade and industry of a country. The
kernel of the railway problem is the question of transportation
charges. When the problem of charges is satisfactorily solved,
other railway problems will be not of much significance. Being
fully realized that the question of railway charges is vital to
the solution of the whole railway problem, the writer determined
two years ago to make a careful study of the Parliamentary
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Regulation of railway rates in England,
The English railway system is a very instructive one. It
is not only the oldest but in many ways the most interesting.
Though not necessarily the most enterprising in these latter
days, it has had the greatest influence on the development of
railways throughout the world. It has been truly said that its
very faults and short comings are instructive. 1 There is much
to be learned from the English railway system not only by rail-
way engineers, but by traffic managers, shippers and law makers.
The regulation of railway rates in England has been the subject
of continued and centralized legislation for over a century, and
this long record alone gives to the study of it a special value.
Little need be said of the development of the English rail-
way system, for it has been fully treated by many able writers.
But a few main points regarding the development both before and
after the coming of railways may be of some help to realize the
historic significance of rate regulation in England. Immediately
after the start of the industrial revolution about 1756 in Eng-
land, the problem pressing hard for its early solution was in-
ternal communication. 2 Parliament first turned its attention to
1. Lawson: British Railway, P. V. Introduction.
2. See Journal of Royal Statistical Society, 1854, V. 17, pp. 156-
157; Jackman: Development of Transportation in Modern Eng-
land, App. 13, pp. 742-744.
Acts. :
. Total Acts for the periods [Average Acts per decade.
.1701-1750
: 1751-1790 : 1791-1830 : 1701-1750 : 1751-1790 .1731-1830
Road i
Canal
418 1633
: 70
2440 !
: 323 :
83.6 : : 408.2 :
; 17.5 :
610.0
: 80.7
rim
the improvement of land transportation and later to water trans-
portation. During the last quarter of the eighteenth and the
first part of the nineteenth century, the system of internal
communication both by land and water had been enormously im-
proved, but it failed to keep pace with the increasing demands
which had arisen in the manufacturing districts. 1 The lack of
accommodation and equipment on the part of the canal companies
was in many instances notorious, especially on the routes con-
necting the great industrial and distributing markets, like
2Manchester, Liverpool and London. The shippers and manufactur-
ers were said to have suffered considerably by the dispropor-
tionate scale of high charges. The service of transportation
was not only extravagantly charged for, but ill performed. Cotton
which was transported three thousand miles across the Atlantic
from New York to Liverpool in 20 days took sometimes six weeks
to be carried from Liverpool to Manchester, a distance of only
3
30 miles.
In the midst of such a period when all attempted improve-
ments of internal communication, both by land and water, pro-
mised little hope of success, when canal companies were ineffi-
ciently managed, when land transportation was slow and costly
and when the pack horses, wagons and boats failed to keep pace
1. Cunningham: Growth of English Industry and Commerce, p. 811.
2. Quarterly Revies, 1824, V.31, p. 360; Edinburgh Review, 1846,
V. 84, pp. 479-531.
3. Edinburgh Review, 1846, p. 481.
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with the growth of industry, the railway came. It came to
supply the industrial need of the time; it came to meet the de-
mand of commerce.
Railways, or as they were first called, tramways - that
is artificial tracks for facilitating the draught of carriages -
were probably employed in England as early as in the middle of
the seventeenth century. 1 The first Act of Parliament for the
making of a railroad was one passed in 1801 for the building
of the Surrey Iron Railway and it was on Anderson's plan. 2 It
ran "from Wandsworth to Croydon for the advantage of conveying
coals, corn and goods and merchandise to and from the metropolis
and other places." 3 Between the Act of 1801 and that of 1821
there were not less than 20 railway Acts passed. In 1821 an
Act was passed authorising the construction of a railway from
Darlington to Stockton. This short line exercised an important
influence on railway development, as it was the first public line
on which steam power was used for locomotion and also the first
to carry passengers. The Act as amended in 1825 authorised the
companies to work the railways by means of locomotive engines.
1. Quarterly Review, V. 42, 1830, p. 383; V. 74, 1844, p. 225;Life of Lord Keeper Guilford, V. 1, p 265.
2. Quarterly Review, V. 74, 1844, p. 229; Anderson's plan was
to use flanged rails.
3. Report, Royal Commissioners on Railways, 1867, V. 38, p. VII*Quarterly Review, 1844, V. 74, p. 232.
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In 1824 the number of Acts passed for the construction of rail-
ways amounted to 24. 1 On May 5, 1826 the Liverpool and Man-
chester Railway Act received the Royal assent. The Liverpool
2
and Manchester Railway was opened on September 15, 1830, with
it the modern railway era began. It was the first railway that
was constructed for the express purpose of carrying passengers
as well as freight. No other power was ever used on it but
that of locomotive engines.
1.Report, Royal Commissioners 1867, v. 58, p. VIII-IX. The Fol-
lowing table showing the number of railway acts passed in
Parliament 1801-1845 is condensed from the account given by
Mr. Porter, a member of Mr. Dalhousie's Board, in his book,
"Progress of the Nation," 1847, pp. 329-352.
List of Railway Acts and Railways Completed, 1801-1845.
Year : For new
j
Extension of
J
Number of Miles
J
Lines. ', existing line. completed. '.
1801-05: 5 : 1 : 57f
1806-10: 5 :: 3 :
1811-15: 6 : 4 : 46
1816-20: 4 :: 1 : 47f
1821-25 : 12 : 5 : : 171
: 274f1825-30 : 26 : 18
1831-35 ! 28 : 34 ! 647-2/3 :
: 12814
! 15l{ :
1836-40 ! 49 : 98
1841-45 : 112 : 121
2. Blackwood Magazine: Opening of the Liverpool and Manchester
Railway 1850, v. 28, pp. 825-851; Booth, H: An Account of
the Liverpool and Manchester Railway.
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Stimulated by the success of the two modern railway pioneers,
the Stockton and Darlington, and the Liverpool and Manchester
Railways, the construction of railways was very rapid in Eng-
land. 1 By the end of the fourth decade of the century the
important trunk lines were all either under construction or
formation.
2
With the rapid growth of a railway system the problem
of internal communication in England was no longer a question
of adequate transportation facilities but a problem of railway
tolls, rates and charges. Laws for regulating railway rates
were passed by Parliament first in connection with special Acts
applicable to particular railway companies, and later in the
form of general railway Acts applicable to all railway companies.
The General Railway Acts were based on broad principles and in
the regulation of railway rates they displaced the Special Acts.
1. See Lewin: British Railway System, and Scrivenor, H: Rail-
ways of the United Kingdom.
2 . The Progress of English Railways can be seen from the
following table.
Year
1840^
1845?
1849°
1854
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910 ,
1912°
Total Length
of lines open
for traffic
miles
1,556
2,343
5,447
8,053
J.0,433
15,537
17,937
20,073
21,855
23,387
25,441
Total Capital
paid up.
286,068
348,130
529,908
728,316
897,472
1,176,00;
1,318,515
1 ,554,963
,794
,127
,673
,848
,026
,890
,417
518
Total receipt
for passenger
traffic.
3,976,341
6,105,975
10,244,954
13,085,756
19,301,911
27,200,464
34,327,965
45,383,988
52,758,489
54,258,402
Total Receipt
from goods
tralfj cu
a. Journal of Royal Statistics
b. Third Report, Railway Commis
c. Railway Returns, 1854-1912.
', 1853, v. 16, p 290.
sion, 1850, p. 304.
d. Last Available
2,233,373
5,094,925
9,970,770
14,680,866
24,115,159
35,761,303
42,220,382
53,470,456
61,478,643
64,048,814
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The law relating to the regulation of rates in England is very-
complicated and intricate.^ The main reason of the complication
arose out of the wrong conception in the early days of the nature
of railway transportation and the many changes of legislative
policy that were needed in the successive periods. Yet on account
of this very fact, English experience furnishes the best field
for the study of the problem, for the regulation of railway rates
has been experimented with more or less success from many angles
and different phases.
The object of the present work is to trace out the history
of the regulation of railway rates in England. To accomplish
this, the writer has endeavored to find out, first what laws
the English Parliament has adopted from time to time for the re-
gulation of railway rates; secondly, what special circumstances
led to the adoption and rejection of the various legislative
measures; thirdly, why and how these laws were adopted; fourthly,
how they have been adopted; fifthly, what interpretations, if
any, were given to the laws by the various courts and the Com-
missions; sixthly, what are some of the results; and lastly, where-
in lies the problem of future regulation. Special care has been
exercised to draw any definite conclusion. Statements and
comments whenever and wherever made are based upon actual ana-
lysis of fact and circumstances.
In writing on a subject of this kind with a rich resource
of materials extending over more than a century, the writer is
aware that the hardest task is to put into the work enough to
anable it to be understood intelligently and completely without
1. Parsloe: Our Railways, P. 232-235,
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confusing the issue by unnecessary prolixity of detail. This
aim has been kept constantly in mind, care has been exercised
in selecting materials and in knitting them together and an at-
keep
tempt has been made to the whole within proper proportion.
Materials used in this work are all from the original and pri-
mary sources. Bills have been compared, debates in Parliament
noted and laws relating to rate regulation, pointed out with
careful analysis. For these purposes the British Statutes at
Large, the Parliamentary Papers and Debates, the reports by the
various Select Committees and Commissioners, etc., have been
used. To ascertain differences of opinion, important papers and
magazines such as the London Times, the Economist, Blackwood's
Magazine, the Fortnightly Review, the Railway Times, etc., have
been referred to. The interpretations of the laws given by the
various courts and Commissions have been taken from the cases
themselves. For decisions relating to the Railway Clauses Act,
1S45, various law reports have been used, and for those bearing
upon the Traffic Acts, the Railway and Canal Traffic Cases,
1854-1914. The purpose of the writer in making use of the court
decisions is to find out what meaning the court has given to the
laws and how the laws have been applied. With this purpose in
view, only important principles that help to interpret the law
have been analyzed. The text of the cases have not been given
unless of direct assistant in making the law or underlying prin-
ciples clearer. Cases decided on the same or similar principles
as those discused in the text have not been given space in the
text, although they have been studied. Owing to the limited
<ill ffe»
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length of the work and the time of the writer, questions having
little or no connection with the main issue of the subject, such
as canal tolls, owner's risk rates, reasonable facilities, etc,
have not been treated. It is further assumed that a reader of
this work is already acquainted with the history of English
railways and the theory of rate-making.
The chapters fall naturally into two divisions.
1
The first
division whioh camprises Chapters II to IV, deals with the re-
gulation of railway rates from 1801 to 1840 when railway companies
were only under the regulation of special acts. The second divi-
sion, which consists of the rest of the work except Chapter XII*
1. The writer finds that it is not advisable to adopt the divi-
sions of the legislative period as proposed by some writers. The
following will illustrate what was generally proposed:
Journal of Royal Statistical Society, 1860, V. 29, P. 554.
Five Periods.
1. Period of Experiment 1820-1830.
2. " " Infancy 1850-1845.
5. n " Mania 1845-1848.
4. " " Competition by great companies 1848-1859.
5. " Contractors 1 Lines and Company Extension
1856-1866.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1894, V. 8, P. 283.
Four Periods.
1. Period of Doubt and Suspicion 1824-1840.
2. Period of unlimited concession 1840-1854.
3. Period of struggle in railway policy be-
tween a tendency towards diminution of
state control over industry and commerce
and a tendency towards increase of this
control 1854-1872.
4. Period of the victory of state control
a. The beginning of the period 1872-1882.
b. Period of agitation for reduction
of rates
(1) . A period of high prosperity 1873-1879.
(2) . A period of occasional depression 1880-1886.

- 10 -
deals with the regulation from 1840 to date when both the General
and the Special Acts are in operation. The latter can be further
divided into two parts. The first part, which may be entitled as
the beginning of restrictive legislation, is discussed in Chapter
V from 1840-1853 and in Chapter VI from 1854 to 1872. The second
part begins with the Commission regulation from 1873 to date and
is treated in the four Chapters VTI-XI. During the period cover-
ed by the second part legislative policy was changed twice, first,
in 1888, by the revision of classifications of merchandise traf-
fic and schedules of maximum rates, and again, in 1894, by the
requirement of justifying reasonableness in an increase of rates.
The concluding chapter is separated by itself, although part of
the substance chronologically belongs to Chapter V. The purpose
is to bring out the future problem of rate regulation in Eng-
land more prominently and conspicuously before the mind of the
reader.
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CHAPTER II.
Railways as Public Highways.
The railway is a thing, as it has been said, of only ye-
sterday. It is true that the railway system was developed out
of the colliery tramways applied to turnpike and canal traffic
and it came to meet the need of the time; but its nature is
entirely different from that of a turnpike, or a canal. In
those early days very few understood the real nature of railway
transportation, nor could they see the fundamental differences
between a railway and a canal or turnpike. The unexpected re-
volution that followed in the change of transportation methods
puzzled all alike.
1
The adoption of locomotive power was esta-
blishing a new era in the state of society, the final results of
2
which it was impossible to anticipate and to predict. Even
railway promoters and the leading statesmen of the time did not
have any idea of what tremendous changes there would be in the
carrying business and what railways were destined to become.
The Duke of Wellington, who was then the Prime Minister of Eng-
land, could not, at the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester
1. Blackwood Magazine, V. 28, 1850, P. 823: Opening of the
Liverpool ana Manchester Railway.
2, The following quotations, though extreme, will illustrate
what was thought of railways in those early days:
"As to those persons who speculate on making railways general
throughout the kingdom and superseding all the canals, all the
wagons, mail and stage coaches, post-chaises, and in short, every
mode of conveyance by land and by water, we deem them and their
visionary schemes unworthy of notice."
"We scout the idea of a general railroad as altogether im-
practicable; or, as one, at least, which will be rendered nuga-
tory in lines where the traffic is so small that the receipts
would scarcely pay for the consumption of coals." Quarterly
review, V. 51, 1824, P. 361-362.

- 12 -
Railway, 1830, conceal his surprise at the strange situation in
which he, like the rest of the world, found himself so suddenly
placed.
1
Both the public and Parliament did not know exactly
what principles should be applied to the control of this new
mode of conveyance. England had been the pioneer in railway
invention and railway construction; as she had no beaten track
to follow, she now also had to be the pioneer in railway legisla-
tion. Yet the conception of railways as public highways, the
same as that of King's other public highways, was firmly grasped
and retained in the history of railway rate legislation in Eng-
land.
Under the common law in England, everyone has perfect free-
dom in the use of the public roads. One can use them at all
hours and in any manner one pleases. There was no such a thing
as a statutory monopoly of the means of conveyance on an ordi-
2
nary road. The use of the turnpikes and the canals, which were
improved forms of public roads, was restricted only by the re-
quirement of certain tolls. When railways came, they naturally
fell into the group of their predecessors. It was no great
surprise that they were treated and regarded as only improved
turnpikes and canals. The early conception of a railway result-
ed that a railway would still be, like the turnpike in the past,
the King's Highway. The roadway of a railway line must be free,
like the waterway, to all alike.
Dr. James Anderson who first conceived the principle of a
1. Blackwood, 1850 V. 28, P. 824.
2. Second Report, Select Committee On Ry. Acts Enactments,
1846, P. IV.
3. Hansard, 1887, V. 312, pp. 125-127 ; Disney: Law of Carriage, P. 1.
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modern railroad about the beginning of the 19th century, thought
that the railways should be managed by a Public Commission and
"be kept open and patent to all alike, who shall choose to employ
them, as the King ' s Highway , under such regulations as it shall
be found necessary to subject them to by law".
1
The Stockton
and Darlington and the Liverpool and Manchester Railways, the
two earliest ones in our modern sense, were projected and regard-
ed as ordinary roads. 2 The privileges and rights contemplated
for the early railway companies, by Parliament, and by the public
were merely those necessary to enable the railway companies to
construct and maintain a road which was to be open to all who
might desire to use it on the payment of a certain toll to the
companies. 5 The early railway companies were thus simply toll-
takers; they acted as owners of the road only and received a
payment for the use of it, called "road-toll". The public were
conveying their own traffic, using their own locomotives, and
supplying their own wagons upon the lines of the railway com-
panies. 4 Engines belonging to different parties, and the vehicles
of coach proprietors and others were running on the Liverpool
and Manchester line, as recorded in the report of the Select Com-
mittee of 1837. 5 This Committee recommended as a remedy for
the delay of the Imperial Mails, that the right enjoyed by pri-
1. Recreations in Agriculture, 1800, V. 4, P. 1: Quarterly Re-
view, V. 74, 1844, P. 227.
2. Edinburgh Review, 1846, V. 84, P. 482; Jean: Jubilee Memorial
of the Railway System, pp. 20-40.
3. Edinburgh Review, 1846, V. 84, P. 525.
4. Clifford; History of Private Bill Legislation, V. 1. P. 45.
5. Report of Select Committee on Roads, 1837, Minutes of Evidence,
P. 135.
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vate persons of running their own engines and trains upon any
railway should be extended to the Imperial Post Office.1 The Com-
mittee of 1853 remarking on the railway practice of this period
stated that it could not be doubted that railways were expected
to be in practice what they were in contemplation of law, new
highways freely open to the public to pass with engines and car-
2
riages at their own discretion. The railway companies in the
first few years of their existence were contented to remain as
the owners of the line. This represents the first stage of rail-
way development.
The transition to the next stage, the provision of locomotive
power by the railway companies, was a rational one. The public
in most cases was unable and sometimes unwilling to furnish loco-
motive engines. This was especially so when railway companies
found that for the sake of safety they had to fix rules and regu-
lations regarding the use of the locomotive and rolling stock on
their lines. It became apparent that it was more convenient for
the railway companies to provide the motive power and fix the
4hours of departure and arrival, etc. In the special railway
acts a clause was usually inserted, authorizing the railway com-
5panies to charge for the provision of motive power.
1. Report of Select Committee on Roads, 1837, Minutes of Evidence,
p. IV.. British Parliamentary Paper (257) V. XVI, 341.
2. Waghom: Railway Law, P. 2.
3. Several large carrying firms, Messrs. Pickford & Co., Mes. rs.
Chaplin and Home and others, developed a large carrying trade on
the railways. The public dealt almost entirely with them and had
practically little or no communication with the railway companies.
4. Spiller v. Great Western Railway; 14 Railway & Canal Traffic
cases, P. 70.
5. Great Western Railway Act, 1835, Section 166.
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The provision of locomotive power by the railway companies
naturally led to the third stage of railway development, the rail-
way companies themselves performing the carrying business. It
was found necessary for the railway companies to supply not only
engines, but also the whole equipment of rolling stock and a staff
of officers for performing the conveyance themselves. This was
the only practical method, for the railway companies were alone
in a position to man and operate the necessary signals at the
junction points. 1 From 1853 to 1840 railway acts authorized the
railway companies not only to provide engines but also to use and
employ them themselves in carrying goods and passengers. Thus
the charges for railway service fell into three divisions: first,
the road toll for the use of roadway; second, the locomotive toll
for the use of the engine, third, a reasonable charge for convey-
ance. The first, road toll, was always of a fixed maximum amount
stated in the special acts. Parliament no doubt thought it best
to limit and fix the road tolls as the railway companies possess-
ed the monopoly of the roadway. The other two kinds of charges,
locomotive toll and conveyance charge, were not thus fixed. The
reason was plain: it was expected that they would be determined
by competition, since the company might legally employ their own
engines and do their own carrying. The fixing of these charges
1. Spiller v. G. W. Railway, 14 Railway & Canal Traffic Cases,
P. 70.
2. Jackman: Development of Transportation in Modern England, V. 2
p. 576.
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in the later acts passed probably shows that Parliament recog-
nized the futility of depending on the regulation of those charges
by free competition.^"
As a result of these changes in railway practice, the situ-
ation of the various companies was far from uniform. But it is
2
possible to group them under some four heads:
1. Railway companies which acted as carriers, independent carriers
being excluded from participation in the business, such as the
Liverpool and Manchester Railway Company, the Newcastle and Car-
lisle Railway Company and the Leeds and Selby Railway Company.
2. Railway Companies which acted both as owners and carriers, in-
dependent carriers being freely allowed on their lines to compete
with the railway companies in the business, such as the Grand
Junction Railway Company and the Stockton and Darlington Railway
Company.
3. Railway Companies which acted solely as owners, providing loco-
motive power and wagons; independent carriers doing the business
on their lines, such as the London and Birmingham Railway Com-
pany.
4. Railway companies which acted strictly as owners, letting the
carriage on their lines only to a single independent carrier,
1. Great Junction Railway Act, 1833, (3 W. IV, C. 34); London &
Birmingham Railway Act, 1833, (3 W. IV C. 36); Great Western Rail-
way Act, 1835, (5 and 6 W. IV, 107); Bristol and Exeter Railway
Act, 1836 (6 and 7 W. IV, C. 36)
2. Second Report, Select Committee, 1839 V. 90, P. VIII.
Third " " " 1840, PP. 9-11.
Fourth " , Railway Commission, 1851, P. XX.
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such as the Bolten Leigh Railway Company and the Worth Union Rail-
way Company.
The system of carriage most subjected to criticism was the
fourth one—railway companies acting solely as owners "but letting
the carriage to some single carrier. The usual way of doing was
for the railway company before admitting any carrier first to se-
cure from him a contract or an agreement not to charge less for
the carriage of goods than the price which the railway company
demanded. Naturally this created much ill-feeling as it virtu-
ally developed a monopoly.
1
As experience made clear the anomaly of competitive carriers
on the same line and accordingly the necessity of the work of
conveyance being undertaken by the railway company, so also it
showed the need of a centralized management. The system of di-
vided responsibility on the same line was not found to work well.
The right secured to the public, by every railway Act, of running
their own vehicles and engines over the railway was practically
a dead letter. There were various reasons for this but only the
most important ones need be given here. In the first place, on
account of the struggle for the use of railway facilities, there
was great danger in the running of rival trains over the same
rails by various persons. This was due chiefly to the changes
in tractive power. The principle of making railways open to the
public would have been feasible for the line worked by horse
1. Fifth Report of Select Committees on Railways, 1840; P. X, Rail-
way Times, 1840, P. 586,
1TTC
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power like the common roads.
1
When locomotives replaced horses
the nature of a railway was made different from the ordinary
road.
2
Public safety demanded that the management should be in
the hands of responsible persons; and that the working of the
railways should be under one authority. "The liability of acci-
dents by collision is of itself a consideration sufficient to
show the necessity of placing all the trains under same common
management and control."
4 The danger to public safety in allow-
ing open use of the railway was fully discussed by the early com-
mittees, and by the Railway Department of the Board of Trade.
After 1850 the erroneous principle was abandoned and the running
5
clauses, no longer enforced.
In the second place, no provision had been made to ensure
for private trains and engines access to stations, water tanks
and other equipment along the line. The mere authority to place
and run engines on railways without power to make use of stations
for passengers, of coaling stations and water tanks for supplying
engines with coal and water did not afford to other persons the
means of competing with the railway companies for the traffic
1. Edinburgh Review, V. 84, 1846, P. 482.
2. First Report of Railway Department, 1841, P. 1.
5. The fourth Report of the Railway Commission, 1851, P. XIX.
4. First Report of Railway Commission, 1848, P. 51.
5. "Running Clauses" were those clauses which gave to one railway
company the use of the water tanks and stations and the other fa-
cilities that were necessary in order that they might avail them-
selves of this common law right of using the road as a common
highway upon payment of tolls. See Railway Clauses Consolidation
Act, 1845.
Han. 1854, V. 132, P. 588.
Waghorn: Railway Law, P. 2.
6. Report of the Royal Commission, 1867, V. 60, P. III-V.
Third Report, 1840. See Under Conveyance of Passengers by Railway
Companies
.
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upon its lines. In the third place, tolls as fixed in acts of
Parliament were almost always so high as to make it impossible for
other parties than the railway companies to work at a profit even
if the other obstacles were all removed.
1
In the fourth place,
private parties were not very willing to build engines and car-
riages, the use of which must be subject to the rules and regu-
lations of a railway company. 2 The change of railway companies
from mere owners of their lines to exclusive carriers as well as
owners was the result of circumstances and a natural development
of railway business. The carrying mechanism was made for the
railway and the railway was made for it. It was impossible to
separate them and the carrying business could only be conducted
by those who had the direction and management of the railway.
The railway companies, therefore, found themselves - by a neces-
sity arising from the very nature of things and practically irre-
spective of either their own or the public's wishes - carriers as
well as road-owners.
This important change was not accompanied without much con-
tention. The public gave up the privilege only with great re-
luctance and Parliament abandoned it only because of necessity.
The contention first appeared in connection with the question
whether the railway companies should be allowed to become com-
peting carriers. 4 The public had great fear of monopolies, which
1. Fifth Report, Select Committee, 1844, App. 2 P. 22; Waghorn:
Ry. Law P. 2.
2. Third Report, Select Committee, 1840, PP. 5-8.
3. See also Reports of the Commissioners on Rys for Ireland, 1838;
Edinburgh Review, 1839~,T7 69, PP. It?b-±9T7
4. Second Report of Select Committee on Railways, 1839, PP. 8-10.
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was probably due to their experience with canal companies. Al-
though it was natural and more economical for the railway com-
panies to do the carrying business, yet the public seemed at first
uncertain as to the advantage of allowing the railway companies
to become carriers. Many witnesses before the Select Committee
of 1840 contended that the duties of a railway company should
cease with providing the locomotive power, fixing the speed of
conveyance, the weight to be carried, the hours of arrival and de-
parture and such other matters of detail as were essential to the
due management of the railways.
1
The railway companies, they
argued, should not be allowed to carry on their own behalf. The
carriers of the time, fearing the effect of competition of the
railway companies upon their own carrying business, determinedly
opposed the proposal. They emphasized the injury that would
be wrought to their business by such a change.
3 The advantages
of allowing the railway companies to become carriers were, how-
ever, recognized by a few witnesses. It was urged that the rail-
ways could provide for the conveyance of goods on their own lines
more cheaply than could be done by any other carriers, "because
one general system for collection and delivery, the warehousing
and the carriage of the goods must be more economical than when
several rival establishments are kept up, each having a less
amount of business."4 Although nowadays the question seems so
It Third Report of Select Committee on Railways, 1840, P. 9.
2. See the case of Pickford v. Grand Junction Railway.
,
Statistics of British Railway 1859, P. 25.
3. Third Report of Select Committee on Railways, 1840, P. 9.
4. Second Report, 1859. V. 90, P. VIII.
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simple, that no one would hesitate to answer it, yet it is in-
structive to note that the Select Committee of 1839 admitted in
plain words that they were "incompetent to offer an opinion to
the House until further experience shall more fully develop the
comparative inconvenience and advantage of either system."
1
The
main object2 of the Select Committee of 1840 was to discover
whether the plan pursued by the London and Birmingham Railway
Company of merely providing the locomotive power to other carriers,
they themselves carrying no goods on their own accord, or that off
the Grand Junction Company, who did both, was in the best inter-
est of the public. The Select Committee of 1840 found itself able
to recommend that the railway companies should be allowed to be
carriers also. 3 However, the preponderance of evidence was in
favor of the method adopted by the London and Birmingham Railway
Company. Most of the witnesses appeared to dread the extinction
of private carriers. It was only after a bitter and long contest,
as in the Case of Pickford and Company v. Grand Junction Railway
Company, 1842, that the right of railway companies to act as
carriers was definitely recognized. 4
The change of railway companies from mere owners to exclusive
carriers, thus creating monopolicies in the carrying business, was
1. Second Report, 1839, V. 90, P. IX.
2. Railway Times, 1840, P. 586.
3. "The only measure which could effectively protect the carriers
against the competition of the railway companies on whose lines
they conduct their business would be a prohibition of the railway
companies from acting as carriers. A full consideration of all
the circumstances end a due regard for the interests of the pub-
lic as well as of the parties more immediately concerned in those
undertakings, have induced your committe to recommend that no
such measure should be adopted by the Legislature." Third Re-
port, 1840, P. 11.
4. Statistics of British Railways, P. 23; Pickford & Co. v. Grand
Junction Railway Company, 1842; 10 M. & W., 399.

- 22 -
not the fault of Parliament.
1
It is true that the nature of the
railway business was imperfectly understood, so that large powers
were conceded to railway companies and conditions were imposed on
them which tended seriously to endanger the safety of the public
and to impair the inefficiency of the means of intercourse. But
the intention of Parliament not to give railway companies the com-
plete monopoly of this means of communication was, nevertheless,
evident, though made totally void by later developments. The ex-
tensive powers contained in their special acts of incorporation
were obtained under the impression that the interests of the pub-
lic were sufficiently secured by fixing maximum tolls and rates
and providing for free competition in the supply of locomotive
power and other means of conveyance. The change was made neces-
sary by the nature of railway business.
As the railway system extended and developed itself, im-
provements in its organization and economy reduced to a great ex-
tent the expenses of conveyance. The restrictions and limitations
as originally laid down by Parliament were thus repeatedly shown
to be useless.
2
With the railway companies developing very rap-
idly, first as owners and finally as exclusive carriers substitut-
ing and displacing most of the means of communication then in
existence, the whole country came to realize the importance of
railway transportation and became alarmed at its monopolistic
LSecond Report, Select Committee, 1846, P. Ill; First Report, Rail-
way Department, 1841, P. 1; Fourth Report, Railway Commission,
1851, P. XIX; Report, Royal Commission, 1867, V. 38 P. VII; Edin-
burgh Review, 1834, V. 60, PP. 94-125; Quarterly Review, 1844, V.
74, PP. 234-235.
2. Fourth Report, Railway Commission, 1851, P. XIX.
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character. 1 Railroads were no longer regarded as mere private
enterprises but as great public concerns forming a new but most
material factor in the development of national wealth. The main
avenues throughout the country, it was said, ceased to be the
property of the State and were handed over to the absolute posses-
2
sion of monopolists placed beyond the reach of rivalry or control.
England ceased to possess highways. 5 The country was intersected
by roads which no one could use except by the permission of and
on the conditions prescribed by their owners. England was con-
demned as the only country in the world whose legislature commit-
ted the singular imprudence of surrendering without available con-
ditions and for indefinite time its public communications into
private hands.
The conception in England as to the nature of public roads
intensified the contention. The roads of a country, it was said,
from the very nature of things are public concern. They are as
necessary to a people as the air they breathe. Man should have
access to each other for the supply of their respective wants
whether they live in towns or are scattered over the face of a
country. Common sense tells every one that the roads and streets
should be free from obstruction; that the country should never
divest itself in perpetuity of its right of property in its ordi-
nary highways; and that it should never part with the right to
control its highways. The designation of King's highways by which
1. Fifth Report, Select Committee, 1855, P. 81; Blackwood, 1857,
V. 41, P. 755.
2. Edinburgh Review, V. 69, 1859, P. 176.
5. Edinburgh Review, V. 84, 1846, P. 551.
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all the public roads were known indicates sufficiently the right
which the Crown possessed and exercised over them.
1
Such contentions were heard in Parliament itself. Mr. James
Morrison, in his speech2 before Parliament in 1856, stated that
the change which was going on and which was likely at no distant
period to transfer the chief public conveyances from King's High-
ways to a number of joint-stock railway companies, was a subject
which should demand the early, the deliberate, and the serious at-
tention of Parliament. The legislature saw with what rapid strides
the railway systems were advancing. They perceived how totally
inapplicable to the new mode of communication were all the laws
which regulated the old. Mr. Laing in his report
3 to the Board
of Trade in 1839 stated that "as regards the public the existence
of so many independent railway companies subject to no control
has been attended with considerable inconvenience, in addition
to the evil of high fares." Since railways were becoming by far
the most important of all the means of communication, the public
welfare demanded that railways should be well regulated. The
contention quickly spread and soon assumed national importance.
It turned out to be a question of public versus private interest,
national welfare versus vested rights. The bitter complaint of
the public was that the interests of the public had been too lit-
tle protected. The public feared greatly that railway companies
would dictate unbearable terms, such as exhorbitant charges and
1. Second Report, Select Committee on Railway Acts Enactments,
1846, P. Ill and IV.
2
. Han. 1856, XXXIII, P. 977.
3. Report of Railway Statistics, 1839. P. 17.
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refusing to carry this or that class of goods or passengers. No
doubt in early days railway companies catered chiefly for high
class traffic.
1
Railway companies on the other hand contended
that they were entitled to the fruits of their enterprise and to
the protection of their rights granted by Parliament. In the
early days, public interest was thought to be coincident with the
private interest of the railway companies. Evidence was brought
before the Select Committee of 1839 that the interests of the rail-
2
way companies and those of the public could never be at variance.
The desire for large returns does not prevent railway companies
from fostering new routes and from maintaining them against exist-
ing competition, from developing new ports and from promoting com-
petition between distant seats of trade or manufacture and the
various markets for their products.
It was soon found out, however, that private interest did not
coincide with public interest at all times and at all places. The
private interest of the railway companies would desire to shut
up all rival routes by land and by water, but it would be to the
public interest that they should be kept in order that the public
could obtain better service and lower charges. Public interest
would lead a man to go by the shortest and most convenient route
but the private interest of a railway company would send him
through the route where the company could make the most money
1. Cleveland-Stevens: English Railways, their Development and
their Relation to the State, P. 80.
2. Second Report, V. 90, P. 11; See also Report of Royal Commis-
sion, 1867, P. XLVII. mnnrt
3. Han. 1840, V. 55, P. 906; Second Report, Select Committee, 1859,
P. VII; Report, Royal Commission, 1867, P. XLVII; Rept., Joint
Committee, 1872, V. 13 P. XXX.

- 26 -
out of his trip. Private interest would aim at the maximum
amount of net revenue with little regard to public convenience,
while public interest would center on the maximum amount ®f ser-
vicability. In short, one might say that it was undoubtedly for
the advantage of the railway companies to satisfy the wishes and
supply the wants of the community, especially on those lines where
other means of communication yet existed and maintained a compe-
tition; but there were many cases in which the interests of the
railway companies and of the public were found to be opposed to
each other. It was because of this divergence of interest that
the public repeatedly urged, as we shall see in the following
chapters, a more restrictive legislation on railways.
The reason that public interests were not adequately protected
was partly due to the defective system of handling railway bills
in Parliament.
1
In Parliament there were no single committee or
authority into whose hands fell the bills proposing the incorpor-
ation of companies for railway construction. Such bills were re-
ferred to a special committee created for those special bills.
The committee would commence and terminate with those bills. Mem-
bers of the committee were usually chosen from those who had some
knowledge of the bills or had some interest in the proposals.
The conditions in the particular locality, as affecting the need
for the proposed line, would be carefully investigated; but the
1. Second Report, Select Committee, 1846, P. XVII; Report Royal
Commission, 1867, P. VIII? IX. Cleveland-Stevens: English Rail-
ways, their Development and their Relation to the State, P. 316.

- 27 -
interests of the public from the point of view of the nation were
insufficiently represented. Between the committees of the differ-
ent years there was absolutely no connection. What was the policy
of former committees, no later committee could know. Each project
was considered on its own merits and sanctioned by a special act
which contained the entire statutory law applicable to the under-
taking. Uniformity in railway legislation was thus impossible.
A greater emphasis was unconsciously laid on the local and private
than on the national interest. Important questions of principles
had been treated very slightly and superficially. The lack of a
central supervising body for these bills was specially conspicu-
ous.
1
This system of Private Bill legislation
2 on railway bills
was an inheritance from canal legislation. No special system for
railway legislation was adopted in Parliament. Parliament simply
transferred without any variation the system applicable to canals
to the railways. 3 In 1856 a Select Committee was appointed "to
consider the Standing Orders
4 for railroad bills and the con-
ditions which it may be advisable to recommend for introduction
into such bills, with a view to future session of Parliament."
It was proposed to have the railway bills first under some gen-
1. Han., 1844, LXXII, P. 286; Fifth Report, Select Committee,
1844, P. VI.
2. For the history of Private Bill Legislation, see Clifford:
History of Private Bill Legislation, Ch. 1, PP. 267-287.
3. Report, Select Committee on Railway Bills, 1836, P. III.
4. . Standing Orders are rules and forms for the regulation of pub-
lic business and debate, as well as of proceedings relating to
private bills; see Clifford: History of Private Bill of Legisla-
tion, V. 2, Ch. XX; and Black's Law Dictionary, P. 1119.
5. Report, Select Committee onRailway Bills, 1836, P. 1.
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eral survey either by a Committee or the Ordinance Department;
but the Committee stated that a close examination of the proposal
convinced them that such an attempt would be i( productive in Great
Britain at least of no practical good."
1 As to the practice of
appointing Committees by list, adding to such list members serv-
ing for the counties through which the railway was proposed to
run, the Committee did not recommend any change. It stated that
it appeared decidedly best to permit railways, in Great Britain,
like all other undertakings, to be decided upon according to the
judgment and interest of those who were willing to embark their
capital in them. This system of Private Bill legislation contin-
ued in effect, although its evils were exposed at various times.
The Select Committee of 1844 recommended that the railway bills
should be submitted to some public authority, for the Parliament-
2
ary Committees were very imperfect tribunals in such matters.
The Select Committee, of 1853 stated in the Fifth Report that the
mode in which railway bills were dealt with in the House of Com-
mons should be revised with the view of securing, by the insti-
tution of a committee of a more permanent character, a compre-
hensive review of all schemes submitted to Parliament in every
i> 4
session. Parliament never gave effect to these recommendations,
in fact, it was already too late in 1844 and 1853, for anomaly
already prevailed in other respects and it was no longer simply
! Report, -Select Committee on Railway Bills, 1836, P. IV.
2. First Report, Select Committee, 1844, P. VI.
3. Fifth Report, Select Committee, 1853, P. 12.
4. See also Third Report, Select Committee, 1840, P. 4; Second
Report, Select Committee on Railway Acts Enactment, 1846, PP.
XVI I -XIX: Railway Times, 1839, P. 411.
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a question of changing the system of Private Bill legislation.
Returning no?/ to the consideration of the evolution of gen-
eral railway practice, we have seen that the railway companies
first acted as owners of lines, then as suppliers of locomotive
power, then as competitive carriers and finally as exclusive car-
riers. By about the year 1850 there was no longer any such thing
as a railway company conveying without carrying. The new system
of exclusive carrying by the railway companies prevailed every-
where.
1
Moreover, the railway companies had not only by this time
succeeding in ousting the outside carriers from their lines, but
they had also to a great extent succeeded in getting the carting
2
business of the former independent carriers into their own hands
•
For the purpose of distributing the goods, railway companies built
stations for the receipt and for the dispatch of goods. For these
the tolls of the railway proper were obviously inadequate and con-
sequently the companies demanded from the shippers additional pay-
ments, a practice which proved to be a bone of contention for a
3long time.
We are now in a position to understand the development of the
1. Sowerly v. Great Northern Railway, 7 Railway and Canal Traffic
Cases, 165-176.
2. Baxendale v. Great Ytestern Railway, 1 Railway & Canal Traffic
Cases, P. 202.
Sowerly v. Great Northern Railway, 7 Railway & Canal Traffic
Cases, P. 165.
3. In the Sowerly case, it was argued that "if Messrs, Pickford
or Messrs. Chaplin and Home did it in times gone by, and the rail-
way companies have succeeded to the business, why are not they who
are now performing the same duties that Pickford and Chaplin and
Horne performed, entitled to make the gains or profits that those
firms made when those firms were carrying it on as an independent
business of their own."
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English railway rate. For each distinct service
1 performed, the
railway company was entitled to receive compensation. For provid-
ing the roadway the railway companies received road toll, for sup-
plying the locomotive power, locomotive toll, and for acting as
conveyors, a reasonable conveyance charge. The road tolls were
fixed sums specified in the special acts from the very beginning
and the other two charges were also at a later date, fixed in
amount. When conveyance by the railway companies had become the
usual mode, the three charges were usually combined and limited
by Parliament in the maximum rate clauses^ to something less than
the aggregate of the three. In addition to the rates for convey-
ance, the railway company might charge under certain circumstances
stations, sidings, etc. When railway companies become exclusive
.carriers, they performed, as we have said, not only the carrying
business proper but also some other work belonging to the function
of the former carriers, such services as loading, unloading, col-
1. The carriage of goods by English railways, it must be remem-
bered, includes the following elements:
1. Collection of goods and bringing them to the terminus of
the railway.
2. Porterage in loading, packing, etc.
5. Use of the railway, locomotive power and wagons.
4. Insurance against railway risk.
5. Porterage in unloading, etc.
6. Distribution and forwarding of goods.
7. General insurance to the customers against carriers risk.
That the third and the fourth of these items belong exclusively
to the province of the railway companies is admotted on all hands,
but it is the subject of a great deal of controversy whether the
companies should undertake the other items, or leave them to other
carriers, especially as regards goods which have to be forwarded
beyond the terminus of the railway: Statistics of British Railways
1859, P. 22.
2. See next Chapter.
I
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lecting, delivering, etc. The charges for this latter group of
services were not fixed by Parliament. The railway companies in-
herited from the carriers of the time performing the carrying busi-
ness the practice of making such charges. The right of making
such charges was contested for a long time and it was only settled
after the passing of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888.
1
With the increase of traffic and the improvement in manage-
ment and in economy of working, the public naturally expected that
p
railway charges would be greatly reduced." As railway companies
were benefitted by the evolutionary changes of their business, pub-
lic interest would need better protection. But as railway rates
were not much reduced and the great power of railway companies
were not curtailed, the agitation against railway companies had
its start and began to spread very rapidly. The complaint of high
railway charges was universal. The rate of charges on English
railways was said to be practically unlimited. Railway companies
were in every instance left at liberty to charge as high a rate
on every part of their traffic as they had ever thought, or were
ever likely to think, for their own advantage. The consequence
was that on all the English railways except a very small number
of lines placed under peculiar circumstances the charges were much
1. See also Hall v. London, Brighton and South Coast Railway
company, 5 Railway & Canal Traffic Cases, 28; Sowerly v. Great
Northern Railway, 7 Railway & Canal Traffic Cases, 161.
2. It was said that their rates for cattle and sheep at 1846 were
only one-third of those with which they started. Second Report,
1846, P. XX.
3. Quarterly Review, 1844, V. 74, PP. 255-270; Edinburgh Review,
1846 V. 84, P. 55; Railway Reform: Its Expedience and Practicabil-
ity considered, P. 12, 60.
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higher than the French maximum rates.
1 Railway companies by fixing
their charges for cattle and sheep too high were said to deprive
the public of the benefit of the conveyance of these animals by
railways. In Parliament Mr. Morrison said that if any improve-
ment took place which tended to lower the cost or to accelerate
the speed of public conveyances, the public immediately had the
full benefit of it; but in the case of railways, no security was
taken that the public should have the benefit of any improvement
of railways.
2 England, it was said, on account of the high charges
of her railways was pladed at a great disadvantage in comparison
with other European nations. The disadvantage was estimated to be
equal to a tax of from 80 to 100 per cent on the upper and lower
3
classes in the case of passenger traffic.
We have endeavored to show in the preceding pages what was
the conception of the early railways and what effects it had on
the English system of making charges. Although the practice of
shippers running their own trains fell early into disuse, the
theory of open use was preserved in all the early railway acts
and in a greater part of the modern railway legislation. The
4
privilege was preserved in the Railway Clauses Act of 1845. The
theory of railway law was and is that a railway is open to any
person who chooses to travel upon it with his engine and carriages,
1. Morrison: Defects, P. 14; Third Report, 1840, P. 4; Second
Report, Select Committee on Railway Acts Enactments, 1846, P.
XX
2. *Han. 1836, XXXIII, P. 977.
3. Morrison: Defects, P. 15.
4. See Chapter V.
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paying the toll which Parliament sanctioned to he taken.
1 Indeed,
one may say that the later regulation of railways in England still
centers, as in the early days, on the one object of making rail-
ways the true Public Highways. How far England succeeded can be
seen in the following chapters.
1. Han, 1854, V. 132, P. 588.
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Chapter III - Maximum Rate Clauses.
Railway companies in England were incorporated as other joint
stock companies by a Special Act of Parliament. Railway companies
went to ask Parliament for certain rights and powers. Parliament
on behalf of the public would lay down certain limitations and
restrictions. These rights and powers with their limitations and
restrictions would be enumerated and embodied in a special act.
As railway enterprise was regarded in those early days as more of
a private nature than of a public concern, the special acts were
grouped as private, under the "Personal and Local Acts."
1 For
any addition of power or any desired modifications of the powers
already granted, a new special act had to be obtained from Parlia-
ment and Parliament might, and usually did, take the opportunity
to revise or to add new limitations and restrictions. As differ-
ent circumstances were to justify differences in treatment, these
special acts were all more or less different. Each railway
company was thus regulated by its own special act or acts and
its special act or acts comprised all the statutory laws applic-
able thereto. From 1800 to 1840 no general railway act applic-
1. The titles of the divisions of the statutes were frequently
changed. In 1760 there were two divisions - Public Statutes and
Private Statutes; in 1798, three divisions - Public General Acts,
Local Personal Acts declared public and to be judiciously noticed,
and Private Acts; in 1816, four divisions - Public General Acts,
Local and Personal Acts declared public and to be judiciously
noticed, Private Acts printed by King's printer, and Private Acts,
not printed; under the head of "Local and Personal Acts" down to
the year 1868 were placed quasi-public Acts. Since 1868 the di-
vision was named "Local and Private Acts" - Journal of Royal Sta-
tistical Society, 1854, V. 17, P. 156; Clifford: History of Pri-
vate Bill Legislation, V. 1, PP. 267-268.
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able to all railways of the country had been passed by Parliament;
special railway acts reigned supreme in this period.
1
As the growth of the English Railway system was very rapid,
the special acts granted by Parliament for the construction of the
railways soon increased to an enormous number. According to the
report of the Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, there were from
1801 to 1867 about 1800 special railway acts and about 1,300 more
special railway acts modifying the provisions of the original
acts.
2 The Joint Select Committee of 1872 stated that there must
have been more than 5,000 in number up to that year. Mr. Pars-
loe
4
estimated these acts for the 6 years between 1872 and 1878
at between 400 and 500, so that from 1801 to 1880 there must have
been more than 5,500 special railway acts. How many or what per-
centage of the special railway acts belonged properly to the
period we are discussing, from 1801 to 1854, it is hard to say;
but as almost all of the trunk lines and the important network in
England were already built and opened to traffic before the end
of the period, it is safe to assume that the greater number of
those special railway acts must belong to this period. One
railway company was usually regulated by more than one act and
1. After 1840 special railway acts were still more or less in
force. The Regulation of Railway Act, 1840 and 1842 had no re-
lation to rate regulation. The periodic revision of rates contain
ed in the Act of 1844 and the Equality Clause in the Railway
Clauses Act, 1845, were inoperative; the period really extends
to 1854. The maximum rate clauses in the special acts were con-
tinuously in force till the year 1891-92 when the revision took
]pl & CQ • •
2. Report, 1867, Pt. 2, P. XXX.
3. Report, 1872, V. 15, P. XXXIX.
4. Parsloe: Our Railways, P. 254.
5. Jackman: Transportation in Modern England, Chapter VII; Lewin:
The British Railway System, Introduction.
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the regulation was thus complicated. If any single railway com-
pany of importance be taken, it will be found that there was no
general act or any one special act applicable for all purposes to
the whole system. The fact was that one special act would refer
to a few miles here and another act to a few miles there; then
one act would repeal certain provisions and another would modify
certain rights of some previous act or acts. This was made neces-
sary in the natural development of the early railway business, as
the original incorporations were purely local enterprises and the
lines constructed were extremely short. Not only the enormous
number of these special acts increased the difficulty of the regu-
lation, but their diverse provisions made uniform regulation al-
most impossible. The special clauses had gradually increased from
95 in the special act of Surrey Iron Railway, passed in 1801 to
581 in the act for the Lancaster and Carlisle Railway passed in
1844.
1 The provisions in the special railway acts had year by
year become more complicated and conflicting. Even as late as
p
1846, this evil was not wholly remedied. Of all the special
acts passed in 1846 in no less than 27 of them was the prescribed
number of directors and the number actually named in them at
variance. In six of these the number of the directors named was
greater than the prescribed number. In the Cork, Blackrock and
Passage Railway Act, the prescribed number of directors was
1. Report of the Royal Commission, 1867, P. XII.
2. See the Abstract of the Special Acts authorized in the Session
of 1846 as analyzed by Messrs. Bigg and Sons.
Herapath's Railway Journal, 1847, P. 1119.
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twelve, while the number named was twenty.
Among the powers granted by the special acts to the railway
companies, the right of making and collecting tolls and charges
to a certain maximum amount was always specified. Their restric-
tions were usually in the form of limiting them to a certain maxi-
mum amount of charges. The system of limiting charges to a certain
maximum amount was a development of the old common law applicable
to the trade of common carriers. The common law required that a
common carrier must carry for a reasonable charge, although he
was not bound to charge his customers alike. The obligation to
charge a reasonable sum was the basis upon which the system of
maximum rates were built up. Canal companies and turnpike compan-
ies were all common carriers and subject to the common law. When
railways came, it was thought that railway companies would do the
same kind of business and in the same manner as that of the canal
companies or the turnpike companies. So the same kind of law and
legislation which was applied to the canal companies and turnpike
companies was made applicable to the railway companies. The
early special railway acts were based upon the canal and turn-
pike acts and they reproduced, clause after clause, with little
modification, the phraseology long common to both.
1 Railway com-
panies were authorized to make and collect charges in the form
of road tolls within the maximum amount allowed. The following
illustrations show the similarity between the canal tolls and rail-
way tolls:
1. Report of Royal Commission, 1867, V. 38, Pt. 1, P. VIII.
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Canal tolls - Croyden Canal Act, 1801.
1 Per ton
per mile
"Timber, stone, coal, bricks, tiles and all other
goods and commodities, except as here-in-after mentioned 3d.
"Dung, chalk, marl, clay, lime, compost and other
manure
Railway tolls - No. \ Croyden, Mersthorn and Godstone
Railway Act, 1805.
"Dung
l-l/2d.
2d.
"Limestone, chalk, lime, and all other manure (except
dung) clay, breeze, ashes, sand and bricks. 3d.
"Timber, copper, tin, lead, iron, stone, flints, coal,
charcoal, coke, culm, fuller's earth, corn and seeds,
flour, malt and potatoes. 4d.
"All other goods, wares and merchandise. 6d.
No. 2, Stockton and Darlington Railway Act, 1823.
"Limestone, materials for the repair of turnpike roads
or highways and all dung, compost and all sorts of manure
except lime 4d.
"Coal, coke, culm, cinders, stone, marl, sand, lime, clay,
iron, stone and other minerals, building stone, pitching
and paving stone, bricks, tiles, slates and all gross and
unmanufactured articles and building materials. 4d.
"Lead in pigs or sheets, bar-iron, wagon-tire, timber,
stoves and deals, and all other goods, wares and merch-
andise. 6d«
The maxima which were prescribed for the early railway com-
panies, though varied in amount, followed practically the same
schedule as those of the canal companies. Classification of
goods was also more or less similar. This system of limiting
railway tolls to maxima was thus based on the fundamental con-
1. See also Priestley: Inland Navigation and Roads under the
name of the canal or railway.
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ception that railways were the same in nature as canals and turn-
pikes. As railway business developed, railway companies became,
as we have seen, not only owners of their lines, but also common
carriers on their own roads as well as general carriers for all
traffic, and maximum tolls naturally evolved into maximum rates.
The railway toll was of three component parts - road toll, loco-
motive toll and a reasonable charge for conveyance. Road toll
was from the beginning limited by a maximum sum. Locomotive toll
was not thus limited at its beginning; it was first limited only
as a reasonable sum. The evolution of the railway charges from
the maximum road toll to the maximum rates shows three stages of
legislation. When the special acts are classified according to
the manner in which railway charges were regulated, they fall into
the following three groups:
1. Acts without maximum tolls
1
or maximum rates. The South
Eastern Railway Act of 1856 is a type of this class. It author-
ized the railway companies to charge a reasonable sum for loco-
motive power and wagons in addition to the tolls for the use of
the line.
2. Acts with maximum tolls, but without maximum rates. The
Newport and Pontypool Railway Act, 1845, is a type of this class.
In Section 104 it enacted "that it shall be lawful for the com-
1. Toll is here used to mean a charge for the use of specific
property, as applied to roads, bridges and canals, specially fixed
by custom or by statute. This is the original meaning of the word
"toll" but later the word "toll" is used interchangeably with the
words "rate" or "charge." With this distinction kept in mind, the
early legislation on railway charges will be clearer. See Hunt-
er's Railway Rates, P. 50 and Railway Clauses Act, 1845, section 5.
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pany to demand any tolls for the use of the railway not exceeding
the following, that is to say:
,: In section 134 it further enacted
"that the companies may demand for the use of steam engines or
other moving power, when provided "by them for propelling carriages,
whether on their own railways or on any other railway, any tolls
not exceeding the following; that is to say— "These maximum tolls
were not combined and no maximum charges were fixed for convey-
ance,
3. Acts with maximum rates as well as maximum tolls.
The difference between a maximum toll clause and a maximum rate
clause is that the maximum rate clause specifies a total sum to
cover the several tolls, usually three: road toll, locomotive
toll and a reasonable charge for conveyance for the use of railway
engines and wagons and in addition "every expense incidental to
the conveyance? in other words, combined the tolls and total con-
veyance charges. The maximum rate clauses were generally intro-
duced about 1845, when railway companies were already becoming
themselves exclusive carriers. The maximum toll clauses were en-
acted for the benefit of other independent carriers than railway
companies themselves. The best illustration of this type is the
Great Northern Railway Act, 1850.
1
It authorized the companies
by section 12 "to demand and receive, in respect of the use of
their respective undertakings, any rates, tolls, and charges not
exceeding the rates, tolls and charges following: that is to say
"In section 13 it stated that the said companies may lawfully
demand and receive as their maximum rate of charge for the con-
1. 13 and 14 Vict. C. LXI.
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veyance thereof along their railways, including the tolls for the
use of the railways and wagons or trucks and locomotive power,
and every expense incidental to such conveyance, except a reason-
able sum for loading, covering, and unloading, and for delivery
and collection, and any other services incidental to the business
or duty of a carrier, where such services or any of them are or
is performed by the said company and except a reasonable sum for
warehousing and wharfage, or for any extraordinary services per-
formed by the said company (in respect of which the said company
may make a reasonable extra charge), any rates or sums not ex-
ceeding the rate or sums following: that is to say
"
It is not possible to divide the period according to the
three stages of legislation. But generally speaking, about four-
fifths of the special railway acts which were passed between 1800
and 1840 were framed without maximum toll clauses. The tolls for
the use of the roadway were limited but they were very high. Rail
way companies were empowered to add a reasonable charge for wag-
ons and locomotive power. From 1840 to 1844 was the transition
period and the practice was less uniform. After 1844, maximum
r
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rate clauses were always added.
1
It seems the Liverpool and Man-
chester Railway Act formed probably an exception.
2 Maximum road
toll was specified. "For all limestone, any sum not exceeding
one penny per ton per mile, etc.
11 In addition, maximum charges
for conveyance when done by the railway companies were also speci-
fied.
"For all lime, limestone, and all sorts of dung, compost
and manure and all materials for the repair of public roads
and all stone, sand, clay, building, pitching and paving
stones, tiles and slates and also for all timber, staves,
and deals, not exceeding eight shillings per ton, etc."
A further provision was introduced that if the dividend should ex-
1. The following table will illustrate the diverse practice:
Acts of iMaximum Toll
type 1823 Clauses with
Year 1840"Rea-, or without
sonable short dist-
tolls" ance termi-
al Clause
Maximum Rate
Clause. No
Terminal,
Neither
loading nor
covering
Maximum Maximum Rate
Rate Clause Clause. "Ser-
Loading, un-vices inci-
loading and dental to
covering duty or busi-
only ness of a
carrier"
1840 1 2
1841 1
1842 1 4
1843 1
1
3
1844 4 21
1845 16 14 60
1846 32 121 18
1847 6 24 8
1848 -
I
6 2
1849 1
f. I.I I.I III! •
2 3
1. Hunter: Railway Rates, P. 40.
2. Liverpool and Manchester Railway Act, (7 Geo. IV, C. 49)
Sections 134, 136 and 138.
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ceed 10 per cent, an abatement should be made from the maximum
tonnage rates of 5 per cent on the amount thereof for each one
percent which the company might divide over and above a dividend
of ten per cent on its capital."*"
The above illustration shows that Parliament did not maintain
a definite and, uniform method in the regulation of railway charges.
But in the majority of the special acts there were two sets of
maximum charges to suit the different systems of carriage and to
comply with the theory that a railway was open to all just as a
canal. The first was the maximum tolls and the second maximum
rates. Railway companies were allowed to make and collect charges
within the maximum toll, when the carrying was done by independent
carriers other than the railway companies. Where a railway com-
pany performed also the carrying, the charges should be within the
maximum rates. Prior to the revision of the schedules of the
maximum rates in 1891-92, railway companies had full control of
the rates charged by them (apart from questions of undue prefer-
ence and the like) so long as they did not permit their charges
to exceed the Parliamentary maxima inserted in their special acts.
No Court could interfere with the rates actually charged so long
as they were below these maxima.
The maximum tolls allowed may be gathered from the following
example:
Specimen Maximum tolls - London and Birmingham Railway Act, 1837.
"Dung, compost, manure, lime, limestone, salt and material
for the repair of roads
Id per ton per mile.
1. Report of the Royal Commission, 1867, V. 58, Pt. 1, P. VIII.
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Coals, coke, culm, charcoal, cinders, building, pitching and
paving stones, bricks, tiles, slates, clay, sand, ironstone,
iron ore, wrought iron and castings.
l-l/2d per ton per mile.
Sugar, grain, corn, flour, dye woods, earthenware, timber,
staves and deals, metals, etc.
2d per ton per mile.
Cotton and other wools, hides, drugs, manufactured goods,
and all other ware and merchandise
3d per ton per mile.
It would be an almost endless task to trace out and to com-
pare the maximum rates and the classifications in all the special
acts. Fortunately this is not necessary. A general idea can be
obtained from a few illustrations. The wording of the maximum
rate clauses is more or less similar to that of section 13 of the
Great Northern Railway Act, 1850, quoted before. An important
variation in these clauses of different railway companies is that
some clauses will make special mention of terminal charges and
charges "incidental to conveyance" and some not. An idea of the
maximum rate allowed may be gathered from the following example:
Specimen Maximum Rates - London and North Western Railway
Company's Amalgamation Act, 1846.
Dung, compost and all sorts of manure, lime, limestone and un-
dressed materials for the repair of public roads, charcoal, stone
for building, pitching and paving bricks, tiles, slates, clay,
sand, iron ore, ironstone.
1. 9 and 10 Vict. C. 204.
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Up to 50 miles 1-1/2 d per ton per mile
Beyond 50 miles 1-1/8 d per ton per mile
Iron not damageable
Up to 50 miles 1-1/4 d per ton per mile
Beyond 50 miles 1 d per ton per mile
Damageable iron, sheet iron, hoop iron and all other similar de-
scriptions of wrought iron
Up to 50 miles 2 d per ton per mile
Beyond 50 miles 1-1/2 d per ton per mile
Sugar, grain, corn, flour, hides, dyewoods, Manchester packs,
earthen ware, timber, staves, deals, metals, hardware in packages
or cases, nails, anvils, vices and chains
Up to 50 miles 2-1/2 d per ton per mile
Beyond 50 miles 2 d per ton per mile
Cotton and other wools and manufactured goods
Up to 50 miles 3 d per ton per mile
Beyond 50 miles 2-1/2 d per ton per mile
Pish, feathers, canes, cochineal, furniture, hats, shoes, toys,
and all other articles, matters and things
Up to 50 miles 5-1/2 d per ton per mile
Beyond 50 miles 3 d per ton per mile
The following table1 will give some idea of the maximum rates
authorized in the principal acts of the several companies named.
1. Report, Royal Commission on railways, 1867, P. LXX. For further
illustration r ee PP. XII-XIV of the same report. Sections 504-315
of the Lancaster and Carlisle Railway Act, were given "to afforu
some idea of the manner in which the tolls and charges were regu-
lated by private Acts at that time."
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Articles
London &
South
Western
Great
East-
ern
Great
West-
ern
Great
North-
ern
London &
North-
ern
Midland
d d d d d d
Dung, Lime, Bricks
Coal, Pigiron,
Iron Ore 1
1-1/8
to l|
7/8
to 2
f toli
7/8 to
1 t© 2
Sugar, Corn,
Earthenware Tim-
ber, Iron Cast-
ings, Iron 3
2 to
2k
2 to
3
If to
e*
i* to
2i 2 to 2|
Cotton, Wools,
Dungs, Manufac-
tured Goods •zo
2 to 2i to
A
2i to
3
2-| to
5
3 to 4
Pish, Feathers,
Furniture, Cloth-
ing, Silk 5 4
3 to
4
3 to
3i
3 to
3* 3 to 4
The classification of goods in the special acts usually com-
prised four or five groups. The goods classified and enumerated
were between forty and sixty. All other articles were charge-
able as "other articles, matters or things", in the highest class.
In classifying goods no special distinction was given to articles
on such matters as the method of packing or average size of con-
signment. No uniform classification was made applicable to all
the railways; almost every railway company had its separate classi
fication.
The maximum rate clauses were, therefore, of a very imperfect
character. The scale of maximum rates was by no means uniform
and indeed no uniformity was sought. There was not only great
diversity in the amount of tolls for the use of the line and in
the charges for services when railway companies became exclusive
carriers, but also an imperfect enumeration of articles and often
1. Report, Select Committee, 1882, V. 13, P. VII.
-
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incomplete classification of merchandise traffic. In those early
days the maximum rate clauses represented all of the law for the
control of the actual charges of railway companies. The intention
of Parliament in enacting the maximum rate clauses was to protect
the public from exorbitant charges. When a railway company ex-
ceeded its power and made a higher charge than the maximum allowed,
Its right could be questioned. But this protection for the public
against exorbitant charges was nominal and ineffective. It was
not hard for a railway company to comply with the Parliamentary
restriction of making the charges within the maxima. There were
many reasons but we shall examine here only a few which will show
how the regulation of railway rates through maximum rate clauses
failed.
In the first place the maximum rates thus fixed by Parlia-
ment in the special acts were found in all cases above and in
some cases greatly above what ought to have been charged. In fix-
ing the maxima, Parliament followed the prevailing charges made
by canals and turnpikes. Parliament had yet no idea that rail-
ways with new motive power could afford to carry much cheaper.
It did not take into consideration or make allowance for the pos-
sible improvements in railway equipment and machinery, in the
technical and economic administration of the system, nor for the
development and increase of traffic, the growth of population and
like factors that work towards the reduction of the cost of pro-
duction. The maxima appeared too high, in the lapse of time,
and they became useless and ineffective for the purpose for which
they were fixed. The railway companies found that it was not to
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their own interest to charge such high rates as allowed by the
Parliamentary maxima; they voluntarily made their charges far be-
low the maximum rates. The purpose of fixing these maximum rates
was to serve as a check to the possible exorbitant charges of
railway companies but, as they were fixed too high, it could not
be of any use.
In the second place there was the greatest diversity in t he
scale of charges. The mode of charging was different on differ-
ent railways. No two railway companies had the same scale of
charges. The public had no easy means of finding out an exorbi-
tant charge, even when they were so charged. The railway com-
panies could easily conceal it and the public could not find out
what should be the charge. Mr. Bigg, while compiling the special
railway acts of 1846, collected what might be called the maximum
and minimum maxima charges fixed and allowed by Parliament. These
charges show admirably the diversities in the scale of maximum
rates allowed.
1
Animals, per mile Lowest Maximum Highest Maximum
d d
Horses 3 6
Cattle 1 5
Calves and pigs 0-1/4 1-3/4
Sheep 0-1/4 1-3/4
Carriages, per mile 2 9
1. Herapath's Railway Journal, 1948, P. 641.
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Goods per ton per mile
Manure
Coal
Corn
Cotton and general
Merchandise
Passengers per mile
First class
Second class
Third class
Lowest Maximum
d
1
0-3/4
1-1/4
Highest Maximum
d
3
5
7
Lowest Maximum
d
2
Highest Maximum
d
6
1-1/2 4
1 2
These diversities were all contained in the special acts passed
in the year 1846. Mr. Biggs
1
remarks, "had these charges been
made at widely different intervals as in the beginning of railways,
there would be some excuse; but they are all acts of one time, of
last Session and therefore shut out all excuse for inequality of
experience."
In the third place, the classification of merchandise traffic
were incomplete and full of diversities. No uniformity in classi-
fication or rating was observable either as between the acts of
different companies or among the various special acts of the same
company. 2 Almost every railway company levied rates under special
acts applicable to different portions of its system and in some
cases reference must be had to more than fifty acts to determine
1. Herapath's Railway Journal, 1848, P. 642.
2. Parliamentary Papers, 1881, Vol. L.XXXI (134) Return of Maxi
mum Rates of Charges.

- 50 -
the various rates the company was authorized to charge.
1
Coal
was classified lowest in one of the three Midland Railway acts
with a maximum toll of one penny per ton per mile, but in another
act in a different class with a maximum toll of three half-pence
per ton per mile. Grain was classified in one of the acts next
to the lowest class with the maximum toll of three half-pence
but in the other two acts, it was placed one class higher with a
maximum toll of two pence. In one of the thirteen Great Western
Railway Acts rod and pig iron and iron ore were classified in one
class with a maximum toll of half penny per ton per mile but in
another with the toll at three half pence per ton per mile. Grain
was placed in one of the acts next to the lowest class with a maxi-
mum toll of one penny; in another one class higher with a maximum
toll of two pence, and in a third act with the toll at two pence
three farthings per ton per mile. In the Midland Railway Acts
there were generally four classes for merchandise and minerals;
in the London and South Western Railway Acts, three; North Eastern
Railway Acts, five, and Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Acts,
eight. But the Acts of the Newport, Abergavenney and Hereford
Railway on the Great Western Railway system and the Cannock Chase
Railway on the London and North Western Railway system gave only
two classes. In one of the thirteen Great Western Railway Acts,
goods were divided into eight or nine classes but in others only
four or five classes. Of the five London and North Western Rail-
way Acts, some had eight and some three or four classes; of the
Great Eastern and Great Northern Railway Acts some five and some
1. Report, Select Committee, 1882, V. 15, P. VII.
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four classes. The same diversity in classification was true of
the classification of animals and live stock. Generally there
were four classes but it is not uncommon to find only three
classes. The maximum rates- as given in each class were by no
means uniform. For instance, the maximum rates allowed per horse,
mule, ass, etc. per mile varied from 3 d to 6 d and for grain,
flour, sugar, etc. per ton per mile varied from 5 d to 6 d and
from 2 d to 7 d respectively on the London and North Western Rail-
way System.
In the fourth place no important railway company was governed
by one special act and one set of maximum rates. The maximum toll
and maximum rate clauses were scattered through the numerous
special acts obtained by each company. When such railway com-
panies consolidated, or combined with, or were leased to, another
railway company, the special act of each railway company was still
in force. The Midland Railway Company had its power of levying
tolls scattered over three acts; the London and North Western
Railway Company, five Acts; the Great Eastern Railway Company,
five; the Great Northern Railway Company, nine; and the Great
Western Railway Company, thirteen.
1
According to the "Return of the Maximum Rates of Charges v/hich
the railway companies of the United Kingdom were authorized to
make for the conveyance of passengers, animals and goods, etc.
on railways," 2 the Midland Railway Company possessed its power
under 68 different acts; the London and North Western Railway
1. Report of the Royal Commission, 1867, PP. XXVIII-XXXII.
2. Parliamentary papers, 1881, Vol. LXXXI (134). See under the
name of each railway company.
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Company under 109 Acts; and the Great Eastern Railway Company
under 100 Acts. Take any railway company in the Return and it will
be found that a railway company was governed in its maximum rates
by at least a dozen special acts. Under such conditions a railway
company could easily evade any detection of having charged illegal
rates. The situation was complicated to such an extent that it
was absolutely impossible for an ordinary shipper to ascertain
why he should pay this amount for his goods, The multiplicity of
special acts dealing with rates or charges on the same railway
system was of a great evil.
1
Only in a very few cases did Parlia-
ment try to bring all the powers as to rates and tolls into the
amalgamation act, as in the case of Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail-
way. In nearly all cases when railway companies sought amalga-
mation or combination maximum rate clauses were either left as
they were before in their separate special acts, or were greatly
modified as embodied in the amalgamation act, without repealing
the previous ones. Parliament sometimes took opportunity to in-
sert a clause forbidding any alteration of what the railway com-
2
pany were authorized by their acts to demand from the public.
In general one finds that after amalgamation maximum rate clauses
pertaining to the power of making charges became much more com-
plicated instead of being made simpler.
Besides the complications shown above, many other technical
distinctions made the rate situation still worse. These distinc-
tions arose not from the complications in the maximum rate clauses
1. Report, Select Committee, 1882, Vol. 13, P. XV.
2. Report, Board of Trade on Railway and Canal Bills, 1860 (176).
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but from the actual practice of making railway charges. They in-
creased, however, the ineffectiveness of the maximum rate regu-
lation just the same. There were rates which would vary according
to the arrangements made by the company with every other company
over whose lines the goods would be carried. These were the equal
mileage rates when the principle of equal mileage was adopted.
There were again the special rates charged in the more numerous
cases where sea or other competition induced the railway company
to charge lower rates. There were also a class of special rates
still less reducible to principles or rules capable of general
statement where the company in consideration of quantity, regu-
larity or constant custom or for other reasons, made specially
favorable bargains with particular shippers. In addition to all
these, there were the last but not the least complicated questions
of charges for terminals and for services incidental to convey-
ance, of rebates and of private sidings. These questions were
left almost entirely to the discretion of the railway company.
As a consequence of all these complications, the rates actually
charged in the case of all the great railway companies were num-
bered by millions. And they were constantly varying with the
varying circumstances of railway trade policy.
1
The previous analysis of how the regulation of railway rates
through maximum rate clauses failed must not be understood to
mean that the system of railway rates should be based on a uniform
or tapering ton-mile charge. The regulation through maximum rate
clause was incomplete. It did not cover all the systems of mak-
1- Report, Joint Committee, 1872, P. XXXVIII.
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ing railway charges. Schedule of maximum rates and classification
of merchandise traffic were too crude. They differed so much from
one to another of the various railway companies that the purpose
of their enactment was entirely defeated. The reasons for the
failure of the maximum rates were two, as we have said. The first
was that the scales were so complicated that the shipper had no
way to know what amount he should be charged, and the second was
that the scale was so high that the railway companies could make
out whatever amount they desired.
Although the maximum rate regulation was a total failure and
the cry for stricter legislation was heard everywhere, yet Parlia-
ment failed to revise the classification of merchandise traffic
and the schedule of maximum rates till the passing of the Railway
and Canal Traffic Act in 1888. Railways in the meantime had full
control of these rates till the passage of the new classifications
and schedules in 1891-92.
It may be asked why Parliament did not revise the schedules
of maximum rates and classifications of merchandise traffic much
earlier. Among the various reasons which may be assigned, the
chief and the most important was certainly the respect for the
rights of private property. In the reports of the Select Committee
and during the debates before the House the rights of private
property were never disregarded. Arguments on this basis natur-
ally had much more effect on the hearers in the early days of
railway existence as the experiences of those pioneers were still
fresh in their minds. No doubt this was the chief reason for the
absence of a restrictive legislation in those early days. Every-
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body knew that railways fought for their own existence without any
assistance from their government. The railway system had its ori-
gin in the enterprise of individuals in the several localities;
these efforts were not fostered by the legislature as projects of
national concern, but were treated as projects undertaken for the
private profit of promoters, which might be sanctioned for the
public advantage. 1 In other countries like Belgium and France,
the government had a hand in the building up of almost every line;
hence government interference to some extent at least might be
justifiable on this ground, but in England it was different.
Where the railway company assumed from the very first the risks
and adventures of a new industry, it should also be entitled to
all the later profits. The first adventurers in the great lines
which were unfertaken before the practicability and profitable-
ness of railways were established should be entitled to large prof-
its as the legitimate rewards of their enterprise and sagacity.
2
Mr. Muntz
5 in the course of a short conversation which took place
4
on the third reading of Lord Seymour 1 s Bill in the House of
Commons, said that he could not forget that a very short time
had elapsed since the promoters of railways were ridiculed and
the idea scouted that they would even reap any remuneration for
their outlay. Besides, there were canal shares which were or-
iginally worth felOO but subsequently rose to fc3,500 and nobody
ever complained. The Railway Times, the most influential
T . Report of the Royal Railway Co mission 1867 Pt. 1. P VII
2 . 2nd report 1846 P xVn
3 . Railway Times 1840 vol. 3 P631B
4 . See Chapter V
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railway journal of the time stated positively that they could see
on any principle of justice that railway proprietors could be de-
prived of that which they, by their industry, enterprise and capi-
tal, created. "On no principle of English law or custom can the
State interfere with property granted to private parties by Act
of Parliament." Most of the witnesses, while testing before the
Select Committees depreciated all attempts to regulate with exact-
ness the scales of charges; they all contended that the legisla-
ture should concern itself with fixing only the maxima. The
invested interests were so powerful that it took many decades to
bring the railways well under regulation.
The Parliamentary schedules and classifications in the spec-
ial act being of no working value, a more complete classification
of merchandise traffic and a more uniform and more complete sched-
ule of charges were necessary to the conduct of traffic. V»; e will
now examine what the railway companies did for themselves in the
matter of classification of merchandise traffic and schedules of
charges. The need of more complete classifications and schedules
was evident to all railway companies. Firstly, the enumeration of
the articles was not sufficient to meet the requirements of trade;
in such cases there was no basis of making charges and of appor-
tioning them which would be fairly acceptable to all parties con-
cerned. Secondly, since the same articles were usually classified
differently with different maximum rates in the different special
Acts of the different railway companies, inextricable confusion
and difficulty sometimes resulted in the apportionment of the total
rate of charges. A working classification was, therefore, urgently
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needed.
This need was worked out and developed by an association of
the railways called the Railway Clearing House, which was founded
in 1842 by Mr. Morrison an audit clerk of the London and Birming-
ham Railway, 1being incorporated in 1850 by an act of Parliament.
The great object of its promoters was to give the traffic operationsj
of the various railway companies in the conduct of through traffic
the simplicity and ease attaching to the management of a single
establishment. The primary object was to send not only passengers
but goods "through" without change of carriage or wagons. The
fares or rates collected were required to be forwarded daily to
the Clearing House. The accounts were there compared, balances
struck, and received or paid as the case might be, in much the
same way that the business of the city Clearing House banks was
transacted.
The application of the Clearing House system to railway traf-
fic was chiefly due to the effort of Captain Huish, the able man-
ager of the London and North Western Railway Company. The chief
difficulty with which the railway company had to contend was the
absence of a certain classification of the goods. Gradually, as
communications between railway companies became more frequent,
recognized classification of goods and scales of rates applicable
under ordinary circumstances came into force. Such classifi-
cations and schedules were accomplished partly through special
1. Journal of Royal Statistical Society of London, 1848, P. 522,
P. 558. Harding, W: Progress of Railway systems. Railway Times,
1847, P. 1519.

conferences and partly through general practice. Important con-
ferences were regularly held in the Clearing House to promote
uniformity in operation and in making charges. Thus emerged two
important conferences which had the most to do with the competitive
rates: "the English and Scotch Traffic Rate Conference" and "the
Normanton Conference." The first fixed a scale governing the
traffic between England and Scotland; the latter a scale govern-
ing places within England and other places which were not governed
by the scale of "the English and the Scotch Traffic Rate Confer-
ence." The cross-channel rates between England and Ireland were
controlled by an "English and Irish Traffic Rate Conference."
The schedule of charges was so worked out that the rate for goods
in each class in no case exceeded the Parliamentary maxima al-
lowed upon any article in that particular class. At last for the
convenience of the railway companies themselves and simply a fair
basis and guide upon which rates required might be easily ar-
ranged, all railway companies began to adopt the scale of charges
and the classification of goods, later known as Railway Clearing
House classification.
The classification was drawn up by the Railway Clearing
House Committee. A copy of the classification was attached to the
report of the Royal Commission of 1867.
1
The goods were divided
into seven classes; a mineral class, a special class and five
ordinary classes. Goods in the mineral class were to be carried
at station to station rates and must be loaded and unloaded by
owners. They were to be conveyed at owner's risk and in quanti-
1. Report, 1867, Vol. 38, App. CP.
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ties of not less than four tons (2240 lbs.), otherwise being
chargeable at special class rates. Goods in the special class
were also to be carried at station to station rates but in quanti-
ties of not less than two tons. The rates for goods in classes
1 to 5 generally included collection and delivery at the stations.
In 1867 the classification included between 1300 and 1400 articles
but before the revision in 1891-92 it had grown to 4000 articles.
1
Revision of the classification took place periodically so as to
bring it up to the requirements of the day. When a railway com-
pany was desirous of making a special rate for some particular
article included in one of the five classes, it first made an
agreement with the other railway company over whose line the ar-
ticle was to pass, and then notified the Railway Clearing House.
After 1842 and prior to 1892, railway companies among themselves
adopted this uniform classification embracing almost every article
of trade. They voluntarily submitted themselves to its control
but they possessed full power to modify it under the only condi-
tion of securing agreement among themselves. This classification
had been repeatedly recommended by the various Select Committees
and the Royal Commissioners on Railways to be adopted as the
basis of the Parliamentary classification; but this was not real-
ized before the passing of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act in
1888.
1. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1894, Vol. 8, P. 289.

CHAPTER IV
.
Competitive Adjustment of the Early Railway Rates.
The enactment of the maximum rate clause in the special rail-
way acts was only one of the two principal means to which Parlia-
ment resorted in those early days in the regulation of railway
rates. The maximum rate clause might prevent a rate from being
fixed too high but it could neither induce the railway companies
to make lower charges nor could it compel them to offer better fa-
cilities. In the actual regulation of railway rates Parliament
depended more on free competition than on any specified restric-
tion in the special acts. Competition had been a salient factor
in the regulation of all private industries. That competition
and freedom were the essential factors in the development of pri-
vate industries was the strong belief of the time. Railways came
and were developed in England as the result of individual enter-
prise without any governmental or Parliamentary assistance. Both
in England and in America competition has always been depended
upon as an important, if not the only efficient factor in pro-
tecting the public against the evils of railway monopoly. It has
been said that in America, the system is "regulation in compe-
tition", and in England, "competition in regulation."
Parliament in the regulation of railways has never fully
disregarded competition as a factor in the control of railway
rates. 1 In the early period the prevailing practice, following
1. This statement is practically true even to the present day so
far as legislation is concerned; for besides the legislation of
undue preference, reasonable rates and revised classifications
and maximum rates, the English public still depend upon compe-
tition for controlling the rates.
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the prevalent belief, was to open railways both with respect to
construction, use and operation to the free competition of all.
It was the current opinion that Parliament had done its duty of
protecting the public when it had successfully made railways free
to the public. At a later period when the evils of free compe-
tition began to be more widely felt, no one advocated total aban-
donment of the principle. Mr. Gladstone, who attempted to bring
out many drastic reforms and who must have foreseen the ultimate
failure of competition, used in his report the following words :
"the power of encouraging, or if need be, of creating competition,
even although its remedy thus to be supplied might be partial
and must be costly, is nevertheless an engine of great capabilities
in the hands of the State and one which might be used to prac-
tical advantage." In Parliament there was never any lack of
staunch supporters of the principle of free competition, using
every means to argue against government interference in private
industries, whenever any important railway Bill was brought up
for discussion. Strong evidence condemnatory of competition was
brought before the Select Committee of 1844 by eminent authori-
ties, but in Parliament, Messrs. Roebuck, Wallace and others were
2
urging a further and fuller trial of competition.
From 1800 to 1854 competition reigned supreme. Some writers
characterize this period as the "laissez Faire" period. But this
term is misleading, for there was the regulation through the
K Third Report, Select Committee, 1844, P. 4.
2. Report, 1844, Minutes of Evidence; see evidences given by
Messrs. Laing, Swift, Glyn, Hudson, Cardwell, Han. 1844, V. 72,
PP. 252-256; 1845, V. 77, PP. 246-298.
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maximum rate clause. It is true that the maximum rates lacked
working value and the regulation was hut nominal. Railway com-
panies possessed full power to vary their charges within the max-
ima, and they were fixed so high that railway companies could fix
their charges at any amount they desired, if there was no compe-
tition to fear. 1 But railway companies were not entirely free and
the period could not be properly called "Laissez Faire." After
1854 the policy of Parliament was to maintain what was left of
competition - to restrict amalgamation, to compel free exchange
of traffic, and to prohibit secret preference. One may say that
Parliament depended on natural competition and legislative con-
trol of railway rates in about equal measure.
The history of railway competition in England is very in-
structive. Lately important contributions have been made by a few-
English scholars on the subject of combination and amalgamation
among English railways. 2 We will confine ourselves here to ex-
amining briefly the nature and the effects of competition on the
1. In places where there was no competition rates were actually
much higher than in places where there was no competition.
2. The important contributions are first, "English Railways, their
Development and their Relation to the State," 1915, by Edward
Cleveland-Stevens and second, "Combinations among railway com-
panies" by Robertson. The titles of the first book is somewhat
misleading. The author tells in the Introduction that the book
"aims at presenting a detailed historical account of consolidation
of English Railways up to the year 1900." Up to the present time
this book is the only important contribution in the English lan-
guage to the historic account of railway consolidation in England.
The second deals with the development of the English trunk lines
up to 1844. The latter subject has also been treated by Mr.
Jackrnan in his "Development of Transportation in Modern England"
1916, but the history of railway development was given only up
to 1854.
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general control of actual railway charges.
1
In ordinary business, competition keeps prices normal. Par-
liament thought that competition would do the same with railway
charges. For this purpose various forms of competition were suc-
cessively tried with more or less good results. The first form
of competition - competition for the free use of railway lines -
o
was the oldest and the least effective for its purpose, as we
have seen. Next Parliament tried competition among railways.
Competition among railways could be brought about in three ways :
first, by sanctioning the construction of parallel lines, second
by competitive lines, and thirdly by giving the right of free
construction of a railway line to any individual who cared to ap-
ply. Through these means, there was severe competition for traf-
fic. As the construction of any new line might bring in more se-
vere competition, railway companies competed generally with one
another in making proposals to Parliament for new lines with lit-
tle regard to the needs of the country. This policy was, of
course, detrimental both to the public and to the railway com-
panies. It meant great national waste; it also created much un-
rest. Rate wars resulted without benefit to the public. It was
not long after this policy became effective on a large scale that
its evils were manifest everywhere. The various Select Committees
and Railway Commissions reported against it, The Select Com-
1. The remaining part of this chapter should be read together with
Chapters II, IV, VII, IX, and XI in Cleveland-Stevens: English
Railways, their Development and their Relation to the State.
2. Second Report, Select Committee, 1839, V. 90, P. VI; third re-
port, 1840, P. 3. See also the second chapter.
3. Han. V. 77, 1844, PP. 250-251.
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mittee of 1846 stated that "by constructing two lines where one
would suffice, there is not only an unnecessary outlay of capital,
j
but a waste of a portion of our territory. Besides, as the cost
of conveyance diminishes with every increase of traffic, compet-
ing lines, by dividing the traffic, add to the cost of conveyance
on the separate lines."
1 Furthermore the policy of sanctioning
competing lines kept the existing railway companies in a constant
state of alarm and often subjected them to much trouble and ex-
pense in watching and resisting the proposals for competing lines.
The third phase of competition - competition between rail-
ways and canals, or water routes - was much more effective and
much more important in the forties. The canal system was thor-
oughlyestablished when the railway era commenced. According to
the report of the Select Committee of 1846 there were in 1846
about 2500 miles of canals in operation and they afforded the ex-
2
elusive means of conveyance of heavy goods and merchandise.
Water competition was the more effective because of the geography
of the country. No place in England is farther than 90 miles
from the sea. Because of the long broken coast line and the
great number of ports, the competition of water carriage was
widely felt. A canal or a river is a highway which cannot be
closed and which will admit any number of competing carriers.
Boats were readily built, and profits upon them were open to all.
j
1 1. Second Report, Select Committee on Railway Acts Enactments,
1846, PP. IX-XI.
2. Second Report, Select Committee on Railway, Amalgamation, 1846»
P. Ill; Porters gave in the "Progress of the Nation", P. 304, 2200
miles of navigable canals and 1800 miles of rivers in England in
1847.
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Where there was a demand for water carriage, the supply was sure
to appear. 1 The effect of water competition was chiefly in the
direction of the lowering of charges. There were few parts
of the country which had not derived some material advantage from
2
the competition between the railway and the canal. The effect
was not simply confined to the traffic between the two places
which communicated with each other by water, but it extended to
the cost of carriage of the same description of goods to the same
market from other places. Consequently the competition of water
carriage was an important element in determining railway rates,
with a large indirect as well as direct influence. This was much
more effective in the early days when the canal companies were
all independent.
Railway companies, being desirous of eliminating water com-
petition, succeeded gradually by various methods in reducing the
formidable competition to an extent such that it was no longer
harmful. The most important method by which railway companies
defeated the competition of canals was the purchase of important
links of the canal system and the consequent discouragement of
through traffic.
5
Sometimes this was effected by private ar-
rangement. The railway companies would raise the tolls of these
links to the utmost limit allowed by law, thereby rendering it
1. Statistics of British Railway, P. 17; Report of Joint Commit-
tee, 1872, V. 15, P. XXIX.
2. Second Report, Select Committee on Railway Amalgamation; 1346,
P.lll.
3. Birmingham Canal and Huddersfield Canal were good illustrations.
See report of Joint Committee, 1872 V. 15, PP. XXI -XXII. Rail-
way Statistics, 1839, P. 16. Fifth report, Select Committee,
1855, P. 11.
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impossible for the independent canal carriers to maintain their
through traffic in competition with the railways.
1 When the tolls
were fixed "by an Act of Parliament at a remunerative rate the rail-
way companies would in such case neglect the upkeep of the canals.
It was stated that the railway companies not only did not make
improvements but actually did damage by neglecting repairs, by
2
closing the canals at night or by failing to supply water. Par-
liament in such cases made special provisions compelling the
railway companies to maintain the canals in an efficient working
state; to keep them free and open for traffic and even to enable
other canal companies to make through rates: but these provisions
were ignored. With few exceptions the railway companies felt lit-
tle desire to do more than their barest legal duty in maintaining
these canals. 4
On the part of the canal companies the lack of improvement
and foresight also hastened the elimination of their competition.
On the other hand railway companies were under great advantages.
They derived much larger income from passenger traffic. Their
far larger capital and resources made competition less harmful;
and their possession of the important canals carried these ad-
vantages yet farther. The result was that in many cases the
canal companies by way of saving their shareholders either of-
fered their properties to the railway companies or proposed ar-
1. Second Report, Select Committee on Amalgamation, 1846, P. IV.
2. Report, Joint Committee, 1872, Vol. 15, P. XXII.
3. Report, Joint Committee, 1872, V. 13, P. IX.
4. Report of the Royal Commission on Canals, 1909, P. 77.
5. Second Report, Select Committee on Railway Amalgamation, 1846,
P. IV; Report of Joint Committee, 1872, P. XX.
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rangements under which competition should cease. It was often
difficult for Parliament under these circumstances to refuse sanc-
tion for such amalgamations when the shareholders were alleging
that the only way of saving their property was to let a railway
company buy it.
1
Canal companies were further weakened by their
disjointed state and the different systems under which they were
charging for their operations.
The chief transfers of canals to railways had mostly been
effected by 1847. According to an estimate in 1882 the railway
companies had acquired 78 miles under the acts of 1845, 774 miles
2
under acts of 1846 and 96 miles under acts of 1847. In 1865 there
were nearly 4000 miles of water and river communication in Eng-
land and Scotland and of this about one-third had been amalga-
mated with different railway companies. In 1872, 1544 miles of
canals in England and Scotland were held, it was said, by railway
companies, of which 1500 were so held in perpetuity. In spite of
the recommendations of the various Select Committees and the ef-
forts of Parliament, it was not possible to maintain this compe-
tition and far less possible to restore what had disappeared.
Before 1854 Parliament passed three Acts for the purpose of
strengthening the canal companies and maintaining their compe-
tition. After 1854 canals were regulated together with railways
in the Railway and Canal Traffic Acts. Two of the three acts
4
before 1854 were passed in 1845: the first giving the canal com-
panies the necessary power to vary their tolls, and the sec-
1.Report of Joint Committee, 1872, V. 13, P. XXII.
2.Report of Royal Commission on Canals, 1909, P. 77.
3.Report, Joint Committee, 1872, V. 13, P. XX.
4.8 and 9 Vict. C. 28.
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ond 1 enabling the canals to become carriers of goods upon their
canals and to make working agreements with or to lease their ca-
nals to other canal companies. Two years later, in 1847, the
power to borrow money for the above purposes was given to the
2
canal companies by another act. These attempts of Parliament to
preserve the independence of the waterways and to strengthen their
competition with the railways were too late and of little effect.
Moreover, as was pointed out by the Select Committee of 1846,
some important canals, originally independent, were by private
arrangements practically under the same control and management as
the railway companies, so that all the evils of amalgamation
might be produced without affording opportunity for Parliamentary
inquiry. 2 The following recommendations originally made by the
Railway Department of the Board of Trade in their report of 1845
and quoted by the Joint Committee in 1872 will show how they
4
sought to remedy the evil:
1- "That upon amalgamation the maximum tolls and rates be re-
vised and reduced."
2- "That strict regulations should be made for maintaining
the canals in an efficient state of repair and for the free and
open use to all the public."
5- "That no inland navigation shall be placed under the con-
trol of a railway company and leases shall not be renewed."
1. 8 and 9 Vict. C. 42.
2. 10 and 11 Vict. C. 94.
5. Report of Joint Committee, 1872, V. 15, P. VIII.
4. Report of Joint Committee, 1872, V. 15, P. IX, XXIII.
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4- "That the utmost facilities shall be given for the amalga-
mation of adjoining canals with one another or with adjoining in-
land navigations."
5- "That the owners of any canal shall have power to make a
through toll or rate."
The policy of Parliament was to create and to maintain com-
petition for the control of railway rates. We shall now turn to
examine the attitude of the railway companies. The one tendency
of all the railway companies in the early days was to seek com-
bination - to combine among themselves and to combine with canal
companies. The reason for this is very obvious. Combination was
sought not for the sole purpose of checking competition, but
often for the advantages of greater efficiency of operation which
could be derived from it. The- average length of railways prior
to 1840 was said to have been only 15 miles. The line from Lon-
don to Liverpool belonged to three railway companies and the
same was true with the line from Bristol to Leeds.
1
In 1845 the
number of miles of railways opened in England was about 2100 and
they were owned by 70 railway companies, giving an average of
only 50 miles for each company.
2 In 1865 there were 11,451 miles
of railroad under the control of 78 railway companies, giving
an average of 150 miles per company. The longest line open in
1845, controlled by one railway company, was 118 miles in length;
but in 1872 the London and Northwestern Railway Company controlled
1,274 miles; Great Western Railway Company, 1,256 miles; Midland
1. Report of the Royal Commission, 1867, P. XIX.
2. Ibid, P. XXXII.

- 70 -
Railway Company, 700 miles and the Northeastern Railway Company,
1,205 miles. Railway combination, or amalgamation as it was call-
ed in England, was a natural process of railway development. The
lines of the early railway companies were too short. Interchange
of traffic was much impeded - especially at the points of junction
with rival railway companies.
1
There was competition, but the
public could not derive the benefit of a continuous and integral
line in the hands of one single company for through traffic. How-
ever, amalgamation, though natural in railway development, might
not have come so rapidly in England, if it had not been hastened
by the legislative policy of Parliament. In the railway mania
of 1844-46 when the construction of competitive lines was sanction-
2
ed on a large scale, amalgamation was also going on very rapidly.
In the year 1846 alone there were 45 special railway acts,
1. Third Report of Railway Commission, 1850, P. 7.
Total number Including
Year of acts Acts for Acts for Acts for pur-
passed new lines amalgamation chases and leases
1840 24 2 1 1
1841 19 2
1842 24 6 1
1845 24 10 1
1844 49 57 5 7
1845 121 94 5 15
1845 272 219 20 19
1847 194 212 9 20
1848 85 57 5 7
1849 35 11 2 4
1850 57 5 1 5
their Relation to the State, P. 25; see also Report Royal Com-
mission, 1867, Appendix E. K.
5. Ilerapath's Railway Journal, 1847, P. 1119.
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authorizing either an increase of capital or an amalgamation
with another company. Between 1860 and 1872 the number of Bills
introduced to carry out amalgamation was 258 - of which 187 passed,
adding 5,316 miles to the system of amalgamated railways. This
was about a third of the entire railway mileage.
1 On Dec. 31,
1870, the railway mileage of England and Wales was owned as fol-
lows:
TOTAL MILEAGE MILEAGE OWNED BY CHIEF RAILWAY
COMPANIES
Number
of
Railway
Companies
Amount
of
Mileage
Number
of
Railway
Companies
Amount
of
Mileage
England 204 11,043 16 9,572
Scotland 35' 2,519 5 2,468
Ireland 42 1,975 8 1,597
Total 281 15,537 29 13,639
Twenty-nine out of the 281 railway companies held more than
four-fifths of the entire railway system of the United Kingdom.
In order to understand fully the significance of railway
combination upon railway rates, it is necessary to analyze the
various forms of combinations and the methods that were used by
the railway companies. 2 Generally speaking there were six forms
of railway combinations, Their common end and purpose was to re-
1.Economist, Feb. 17, 1872, P. 197; Report on Amalgamation, 1872,
2!
P
Repo?t!' Joint Committee, 1872, V. 13, PP. XXIV-XXVII; Report,
Departmental Committee on Railway Agreements and Amalgamation, 1911
PP. 14-16; Robertson: Combination among English Railways.
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duce competition, to maintain rates, and to hold traffic. The
simplest form was an arrangement for equal charges, and, in a few
cases, for equal speed. The second was an agreement with refer-
ence to the pooling or division of receipts from traffic between
two or more companies. The profits might be divided in certain
fixed proportions with or without reference to the question
whether the traffic had actually travelled over the line or by the
train of the one company or the other. These two forms could be
carried into effect by the railway companies without reference to
Parliament and even without notice to the public.
1 The third was
the working agreement. The purpose of the working agreement was
the use and working of the railways and the fixing, collecting and
apportionment of railway charges. Railway companies had, by their
special acts, the right to make working agreements; but under the
Clauses Act, 1865, working agreements were required to be approved
by Board of Trade, and under the Regulation of Railways Act, 1873,
„ p [
by the Railway and Canal Commission. The fourth form of railway
combination was that effected by lease. The management of a rail-
way company was put into the hands of another railway company,
the owning company being only the recipient of rent. This form
of arrangement had the advantage of putting the work of smaller
and weaker lines into the hands of larger and more powerful com-
panies, but it was also attended by the disadvantage that, if the
latter railway company looked forward to amalgamation or purchase,
1. Joint Committee, Report, 1872, Vol. 15, P. XXV.
2. See the Railways Clauses Act, 1845 and 1865, and the Regulation
of Railways Act, 1875.
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it might be to its interest in the meantime to keep down the traf-
fic and profits and thus depreciate the concern in order to pur-
chase it at a lower price.
1 The fifth form of combination was
working union. The existence of each company was maintained and
the finances of the parties to the union remained separate or were
separately provided for. The sixth form was amalgamation. The
latter differed from the former in being the most complete combi-
nation, involving the absorption of one company by another and a
fusion of capital as well as a union of administration. In this
latter form of combination not only was all actual, but also all
"potential" competition between the railway companies entirely at
an end. The last three forms of combination required Parliament-
ary sanction.
The economic advantages arising from the various combinations
were many and obvious.
2 Viewed from the standpoint of revenue, of
operation and of management, combination was highly commendable.
Through combination, efficient management of the line and full
utilization of its equipment was much more easily secured. By
1. Joint Committee, Report, 1872, V. 13, P. XXVI.
2. The benefits of combination were admitted by the Select com-
mittee on railway amalgamation in 1846. "The benefits arising
from it, if conducted within proper limits and under judicious regu
lations are indisputable." The railway companies were enabled
to conduct their operations with less expense to themselves and
consequently with diminished charges to the public. Amalgamation
would lead to better arrangements and more efficient control and
thereby to greater speed and at the same time to increased safety
to life and property. It would "enable companies conjointly to
provide that increase of accomodation for the public at their
terminal stations and in their general establishments which many
of them could not separately afford."
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greater economy in the distribution of employees and of working
stock, a large saving could be easily effected. The traffic would
be much more regular and the revenue steadier. What was saved in
working expenses might be devoted to other imrpovements and new
construction, and would cause thereby further increase in traffic.
Combination would tend also to promote public convenience; through
bookings without change of carriage could more readily be made
and the meeting of trains at suitable hours of arrival and de-
parture could be easily arranged. Instead of diverting the traf-
fic to the disadvantage of the public by the rival railway com-
pany, the traffic would go by the shortest route. On the whole
not only would the railway companies be benefitted by combinations
but the public would gain largely by the harmonious consolidation
of short and actually inefficient lines.
1 The original desire for
combination was based on the ground of economy in the conduct
of traffic. Many amalgamations were the result of financial dif-
ficulties. It was only at a later period that combination was
adopted as a matter of offensive and defensive policy to enable
the combined company to compete more powerfully with their rivals.
What effect the combination had upon rates is hard to say
precisely. Both Parliament and the public were afraid of the mo-
nopoly; the combination was therefore disliked and discouraged.
The constant plea was that the company by defeating competition
with combination would make their rates and charges exorbitantly
high. This dread of railroad monopoly and high charges was most
manifest during the early days. The Select Committee on railway
1. Fifth Report, Select Committee, 1853, PP. 5-4.
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amalgamation,
1
of 1846, stated that the inducement to low charges
would be noticeably diminished and possibly done away with, if a
system of amalgamation were to be extensively adopted. Amalga-
mation must necessarily produce a tendency directly opposite to
low rates and charges. The committee further stated that past
experience afforded sufficient and convincing proof that while in
some instances amalgamations of the railroads were followed by
diminished rates of carriage and increased accomodation, in others
the results were directly the reverse. It seems that this fear
of high charges was no longer existing in 1855 when the five re-
ports of the Select Committee on railway amalgamation were made.
Among the reasons why railway amalgamation should be discouraged,
as given by the Select Committee of 1855, were the following:
1. A concern might be too large to be properly managed.
2. A powerful company might oppress smaller ones.
5. It might divert traffic into an unnatural channel.
4. It might neglect or injure one part of its district in
order to underbid a rival in another.
The curious part was that no illustrations of the actual
raising of charges as the result of amalgamation were given by any
of the Select Committees. On the other hand, there were in-
stances of reduced charges. So what was feared never fully took
place; the railway companies following their own interest re-
1. First report of Select Committee on Railway Amalgamation
in 1846, P. 4.
2. Ibid.
5. Fifth report of Select Committee on Railway Amalgamation, 1355,
PP. 5-12; Report of Joint Committee on Railway Amalgamation, 1872,
V. 15, PP. X-XII.
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sorted more to reduction than to increase of the rates. The
original North Eastern Railway was composed of 57 lines, several
of which competed with one another: Before their amalgamation they
had generally high rates and low dividends. But after the amalga-
mation the North Eastern Railway had the lowest rates and the
highest dividends of any large railroad in the United Kingdom, in
spite of the fact that it was the most complete monopoly in the
country.
1
The Select Committee of 1872 concluded that "few cases
have been adduced in which amalgamations already effected had to
increase fares or reduce facilities, while on the other hand
there is evidence that the most complete amalgamation which has
hitherto taken place has been followed by a lowering of fares
and rates and increase of facilities as well as by increased divi-
dends'.'
2 Parliament, on the other hand, generally took the oppor-
tunity afforded by railway combination, at the recommendations
of the Select Committees and the Railway Commission, to force a
reduction of rates and charges. One Select Committee stated that
"the effect of amalgamation was to diminish the expense of working
and managing the railroads and thereby to enable the railroads
to secure a greater profit on the existing traffic and in view
of the case it might be taken as a general rule, that the maximum
rates and tolls combined ought not to exceed the lowest rates
which had been previously demanded and received by the respective
railway companies.
1. Report of the Joint Committee, 1872, V. 15, P. XXVI.
2. Joint Committee, Report, 1872, V. 15, P. XXXI.
5. First report of the Select Committee on Railway Amalgamation,
1846, P. 5.
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Combination and competition can not exist together. George
Stephenson has well said, "Where combination is possible compe-
tition is impossible."
1 Competition over the same lines was
proved impracticable.
2 Competition among railroads did not exist
very long before they found out that they had everything to lose
by its continuance and everything to gain by a compromise. So in
almost every case it ended in some kind of arrangement by which
its traffic was divided or in some sort of combination whereby
competition was totally extinguished. Mr. S. Laing, formerly of
the Railway Department in the Board of Trade, testified before
the Select Committee of 1853 that he did "not know of any instance
where competition has been established for any time when it has
not led to combination."
It may be asked why the principle of competition is applic-
able to ordinary trade and not to the railway business. A few
reasons
4
may be stated and examined. In the first place the rail-
5
way business differs from ordinary trade in its nature. The
amount of capital required for the construction of a railroad,
the exclusive possession of the line of country best calculated
for the purpose of economy and traffic, the permanency of a rail-
way investment and the time required for bringing into active
operation any new competitor tend to exclude these great under-
1. Quarterly Journal of Economics, V. 18, P. 282.
2. The Statistics of British Railways, P. 16.
5. Fifth report of Select Committee on Railway Amalgamation, 1853,
P. 117, question 119.
4. The Attempt here is simply to confine the statement to those
reasons which appealed most strongly to the people of that time.
5. Fifth report, Select Committee, 1853, P. 4.
/i
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takings from the sphere of ordinary commercial pursuits. In the
second place, competition in transportation buisness is usually
limited in its applicability.
1
Railway companies can arrange to
meet competition in small areas and make up their loss in places
where there is no competition, or they can vary their charges so
as to allow of such a combination between the railroads and their
rivals as will render to both of them the largest aggregate
amount of receipts from the traffic. Thirdly, its advantages of
combination are too obvious. Railway companies can not be ex-
pected permanently to maintain their competition, more especially
as they are in all probability under little apprehension as to
future competition, the prospect of a return to any third line
being quite inadequate for its cost of construction. Fourthly,
rate wars are too disastrous. When different railway companies
run between the same places they will first try to maintain their
1. The following cases which were reported and analyzed by the
commission are the principal varieties in the circumstance which
will affect the charges of railway companies, but it is only in
the last case as shown by the commission where the full benefit
of competition could be secured, the rest are either partially af
<
fected or none at all by competition.
a. "The conveyance to an important market, from various places
on the line, of some commodity which it is also receiving in
large auantities through other channels.
b. "The carriage between places where there is no competition.
c. "The supply of a town with some commodity which it cannot
obtain through any other channel except at an exorbitant cost."
e."The supply of a town with some commodity which it cannot ob
tain through any other channel except at an exorbitant cost.
d. The carriage between two places which are also connected
by another line of railways or by a canal, the property of an-
other company.
e. The carriage between places which are also connected by a
free navigation, as by the sea or by a large river. Fourth report
Railway Commission, 1851, PP. XXI -XXIII
2. Fourth report of the Railway Commission, 1851, P. XXIII.
3. First report of the Railway Commission, 1848, P. 51.
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rates separately and later to arrange their charges together. If
a new railway should ever be started with a promise of lower
rates, it is certain after a short time to arrange a system of
equal charges with its original rival. 1. As railway companies are
free to agree as to rates and to enter into pooling arrangements,
competition under such circumstances can not be of much use.
Fifthly, railway competition is limited to a few companies. It
will be easy for the few companies to combine as soon as they find
that their interests are the same. Sixthly, the fighting powers
of railway companies are proportional to the size of their net
revenue. Large railway companies can use their resources very
effectively to kill off competition. The tendency is for both
large and small railway companies to seek combination in order
4
to guard against any possible disastrous competition. For these
various reasons railway competition in the form of ordinary busi-
5
ness competition cannot exist.
Competition has not been regarded a satisfactory method of
regulating railways. "It may be assumed to be a rule established
by experience," stated the first Report of the Railway Commission
of 1847, "that the working of each line must ordinarily be en-
trusted to the management of a single company, and that the prin-
1. Report, Select Committee, 1872, P. 25.
2. Fourth Report, Select Committee, 1855, P. 4, Fifth Report, 1855,
P. 14. Evidence 92-95.
5. Fifth Report, 1855, Evidence of the Baxter Railway Solicitor,
P. 7,
4. Fifth Report, P. 7.
5. Journal of Royal Statistical Society, 1875, V. 56, P. 185;
Edinburgh Review, V. 69, 1859, P. 176; Blackwood, V. 58, 1845,
P. 648.
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ciple of competition is not applicable to such an undertaking
V
1
The interests of the public could not be safely entrusted to the
operation of the principle of competition in the case of railways
as in that of ordinary commercial enterprise. "The public can
never be benefitted by the competition of railway companies," said
one Select Committee.
2 Although in certain cases, public advantage
had been derived from the competition of railway companies, yet
those cases must be regarded rather as exceptions than as the rule.
The theory of competition was condemned as the root of most of the
4
mischief in the legislation. In Parliament, it was said, compe-
tition had been tried far enough in railway legislation. The in-
terest of the community should not be left any longer to the oper-
ation of competition as in ordinary business enterprises. As
early as 1840 the Select Committee was recommending that railway
companies must be monopolies and that such monopolies ought to
be subjected to the superintendence and control of some department
6
of the Executive Government.
In connection with this it must be noted that the evils of
competition had been somewhat exaggerated. Competition did ac-
complish a great deal for the English public in obtaining not only
1. First Report of Railway Commission, 1848, P. 51.
2. Second Report of Select Committee on Railway Amalgamation, 1846,
P. X.
3. First Report of Railway Commission, 1848, P. 51.
4. Report of Select Committee on Railway Amalgamation, 1853, Evi-
dence, question 825, by J. Swift.
5. Han. V. 132, 1844, PP. 594-598.
6. First Report of Railway Commission, 1848, P. 53.
Second Report of Select Committee on Railway Amalgamation,
1846, P. X.
Journal of Royal Statistical Society, 1859, V. 22, P. 384. The
paper pointed out the evils of Competition as applied in France
and England for the regulation of railways.
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lower charges but also better facilities and accomodations. The
public complained, because competition failed to accomplish what
was expected. There are two different phases of competition:
competition that secures to the public the cheapest and best ser-
vice and competition that creates waste and insecurity of prop-
erty. It is only the latter form of competition that should re-
ceive some condemnation. In the matter of railway charges, there
was on different occasions effective competition between railway
companies and railway charges had been actually reduced.
1 When
there was little direct competition in lower charges, competition
2
in better facilities and accomodations often became intense. It
was always possible to compete in facilities and accomodations.
One railway company might offer better service than another with-
out breaking the agreements which the two companies might have
made with each other for equal charges. Trains might be more con<
venient to the public, carriages more comfortable or facilities
for collection and delivery of goods might be greater by one rail
way than by another. Station accomodations might be improved and
grievances removed more quickly by one railway company than by
another. In all of these and numerous other ways railway com-
panies did compete with one another. • This competition, of
course, had little direct effect in lowering railway charges to
the public, for they had better service at the old price.
Before we enter upon a consideration of the second period of
rate regulation it may be well to summarize in a few words the
1. Report, Joint Committee, 1872, V. 13, P. XXIV.
2. Han. V. 215, P. 1545.
II
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important points that we have been discussing. The failure of
the early legislation relative to railway rates was chiefly due,
on the one hand, to the recent origin of railway communication, to
the rapidity of its growth and to the variety of unexpected re-
sults consequent upon so great a change in the internal communi-
cation of the country; and, on the other hand, to the strong dis-
inclination of Parliament to interfere hastily with the railways
as private enterprises of national importance. These two groups
of reasons account for the great caution and also for some of the
errors in the early legislation regarding railways. By the end
of the period the conception of the railway was greatly changed.
Railway companies were no longer to be regarded as of merely pri-
vate but of national concern. The need of a change of policy in
respect to railway legislation was immediate and imperative. We
shall see in the next chapter the transition which leads to the
change in the legislative policy in the regulation of the rail-
ways in England at a later period.

CHAPTER V.
The Beginning of General Rate Regulation.
The great burst of railway speculation about 1856 together
with the general dissatisfaction with the rate regulation awakened
the attention of the legislature in that year to the importance
of the railway problem. 1 Parliament began to view the problem
from the standpoint of the nation and much time was devoted to its
solution. One member of the House of Commons, Mr. James Morrison,
had as early as 1856 foreseen with remarkable prescience the chief
problems that must arise as the railway system extended. ne pro-
posed fundamental remedies, which were, however, too far ahead of
his time. Mr. Morrison was the member from Ipswich, a man who
had risen by his own "industry, sagacity, and integrity" from very
2
humble beginnings to enormous wealth. On May 17, 1856, Mr. Mor-
rison made an important speech in the House of Commons and moved
for leave to bring in a Bill. The chief points in his speech
4
are summed up by Professor Hadley in the following words: "Rail-
roads must naturally be a monopoly; competing roads will combine;
parallel roads are a waste of capital; fixed maximum rates are
1. Quarterly Review, V. 74, P. 259.
2. Dictionary of National Biography: "Morrison, James (1790-1857)
5. Han. 1856, V. 55, PP. 977-995; 988 (his motion)
4. Hadley: Railroad Transportation, Ch. IX.
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useless." In his speech he called the attention of the House to
the inefficiency of the railway legislation and he showed how the
regulation of railway charges by fixing the maxima was made inef-
fective. When Parliament fixed a rate of charge, it took for
granted that there would be no increase in traffic and no great
improvements in the construction of locomotive engines and of the
whole machinery and in the technical and administrative management
of railroads. But every one knew from past experience that the
contrary was the fact. Mr. Morrison, therefore, moved that "in
all Bills for railways it be made a condition with a view to the
protection of the public interests that the dividends be limited
to a certain rate or that power be reserved to Parliament of re-
vising and fixing at the end of every twenty years, the toll
chargeable on passengers and goods conveyed'.' He obtained leave
to bring in a Bill to the effect but the House was not very fa-
vorable to it. The limitation of dividends was the chief point
of attack, though the revision of tolls met with little criticism.
The ministry did not support it and Sir Robert Peel, then the
Prime Minister, opposed it too. The Bill was read a first time.
Before a second reading could take place, Mr. Morrison became
sensible of the hopelessness of his task. Signs of alarm were
shown in the market, with reference to railway shares. The idea
prevailed that all those who were in possession of railway prop-
2
erty would be ruined, if the Bill became law. It was added, and
with some degree of weight, that if the State had done nothing
1. Han. 1836, V. XXXIII? P. 988.
2. Francis: History of English Railways, P. 278.
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to help, it ought to do nothing to injure railways. The period
was not propitious. The Great Western Railway was not yet opened;
the London and Birmingham Railway only partially so. The Bills
for other lines had only just been passed. As the session was also
drawing to a close, he was thus obliged to withdraw his Bill. No
further attempt was made by Mr. Morrison in the following session.
Mr. Morrison deals with the whole history of the Bill in a pamphlet"
and remarks that "to suppose that Parliament will continue to re-
ject all applications for railways which may interfere with the
monopoly and high rates of the old lines, is to suppose that it
will continue to sacrifice the interests of many to those of the
few; low fares and national advantage to the high dividends of a
few great railway companies."
2
Had the bill of Mr. Morrison been passed into law, it is dif-
ficult to state what would have been its effects. Francis, writing
in 1851, laments the failure of the Bill. He came to the con-
clusion that the railway companies would have been powerless to
injure the public, while the advantage of their proprietary would
have been inestimable. This may be an overestimation of the
fact. It is true that the Bill, if passed into law, would prob-
ably have produced some good results, but it is doubtful whether
the development of railway system and railway business would not
have been retarded, as it came so early and at such a period that
railway construction in England needed encouragements, not im-
1. Tracts on Railways, P. 16: "Defects of the English System of
Railway Legislation," P. 15.
2.Tracts on Railways, P. 16; Defects of the English System of
Railway Legislation, P. 13.
3. Francis: History of English Railways, P. 280.
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pediments
.
^
Mr. Morrison's Bill was the first attempt at legislation for
railways on a general scale. From now on the public became more
and more dissatisfied with the existing system of regulation. More
attention was paid by Parliament to the legislation relative to
railways. Various Select Committees of the ablest members were
appointed from year to year to the study of the railway problem.
Both the public and Parliament worked for restrictive regulation
of railways.
In 1856 on the motion of Mr. Poulett Thompson, then President
of the Board of Trade, a Select Committee was appointed "to inquire
and to report on the Standing Orders for railway Bills and the
2
conditions advisable for introduction into such Bills." The report
was made in the same year but it did not lead to any railway legis-
lation. In 183$ a Select Committee on railway communication was
appointed "to inquire and to report upon what measure it would be
just and expedient to adopt, for the purpose of securing to the
public the benefit of the conveyance of Imperial Mails by rail-
roads." In a short report which was made on March 23, 1836, the
Committee recommended, among other things, that the Post Office
should have the power to run its own engines and trains, without
3
paying any tolls. As the result of their recommendation, the
4
Railways (Conveyance of Mails) Act was passed in August 14, 1838.
1. In spite of the fact, Mr. Francis was entitled as "champion of
the rail" for his book. Blackwood, 1851, PP. 739-750.
2. Report of the Select Committee, 1836.
3. This Report was reprinted Februaty 13, 1844 and attached to
that of 1844.
4. 1 and 2 Vict. C, 98.
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This is the first general railway Act, but it possesses little
interest in our inquiry. In the following year, 1839, on April
11th., another Select Committee on Railway Communication was ap-
pointed with Mr. Poulett Thompson as chairman
1 to inquire into
the state of communication by railways. In one of the two reports, a
general Exemption Clause was recommended, reading as follows:
"and be it further enacted, that nothing herein contained shall
be deemed or construed to exempt the railway, by this or the said
recited Acts relating to railways which may pass during the pres-
2
ent or future Session of Parliament'.' The Select Committee
recommended that this clause be hereafter inserted in all railway
Bills. 5 The Clause, though it was, perhaps, not very effectively
worded,
4
embodied, however, an important principle, as it marked
the first step towards subjecting all the railways to general
legislation.
5
The Committee wished for further inquiry to be
madethe following Session, so nothing was done.
1. Han. V, 46, P. 1220, 1314.
2. First Report, Select Committee, 1839, P. III.
3. Opinion was expressed that the General Exemption Clause should
have been inserted in all the railway bills much earlier. See
Quarterly Review, 1844, V. 74, P. 239. "It is to be regretted that
a General Exemption Clause, similar to the one recommended in a
report of 1839, for the future intervention of the legislature was
not then attempted. That Committee (of 1836) indeed, does not
seem to have thought of entering into such general considerations
but confined itself to the preliminary and very insufficient checks
to be afforded in the future improvements of the Standing Orders,
So that 29 Bills of 1836 and those of 1837, 1838 and 1839 were la-
boriously battled by promoters and opposed through the Committee
of both Houses of Parliament without any superintendence of the
government .
"
4. Quarterly Review, V. 74, 1844, P. 253.
5. First Report of the Railway Department of the Board of Trade,
1841, P. 18.
Second Report, Select Committee, 1839, PP. V, XIV.
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On January 21, 1840, practically the same Select Committee
was reappointed with Mr. Labouchere, then President of the Board
of Trade, as chairman.
1
Five reports were made by them; the
third, dated May 14, 1840, was of chief importance. Through the
recommendations of the Select Committees of 1859 and 1840, the
2
Regulation of Railways Act was passed on August 10, 1840. The
Act
5 delegated three important duties to the Board of Trade.
The first was to inspect new railways before opening; the second,
to require railway returns and tables of tolls and rates; and the
4
third, to enforce the provision of the railway Acts. The Act
also required all the by-laws, rules and regulations issued by
the railway companies to be approved by the Board of Trade. A
railway Department with the President of the Board of Trade as
its President was for the first time organized in the Board to
take charge of railway affairs. As the Act was limited by its
incomplete legislation, Mr. Gladstone in 1842 introduced another
Bill to amend the Act. The Bill was passed on July 30, 1842, and
the Act was known as the Railway Regulation Act, 1842, which
modified somewhat the powers mentioned in the Act of 1840. The
requirement of giving notice to the Board of Trade before opening
a new railway was now to apply not to all railways, but only to
those which were intended for the public conveyance of passengers.
The power of requiring returns of accidents was extended to in-
1. Han., 1840, V. 51, P. 419.
2. 5 and 4 Vict. C, 97.
5. The purpose of mentioning the Acts of 1840 and 1842 here is to
get the historical connection.
4. See also Report of the Royal Commission, 1867, P. X.
5. 5 and 6 Vict. , C. 55.
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elude all cases of accidents whether or not attended by personal
injury. By this Act, every railway company was also required to
convey troops on railways at prices to be settled between the rail-
way companies and the Secretary of War.
At the beginning of 1844 Parliament again directed its at-
tention to the increasing importance of railway communication.
Mr. Gladstone moved for a Select Committee on February 5, 1844 "to
condiser whether any new principles ought to be introduced into
such railway bills as may come before the House during the present
or future Sessions."
1
The appointment of members to the Com-
mittee was the chief topic of debate in the House. One important
objection was that too much railway interest was represented in
the appointments. 2 Mr. Wallace found that there were no fewer
than five directors of railways on the list. In spite of the ob-
jection the motion was agreed to and a strong Committee was ap-
pointed. With Mr. Gladstone as Chairman, the Committee interpreted
their duty widely and touched almost every question affecting
railways.
The work of Mr. Gladstone's Committee occupies a high place
in the history of railway legislation. Railway inquiry was at
that time more or less a pioneer's work. Through its reports one
can see that they succeeded to a far greater extent than any of
the former Select Committees. Among the many distinguishing fea-
tures, a few deserve to be pointed out. Mr. Gladstone's com-
1. Han. V. 72, 1844, PP. 252-254.
5. Han. V. 72, 1844, P. 286.
5. The' Committee numbered fifteen and included Mr. Gladstone,
Lord Seymour, Mr. Patten, Mr. Labouchere, Lord Sandon and Mr.
Denison.
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mittee, in the first place, gave the question of railway legis-
lation a broader consideration than it had hitherto received.
1
They viewed the question from the standpoint of the nation and
pointed out the harm that had been done to the country by the ab-
sence of national policy in railway legislation. Upon the ground
of positive defects which they conceived as attaching to the ex-
isting system of railway legislation, "the Committee entertained
very strongly the opinion that in the future proceedings of Par-
liament, railway schemes ought not to be regarded as merely pro-
jects of local improvements, but that each new line should be
viewed as a member of a great system of communication, binding to-
gether the various districts of the country with a closeness and
intimacy of relation in many respects heretofore unknown." In
the second place the Committee insisted that the public and the
railway companies should be equally protected. The complaint of
monopoly urged by the public against railway companies was "not
a blot on the railway industry but an indication of the benefit
they had conferred on the country. 5 This monopoly as viewed by the
Committee was not secured through special privileges conferred on
them, but by better accomodation and cheapness in the railway
transportation which gave the railway companies the command and
supremacy of travelling in their districts. Railway enterprise,
1. Fifth Report, Select Committee, 1844, P. X.
2. Fifth Report, Select Committee, 1844, P. VI.
L
- 91 -
therefore, should be encouraged and Parliament should take no step
which would arouse suspicion of its good faith with regard to the
integrity of privileges already granted.
1
It was of great na-
tional importance to give countenance and aid to the investment
of capital in domestic improvements. "The very complaint of
monopoly which is urged against railway companies is an indication
and a measure of the increased accomodation to the traffic of the
2
country which they have afforded. In the third place, they
recommended something far more drastic than the mere strengthen-
ing of competition against the railways. They tried to get at
the root of rate regulation. They sought to give the state a di-
rect control over the railways. The reports no doubt possess
great importance in the history of railway legislation, as not
only were they ably written, but their opinions were broad and
3
comprehensive and the tone was just and conciliatory.
Of the six reports4 which they made between February 16 and
July 22, 1844, the third is the most important for our purpose.
1. Third Report, Select Committee, 1844, P. 2.
2. Ibid.
3. Quarterly Review, V. 74, 1844, P. 274.
4. General Views of the Committee of 1844 as summarized by the
Joint Committee of 1872 are as follows:
1. The indefinite concessions made to the earlier companies had
become unnecessary.
2. Fares and rates were too high.
3. Competition would do more injury to the railway companies
than good to the public.
4. The effect of monopoly, both on the public directly, and in-
directly on the railway companies was to be dreaded and guarded
against
.
5. With regard to new lines, at any rate, the government and
Parliament ought to reserve certain powers to be exercised after
a given time.
Report, Joint Committee, 1872, V. 13, P. V.
i
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The First, Second and Fourth Reports contained short recommenda-
tions affecting Private Bill procedure. The Fifth Report dealt
with the rating and the general problems of railways. The Sixth
Report recommended a General Railway Act, consolidating all such
enactments as were common to all railway companies.
In the third report sixteen resolutions with regard to new
railways were recommended, those relating to the revision of rates
being as follows:
"That
1
if, at the end of a term of years to be fixed, the
annual divisible profits upon the paid up share capital of any
such line of railway shall be equal to a percentage to be paid,
or so soon after the expiration of the said term as the said per-
centage shall have been reached, it shall be in the option of
the government; either, first, to purchase the line at the rate
of a number of years' purchase, to be fixed of such divisible
profits; or, secondly to revise the fares and charges on the lines
in such manner as shall in the judgment of the government, be
calculated to reduce the said divisible profits, assuming always
the same quantity and kinds of annual traffic to continue to the
said percentage; but with a guarantee on the part of the govern-
ment to subsist while such scale of fares and charges shall be
in force, to make up the divisible profits to the said percentage.
"That the term of years be 15, to date from the next fol-
lowing first of January, after the passing of the Act for the con-
1. Third Report, 1844, P. 5, Resolution 2; Report, Joint Committee
1872, V. 13, P. V.
2. Third Report, 1844, P. 6, Resolution 4; Report, Joint Committee
P. V., 1872.
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struction of the railway.
"That 1 the rate of divisible profits at which the right of
revision shall accrue shall be 10 per cent."
In consequence of these recommendations, Mr. Gladstone in 1844
introduced a Bill2 which met considerable opposition both within
and without Parliament and which was passed by a sort of com-
promise. 4 The Bill contained forty clauses; twenty formulated to
the provisions respecting state purchase; four respecting the
public service, access of the public to the station and yards,
conduct of inspectors and the prosecution of offense. The effect
of the Bill was to enable the state either to purchase or to re-
vise the tolls of future constructed railways on certain terms.
The proposition Mr. Gladstone meant to contend for was that Par-
liament ought to have that discretion - state purchase.
1. Third Report, 1844, P. 6; Resolution 4,
2. The opinion about the Bill was very divergent; some thought it
went too far and some not. Mr. Roebuck stated in Parliament that
he could not understand the sort of half and half way in which
the gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) intended to deal with the subject.
He requested Mr. Gladstone to consider the question of railway
monopoly as a whole and not in parts and fractions. Han. LXXII,
1844, P. 242.
3. The opposition both inside and outside of the Parliament to Mr.
Gladstone's Bill was very great. In Parliament, besides, the op-
position of many members, Sir Robert Peel, then Prime Minister,
did not support the Bill. He stated that he would repeat as a
general principle, the House ought to have great regard to those
cases in which large bodies of men had invested immense capital
in certain speculations on the good faith of Parliament. "In his
opinion the natural control over these railway companies was not
by minute interference with their gains or their management, but
by holding out to them the menace of competition." The latter
principle had been condemned as ineffective by Mr. Gladstone and
his Committee. Outside the Parliament the opposition was even
greater. Toward the end of June, 1844, a deputation representing
29 railway companies with capital amounting to 50 million pounds
drew up a memorandum against the Bill which was widely circulated
among railway shareholders and members of Parliament: Han. LXXVII,
P. 250. Railway Times, 1844, PP. 713-727.
4. Han., 1845, LXXVII, P. 267.
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As passed, the Railway Regulation Act of 1844
1 provided in
the first place that if the clear annual divisible profits incom-
plete should amount to 10 per cent on the paid up capital of any
railway authorized in that or any subsequent Sessions at the end
of 21 years from the passing of the Act sanctioning the line,
the Lords of the Treasury might revise the tolls, fares and charges
so as to reduce the dividend to 10 per cent. But the revision
must be accompanied by a guarantee on the part of the government
that revised rates should produce a dividend of 10 per cent to
the company for a further period of 21 years.
2 The clauses re-
lating to State purchase of railways will be discussed in a sep-
arate chapter.
In practice, both the plan for revision of railway rates and
the scheme of State purchase failed completely. We shall examine
here only the plan for the revision of railway rates. In the
first place, the Act excluded all the railways sanctioned before
the Session of 1844 - that is to say, 2,300 miles of railway.
4
In the second place, the plan for the revision of railway rates
possessed inherent defects. The chief hinderance to the prac-
ticability of the plan was the guarantee of 10 per cent profits
for 21 years, before revision could take place. No government
1. 7 and 8 Vict. C, 85.
2. In a few of the special acts, the power conferred upon the
Treasury of reducing the rate of tolls at the end of 21 years when
the dividend exceeds 10 per cent was extended to a lower rate of
profit, sometimes sixpence, such as in the Acts which amalgamated
the Great Western, the South Wales and the West Midland Railway
Companies: Report of the Royal Commission, 1867, P. XXXII. Pro-
vision of the Act; Report of Committee, 1867, P. XI.
5. See Chapter XII.
4. Report of the Royal Commission, 1867, P. 53 contain a table of
the railways; see also Journal of Royal Statistical Society, 1873,
V. 36, P. 261.
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would like to try experiments in reducing rates under such con-
ditions. Moreover, as stated by the Joint Committee of 1872, ef-
ficient and economical administration could scarcely be expected
from a railway company whose rates were cut down and whose divi-
dend at 10 per cent was guaranteed by government.
1
"The hope of
p
revision was quite illusory." In the third place, the lack of
uniform accounting systems on all railways was just as strong a
cause as either of the other two just mentioned. No provision
was made in the Act to settle the principle as to how the dividends
and profits should be calculated.' Mr. Morrison wrote very strongly
of the folly of taking an option to revise charges at 10 per cent
without establishing a systematic control over the method by which
4
profits were calculated. There existed no efficient accounting
system by which Parliament could obtain anything like an accurate
knowledge of the net profits of railway companies. The capital
on which dividends were declared, exceeded, in many cases by large
sums, the actual outlay. It is true that in the following year,
certain rules were laid down in the Companies Clauses Consoli-
dation Act, with respect to the augmentation of capital by the
creation of new charges, but the Act did not prohibit the railway
companies from allocating shares among the proprietors at par
when actually at a premium in order that they might pocket the
1. Report, P. VI.
2. Second Report, Select Committee, 1846, P. VI.
3. Report of the Royal Commission, 1867, P. XXXIII.
4. Influence of English Railway Legislation on Trade and Industry,
PP. 21, 22, 67.
5. 8 and 9 Vict. C. 57.
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premiums. The railway companies by swelling the nominal amount
of stocks beyond the actual outlay on the lines could always nul-
lify the object of Parliament in subjecting them to a revision
of charges when the dividends should equal or exceed 10 per cent.
1
For these and various other reasons the most important parts
of the Act were never enforced, but the Act was not entirely in-
operative. The provisions for the carriage of troops and mails
at special rates and for cheap trains in the interests of the poor
classes, were effective, and, in part, are still in force; but
the discussion of these does not fall within the proper scope of
our inquiry. Mr. Gladstone's Act filled a large place in the Eng-
lish Railway history, because it was the most direct attempt that
had been made to give the state a share in railway working. The
ideas of 1844 oscillated between competition and state ownership.
Mr. Gladstone sought in 1844 to give the state direct control
over the railways. He failed because the railway interest was too
1. Second Report, Select Committee on Railway Enactments, 1846,
P. VI.
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strong at that time.
1 He was compelled to profess that he "did
not call upon the House to interfere with the original rights grant-
ed to the railway companies." His Bill was not "for the purpose
2
of fettering or interfering with private rights." His Act marked
for the second time the failure of the attempt at the regulation
of railway rates. The rate situation left by the Act of 1844 was
practically the same as that of 1836 except that Of some indirect
effects and probably some moral restraint on the railway companies.
Between 1845 and 1854 no important Acts were passed especially
relating to the regulation of railway rates except the Railway
Clauses Act of 1845. In 1845 three Acts - the Companies Clauses
2
Consolidation Act, 1845, the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act,
3 4
1845, and the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, - were
1. Han. LXXII, 1844, P. 255.
Mr. 7/allace: "he understood out of doors that the railway interest
in that House had come down prepared to stop discussion on this
Bill and that if they could not carry it by votes, they^ would by
postponement. Six years ago this month (July 8) upon bringing up
the report of the Railway Committee a similar scene took place."
Han. LXXVI, 1844, P. 474; 466-483.
Mr. Cleveland Stevens in his book on English Railways, their De-
velopment and their Relation to the State, said that "no doubt it
was this opposition (railway interest) that compelled him to amend
the Bill so that it became practically valueless as a means of
purchasing the railways." P. 124. The author seemed to think that
the chief reason that the act remained inoperative was due to the
modifications in Mr. Gladstone's original Bill. "If Gladstone's
intentions as expressed in his Bill, had been made law, the state
would have had far greater power. Moreover, the act might then
have been workable and effective, for Gladstone would have main-
tained an interest in the question and during his many years of
office after 1844 might have grappled with the railway problem.
As it was, Gladstone dropped railways after 1844." P. 115.
2. 8 and 9 Vict C. , 16.
3. 8 and 9 Vict. C. , 18.
3. 8 and 9 Vict. C. , 20.
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passed. Lord G. Somerset, in bringing the Bills before the House,
stated that the object of the measures was simply to embody in
uniform Acts the various enactments relative to the subjects which
were scattered through many Acts of Parliament.
1
The Acts were
simply consolidations of the various provisions usually inserted
into the special railway Acts. Certain modifications and additions
which were deemed desirable by Parliament were also inserted. The
2
Clauses were made applicable to railway companies in general.
These Acts need not detain us except for a few points in the
Railways Clauses Act regarding the power and mode of levying
charges. The Act was still enacted on the familiar basis of the
early conception of railway enterprise. Railway Companies were
toll-takers and owners of the line. But the right of railway
4
companies to act as common carriers was recognized and protected.
Section 90 gave the railway companies power to vary tolls, with
one important restriction. The tolls must be at all times charged
equally and at the same rate to all persons and all goods of the
same description, passing only over the same portion of the line
5
of railway under the same circumstances.
All the common law required of a common carrier was not to
charge any more than was reasonable. Unequal rates might be
charged on different customers. Though the Railways Clauses
1. Han. LXXVII, 1345, P. 170.
2. Report of the Royal Commission, 1867, P. XI.
3. 8 and 9 Vict. C. 20, Sections 82, 86-103.
4. 8 and 9 Vict, C. 20, Sections 86, 89; Waghorn: Law, P. 4.
5. 8 and 9 Vict. C. 20, Section 90.
6. Baxendale v. Eastern Counties Railway, 4 C. B. N. S. , 78.
Branley v. South Eastern Railway, 12 C. B. N. S., 74.
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Act recognized railway companies as common carriers, yet the
equality clause enacted a further restriction on Railway companies
as common carriers. It prohibited railway companies from exer-
cising the power of varying their charges in favor of or against
any particular company or person travelling upon or using the
railway. 1 It was designed to prevent an attempt at monopoly by
the railway companies and a preference in favor of one or more
to the prejudice of others. Railway companies were at liberty to
vary the charges according to differences of cost, risk and li-
ability incurred but they were required to charge equally all
2
persons conveying goods under like circumstances.
The meaning of the equality Clause in the words of goods "of
the same description" conveyed "under the same circumstances" was
with reference to those qualities which would affect the risk and
expense of carriage and to circumstances where the risk, and ex-
pense would in the opinion of a jury be the same. In the case
of parcels, the words were used not with reference to the con-
tents of the parcels but to the parcels themselves, that is like
4
or different for the purpose of carriage. The equality clause
was confined to requiring equality of charges as to goods of the
same description "passing only over the same portion of the rail-
way under the same circumstances . "5 These words would apply only
1. Great Western Railway v. Sutton, L. R. 4 H. L. , 252.
2. Grouch v. Great Northern Railway, 9 Ex. 556.
3. Great Western Railway v. Sutton, L. R. 4. H. L. , 247.
4. Great Western Railway v. Sutton, 1. r. 4 h. 1. P. 226.
5. Murray v. Great South Western Railway Co., 1883; 4 Railway &
Canal Cases, 456; Boyle & Waghorn: The Law Relating to the Rail-
way and Canal Traffic Act, Vol. 2, P. 215 (320)
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to goods passing between the same points of departure and arrival.
1
In order to bring a case within the language of the equality clause,
the termini both of arrival and departure must be the same. It
would not apply when the termini were different. ' There should be
equality of charge in respect of all goods carried upon the same
3
railway under the same circumstances. Mere inequality in the
rate of charge when unequal distances were traversed would not
4
constitute a preference inconsistent with the words of the Clause,
•hen a complaint was made that a railway company carried coals
from a group of collieries situated at different points along the
line and charged all the carriers one uniform set of rates, the
Court held that, as the circumstances were different, the railway
company had not infringed the law. A difference in cost const i-
tuted a real difference in the circumstance. The fact that goods
were carried for one customer to certain ports for the purpose of
developing a new trade or opening up a new market, would not con-
stitute a difference in the circumstance so as to justify in-
7
equality of rates.
The words in the equality clause were used with reference to
o
the conveyance of goods and not to the persons who sent them.
There must not be any personal discrimination. The Clause had
1. Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. Manchester, Sheffield and Lincoln-
shire Railway, 11 App. Case, 97.
2. Murray v. Great South Western Railway, 4 Railway and Canal Traf-
fic Case, 456.
3. London and North Western Railway v. Evershed, 3 App., 1037.
4. Denaby Main Colliery v. M. S. & L. Railway, 11 App. Cas., 97.
5. Ibid.
6. ,Ibid P. 98.
7. Ibid. P, 97.
8. Murray v. Glasgow & S. W. Railway, 11 Court Session Case, 4th
Series, 205.
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1
nothing to do with the business of the consignor or consignee.
Mr. Sutton's business was collecting parcels from wholesale houses
and from private individuals, packing them together in boxes and
sending them by Great Western Railway to the different towns where
he had agents who there received the boxes and distributed the
parcels. His profits were derived from charging each parcel as if
it had been separately carried. On the complaint that the railway
companies charged him higher rates than other wholesale London
houses for like traffic under like circumstances, the Court held
that the railway companies had violated the law. The fact that
Kr. Sutton was a rival carrier with the railway companies would
not constitute a difference in circumstance and thereby justify
a higher charge. Railway companies were bound to treat all per-
sons alike for all purposes. The same mode of making charges must
apply to all whether the consignor or the consignee was a carrier
or not. The Great Western Railway Company once made the follow-
ing distinction as to their charges for carriage: in the case of
the public, if there were several packages from one consignor
to several consignees or from several consignors to one consignee,
the charge was upon the aggregate weight; in the case of carriers,
the charge for similar traffic was upon the separate weight of
each package. On complaint the Court held that the railway com-
panies violated the equality Clause. It was held on another oc-
1. Parker v. G. W. Railway, 11 C. B. 545.
2. See also Pickford v. Grand Junction Railway Co., 10 M & W. 399.
3. Parker v. G. W. Railway Co., 7 M. & G., 253.
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casion that the requirement of equality of charge was confined to
the railways in England; no excess of charge made in France for
the carriage of goods from France to London was recoverable."
1
The Equality Clause was, therefore, a very rigid rule. For
the same service the same sum should be charged. Everything turned
upon the words "the same"; the moment the service was not the same
2
the Clause would not apply. The construction that was put by
the Court of Law upon the Clause rendered it inoperative. The
Court held the opinion that where the original place and departure
or ultimate place of arrival for the passengers or goods was dif-
3
ferent, the charges could be different too. Practically no two
kinds of traffic would be carried the same distance and under ex-
actly the same conditions. Therefore a clause that merely in-
sisted on equality when all the circumstances were exactly the
4
same had very little effect.
In 1846 several important Select Committee on Railways were
appointed. They all recommended 'in one form or another that a
1. Branley v. South Eastern Railway, 12 C. B. N. S. , 63.
2. Pickering, Phipps and others v. L. N. W. Railway Co., and others,
1892; 8 Railway and Canal Traffic Cases, 83, 110
3. Fourth Raport of Railway Commission, 1851, P. XXI.
4. Darlington: Railway and Canal Traffic Acts, P. 48.
5. Both Houses appointed separate Committees; two from the House of
Commons and one from the House of Lords. The Select Committee of
the House of Commons made four reports: two on the principles of
amalgamation as applied to the Railway and Canal Bills and two on
Railway Acts Enactments. The Select Committee of the House of Lords
was appointed to consider whether a uniform system of management
could be enforced on railways; how the expense attendant on obtain-
ing Acts of Parliament could be diminished; and whether legislative
measures could be found to protect individuals from the injury sus-
tained from railways passing through their property, so as to re-
lieve them from being subjected to the expense of opposing Bills in
Parliament. Besides these Committees, a Commission was appointed
to inquire into the gauge of railways.
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low scale of tolls and charges should be imposed and that the
rates of amalgamated companies should "be subjected to revision.
The Committees concurred in recommending the appointment of a spec-
ial Railway Commission or the creation of a special Executive De-
partment, which should make preliminary investigations into all
railway schemes and be charged with the power of general control
and supervision of railways. In consequence of these recommenda-
tions an Act was passed in 1846 establishing a Board of Railway
Commissioners.
1
The powers which were formerly possessed by the
Railway Department of the Board of Trade were transferred to them
and more powers were promised. But this Act was repealed by the
2
Board of Trade (Railways) Act in 1851. The Railway Commission
formally ceased to exist in 1851, but in 1851 the work was already
combined with that of the Board of Trade.
The period under review shows that Parliament endeavored to
deal effectively with the great question of a proper regulation
of railway rates. Some of the Acts, as we have seen, were sub-
jected to such powerful influence that some of the provisions -
and the most important ones as regards the public - were rendered
to a large extent nugatory. But much was accomplished. Railway
enterprise was much better understood. Railway expansion was no
longer looked upon with fear and suspicion. Regulation was to
take place but only with the interests of both the public and pri-
vate well protected. The various Select Committees from 1837 to
1. Its work will be discussed in Chapter XII.
2. 14 and 15 Vict. C. , 64.
3. Parsloe: Our Railways, P. 237.
I
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1853 agreed almost to a man that regulation of rates was necessary
and that some supervising board should he created. During this
period Parliament succeeded in reserving a certain right to itself
which was of vital importance to all later legislative regulations.
The first one was that Farl lament might pass any general railway
Act for regulating the railway system; the second was that Parlia-
ment possessed a power in certain contingencies of reducing the
maximum rates; and thirdly, government might as a last resort pur-
chase the lines under certain conditions. All these exerted such
a strong influence on all the railway companies that there were
left only two alternatives for the railway companies - either to
submit to reasonable regulation or to government ownership.

CHAPTER VI.
The Railway and Canal Traffic
Act, 1854.
Railway promotion was almost entirely suspended in the years
following the mania of 1344-46 .The actof 1850 which was to facili-
tate the abandonment of the construction, and the dissolution of
railway companies illustrated the depression of the time. By
1852 the worst of the crisis was over and the spirit of railway
enterprise was again reviving. The year 1854 marked a new era in
2
railway legislation. A Railway and Canal Traffic Act was passed
in this year, and, the first of its series, effected a great change
3
in the regulation of railway rates. The Act imposed a new duty
upon railway companies, namely, the duty of treating all cus-
tomers alike, without giving "any undue or unreasonable preference
or advantage" affording all reasonable facilities to the public
and forwarding and delivering traffic without delay.
The Act of 1854 was the creature of the period. Maximum rate
regulation of railway rates was ineffective and periodic revision
of rates inoperative. Competition reigned supreme, but it af-
forded little protection to the public. Interchange of traffic
1. The Abandonment of Railways Act, 1850; 13 and 14 Vict. C. 83.
2. Cleveland-Stevens: English Railways, Their Development and
their Relation to the State, P. 192.
3. Spillers v. G. W. Railway, 14. Railway and Canal Traffic Cases
P. 81; Modern Railway Workings, V. 7, P. 133. Report, Joint Select
Committee, V. 13, 1872, P. XI.
I
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was almost impossible, because of the intense rivalry among railway
companies. Railway companies did not hesitate to vary their charges
so as to produce the greatest amount of profit to themselves, ir-
respective of the greater or less facility or expense with which
the several services were performed. Either by laying obstructions
at the junction points in the interchange of traffic or by charging
unequal tolls and rates, traffic was usually sent by the most cir-
cuitous routes for a longer mileage distance. Railway companies
even disregarded maximum charges as in the case of the conveyance
of coals and minerals; they denied to one person facilities which
they afforded to others.
Difficulties thrown in the way of interchange of traffic only
excluded the public from enjoying the freedom of using the rail-
ways; the railway companies could always arrange to divide the
traffic in that manner which they might consider most advantageous
to themselves, with little or no regard to the interests of the
public using the railways.
4 Railway companies never failed to
combine to secure their respective interests and to obtain from
the public the greatest possible amount of remuneration for ser-
vices rendered with little or no regard for public convenience
and security. They possessed the power of materially inter-
fering with the freedom of trade and of frustrating the intentions
1. Fourth Report, Railway Commission, 1850, P. XXI.
2. Third Report, Railway Commission, 1849, P. 7.
3. Fourth Report, Select Committee, 1853, P. 5; Han. 1854, V. 132,
P. 1242. See also Evidences given by Mr. Seymour Clark, general
manager of Great Northern Railway; Report, Select Committee, 1853,
Minutes of Evidence; quest ion, 388-508.
4. Third Report, Railway Commission, 1849, P. 8.
5. Fourth Report, Railway Commission, 1850, P. XXIII.
I
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of Parliament. Railway companies were managed in this period
rather by the desire to serve their own local interest than to
exchange traffic with one another for the convenience of the pub-
lic. Strong efforts were made by some of the large railway com-
panies to eliminate the smaller ones.
1
The object of Parliament
in authorizing the construction of shorter lines on the ground
of the advantages to be' derived in the conveyance of particular
classes of goods to markets by a shorter and more economical
route at more moderate rates was largely defeated.
There was further the question of unequal rates which had ex-
ercised the public mind ever since 1845. Disputes constantly arose
between the railway companies and the public as to the equality
of charges. 2 The necessity for vigilance in parting with any
control of the railway companies was further enhanced by the fail-
ure of competition to do what it was intended by Parliament, and
the constant increase of amalgamation among railway companies
under such conditions which Parliament must sanction.
Though the need of more restrictive regulation was imperative,
yet Parliament did not adopt it without consideration and inquiry.
In Parliament it was urged that the railway systems had attained
such vast proportions that all legislation connected with it must
1. Amalgamation was no longer among small railway companies. For-
instance, one bill in Parliament at this time sought the union
under one control of raised capital of 60,000,000 fc, and annual
revenue exceeding 4,000,000 fc, and an extent of railway communi-
cation of upward "of 1,200 miles, or more than one -sixth of the
railways in the United Kingdom. Han. 1854, V. 132, -ff 1587.
2. Han. V. 303, 1886, P. 554.
3. Second Report, Select Committee, 1846, P. IV; Fourth Report,
Select Committee, 1853, P. 4, 5.
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"be cautious, practical and well considered, that the interests
of the railway companies as well as that of the public should not
be neglected, and that it was advisable not to enter too much
into the details of the management of the different lines.
1
Although the rights and privileges granted by Parliament in the
special acts could not be exclusively maintained when they ceased
to be consistent with the general advantages of the public, yet
the power of making charges from which their just renumeration
was to spring as specified in the Acts, must not be curtailed ex-
cept that upon clear grounds of public policy. The utmost import
ance of preserving the most amicable relations between the execu-
tive government as the guardian of the public interests on the
one hand, and of the private interests on the other must be duly
and carefully realized.
Though railway problems were probably pretty well understood
by this time through the many valuable reports made by the various
Select Committees, 4 the Railway Department of the Board of Trade,
and the Railway Commission, yet it was thought desirable to ap-
point, in December, 1852, a strong Select Committee "to consider
1. Han. V. 132, 1854, P. 601.
2. Fifth Report, Select Committee, 1853, P. 6.
3. Fourth Report, Select Committee, 1854, P. 4.
4. The following committees upon Railway Bills had sat during the
seven years preceding 1853:
1846— -64 Committee sat for 867 days.
1847—52 Committee sat for 635 days.
1848—14 Committee sat for 176 days.
•49—11 Committee sat for 73 days.
! 50—15 Committee sat for 113 days.
•51—14 Committee sat for 131 days.
•52--15 Committee sat for 137 days.
Fifth Report, Select Committee, 1853, P. 15.
5. No less than five members were once either Presidents of the
Board of Trade or Chief Commissioners of Railways, Han. V. 132,
1854, P. 585.
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the principle of amalgamation as applied to Railway or Railway
and Canal Bills about to be brought under the consideration of
Parliament and to consider the principles which ought to guide the
House in railway legislation. 11 This Select Committee, of whiah
Mr. Cardwell 1 was chairman, made five reports, the fourth and the
fifth being the most important. It went into the subject very
thoroughly and laid special emphasis on the need of facilities
for the interchange of traffic. In the fifth report eleven recom-
mendations were made; the seventh which is given here was the
basis of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1854.
"7. That every railway company should be compelled to afford
to the public, in respect both of goods and passengers, the full
advantage of convenient interchange from one system to another; to
afford every class of traffic, including postal communication,
just facilities and observe all statutory provisions especially
those requiring equal charges under same circumstances, and that
when complaint arises that any company has violated any of these
obligations, provision should be provided for the hearing and de-
cision of such complaint in open court, with power to make use of
the interference of the Railway Department for the purpose of as-
certaining by what specific and detailed arrangements such com-
2
plaint may be effectually redressed." It was pointed out that
in conceding amalgamation, Parliament would part with a power
1. Mr. Cardwell was added to the Committee in Feb. 1853, after
the first report was made on Dec. 16, 1852; the first report con-
tained only one resolution.
2. Fifth Report, 1853, P. 21.
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which it might exercise for the purpose of securing to the pub-
lic one of the greatest advantages that a commercial country could
enjoy, viz., freedom and economy of transit for persons and mer-
chandise from one part of the country to another.
1 Such power
should never he parted with unless these advantages were fully
secured.
Mr. Cardwell moved to bring in a Bill for the better regu-
2
lation of traffic on railways and canals. Lhe object of the bill
was twofold; it first defined the duties and obligations of rail-
way and canal companies, and secondly it proceeded to establish
_ 3
a code by which these duties and obligations could be enforced.
The Bill originally consisted of three parts. In the first part
it aimed to give to railway companies powers of entering into
combinations and working agreements with one another for the pur-
pose of bringing the whole system into harmony. In the second
part were provisions for arbitration by the Board of Trade. The
third part provided a machinery for- securing to the public the
practical enjoyment of that fair transit along the lines of rail-
way companies from one to another, to which by the theory of law
the public were already entitled. The Bill aimed to make this
right effective and practical. Mr. Cardwell remarked that by en-
actment the right would be established; by decree of a court of
justice, the violation of that right would be adjudicated and
by arbitration the mode would be Beter-mined in which complete
1. Fourth Report, 1853, P. 4.
2. Han. 1854, V. 132, P. 585.
3. Han. L854, V. 133, P. 594.
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effect could be given to the decision of that tribunal.
1
The Bill
did not intend to obtain powers for varying or altering railway
charges. What was intended was to make the railways to be really
King's Highways for the public. There would be no more alliance,
offensive or defensive, no more policy and no more diplomacy; but
all the railway companies would be subjected to the law, giving
their full benefits to the public with regard to the traffic of
3
passengers and goods from one end of the Kingdom to another.
The Bill enunciated three important principles, viz.:
1. That every railway company should afford reasonable facili-
ties for forwarding and delivering traffic.
2. That no undue or unreasonable preference or advantage
should be given.
3. That tolls and charges authorized by the special acts to
be taken and exacted by the railway companies should be published
by being exhibited on a piece of board.,
When the Bill was in Parliament there was considerable dis-
cussion as to the best mode by which the rules could be carried
into effect. Two modes were suggested; one, the establishing of
a separate and independent Board of Executive Government; the
5
other, reliance upon the court of law. In spite of unfitness
and prediction of failure from several members and many judges,
the latter mode was adopted. The duties sought to be cast upon
1. Han. 1854, V. 132, P. 593.
2. Han. 1854, V. 132, P. 596.
3. Han. 1854, V. 132, P. 599.
4. Joint Committee, 1872, V. 13, P. XII.
5. Han. 1854, V. 133, PP. 594-612; Railway Times, 1854, P. 580.
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the judges by the bill, it was said, had nothing at all to do with
1 2
law. Regarding the word "reasonable" in the Bill, no one could
interpret it as it was not a code. It would leave the judges to
exercise their own discretion as to what they might deem reason-
able. Many courts intimated their unwillingness to undertake the
duties, so the whole proceeding was confined to the Court of Com-
3 4
mon Pleas, assisted, if necessary, by an engineer or a barrister.
The Bill passed into law on July 10, 1854, under the title
5
as already indicated, of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854.
The Act was a short one of but eight sections; of these, the sec-
ond was much the most important. It required every railway com-
pany to afford reasonable facilities and no undue preference or
advantage was to be given. It should be lawful to complain in
1. Han. 1854, V. 133, PP. 594-612; Railway Times, 1854, P. 594.
2. Regarding the word "reasonable" the object of this part of the
Bill was to apply the old law of common carriers, as it used to be
upon the old roads, to the altered state of things upon the rail-
ways of the country. . That law imposed a presumtory obligation
on the common carrier, and the word "reasonable" was the legal
word always adopted to define the measure of obligation.
3. The Court of CoTjnon Pleas, like the other two Courts of Common
Law - the Court of Exechequer and the Court of King's Bench - was
an offshoot of the King ' s 'Household and was dependent upon the
Curia Regis. In the 17th article of the Magna Carta granted in
1215 it was provided that "Common Pleas shall not follow our Court
but shall be held in some fixed place." The Court of Common Pleas
thus assumed its distinction and was later permanently fixed at
Westminister. The Court of Common Pleas was for the private suits
of subjects, the Court of Exechequer for cases touching the King's
revenue and the Court of King's Bench for all other matters, but
later they became for most purposes three sister courts of similar
and coordinate authority. Holdsworth, W. S. : History of English
Law, 1909, V. 2, P. 168; May, T. E. : Constitutional History of Eng
land, 1912, V. 3, P. 284; McKechnie, W. S. : Magna Carta, 1905, PP.
308-317; Stubbs, W. : Constitutional History of England, 1873, P.
600, V. 2, p. 290.
4. 17 ana 18 Vict. , C. 31.
5. The Act, Section 2.
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the Court of Common Pleas against any violation of the Act. The
Act dealt with the question of impediments interposed in the way
of freedom of traffic by compelling every railway company to af-
ford reasonable facilities. As in that period through traffic
was practically undeveloped, this certainly marked decided progress
The Act did not, however, give every railway company power to make
through rates, which was just as essential as the power of obtain-
ing facilities for through traffic. The Act, therefore , had two
important defects. The first was that the Court of Common Plea
was not a Court that could discharge efficiently what was intended
by the Act. The second was that as the power of making through
rates was not given, the enactment for through' traffic was made
inoperative. The Select Committee of 1872 attributed much of the
failure of this Act to the alterations of the Bill in Parliament,
2
made under railway influence.
With the passing of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854,
the legislative policy of rate regulation was distinctly changed.
Before 1354 railway statutes were passed with the idea that the
company should provide a railroad which was to be open to all on
payment of certain tolls. It was also empowered to carry and
convey goods, making reasonable charges not exceeding those author-
ized. The right of free passage over railways was, however, un-
workable. The later Acts, especially the Consolidation Acts of
1845 failed to impose such duties upon the companies as would make
1. Han. 1854, V. 132, P. 589.
2. Joint Committee, 1872, V. 13, P. XIII.
91
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it workable. The theory of free passage over railways was re-
tained; but they laid down such obligations as would make the
railway companies common carriers. The Railway and Canal Traffic
Act, 1854, did not require railway companies to provide motive
power to handle other persons 'wagons at all times or under all.
circumstances, 1 but it recognized the right of the railway com-
panies to be exclusive carriers and specified certain obligations
for the protection of the public. Prior to the Traffic Act, 1854,
the law against preference was contained in Section 90 of the Rail-
way Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, which made it unlawful to
charge unequal rates "for goods of the same description passing
only over the same portion of the line of railroad under the same
circumstances.' But a railway company was, not liable under these
terms, unless the circumstances were exactly the same and unless
the traffic passed not only over the same portion of the railroad
but also over such portions, i. e., for the same distance, and
between the same termini, as we have seen in the Murray and Great
South Western Railway Company case. The enactment necessarily
possessed only a very limited application and its usefulness proved
therefore, to be very small. The Traffic Act of 1854 extended
the same principle; it prohibited the giving of any undue or un-
4
reasonable preferences or advantages in any respect whatever.
1. 14 Railway and Canal Traffic Cases,. P. 70-71; Spiller v. G. W.
2. Railway Clauses Act, 1855, Section 90.
3. Murray v. Great South Western Ra. Co.; 4 Ry. & Ca. Tr. Cas. 456..
Boyle & Waghorn: The Law relating to the Railway and Canal Traffic,
V. 3, P. 215.
4. Twelfth Annual Report of Railway Commission, 1886, V. XX, P. 6,
(c 4718)
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The Railway Clauses Act of 1845 said that circumstances being
equal, charges should be equal; the traffic Act of 1854 said cir-
cumstances being different, the difference is to be proportional
to the differences of circumstances.^ The words of the equality
clause in the Railway Clauses Act of 1845 had no elasticity at
all; there were no outside circumstances to be taken into consid-
eration. It was not a question of regarding the position of one
trader as against that of another and then determining whether
there was any undue preference. It was an absolutely rigid equality
2
that was demanded by the statute. A broad distinction must there-
fore be drawn between the equality clause and the Clause against
any undue preference.
Before we examine the interpretations of the Act given by the
Court of Common Pleas, it is first necessary for us to review brief-
ly the principles that were rejected and the new policy adopted in
the enactment, and also the reasons for the same. Periodic re-
vision of rates was not only recommended by Mr. Gladstone in 1844,
but also by Mr. Morrison as early as 1836. Revision of rates passed
into law in 1844 but it was, as we have seen, inoperative. Aside
from legislative defects, the principle of revision of the rates
was in itself impracticable. To put the principle in practice,
the natural question to ask was "on what principle is it (the Re-
vision) to be performed and by wh6m?" Various methods had been
1. Hearings on Regulation of Railway Rates, Senate Document, V. 18,
59th Congress, first session, 1905-1906, PP. 1844-46.
2. 8 Railway and Canal Traffic Cases, P. 108, Pickering Phipps v. ,
L. & N. W. Railway Co., 1892.
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suggested at different times. Firstly, it was proposed that a
reduction in the rates should be made equivalent to the profit
that the railway companies would gain in amalgamation
.
1
Such a re-
duction would be surely temporary; it would not touch the rates
most complained of. Moreover, a charge which gave the railway
companies ample profit at a certain time, might, through increased
economy or other causes, be excessive at a later period. Secondly,
absolute limitation of dividends was proposed. The profit over
and above a certain limit which was refused to the shareholder
might go to the public in the form of reduced rates. But in order
to make it effective a certain government department must be able
to determine what would be the proper and necessary expenses of a
railway company, what economies they could practice , and what ex-
penses should be charged against revenue, besides, the assumption
that what was withheld from the share holders would be available
for reduction of rates, might be a fallacy. It might lead to ex-
travagant current expenses, which would leave nothing for re-
duction of rates or it might deprive the railway companies of. their
ordinary motive for efficiency and economy to such an extent that
the profit would never rise above the fixed limit. Thirdly, di-
vision of profit beyond a certain limit .between the railway com-
panies and the public was recommended. A limit (say 10 per cent)
being set, all surplus profit should be divided between the com-
pany and the public; one portion of the surplus would be added
1. Joint Committee, Report, 1872, -V. 13, PP. XXXIV, XXXV.
2. Joint Committee. Report, 1872, V. 13, P. XXXVI.
i
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to the dividend and the remainder applied in reducing charges.
The difficulties were to find what the sum available for dividend
should be, what specific rates should be reduced and according to
what standard those rates should be reduced.
These methods being of no avail, it was repeatedly urged to
fix some standard by which rates shoulo be determined. One pro-
posal was that the rates ought to be on some fixed proportion to
the cost of service performed. The cost of carriage should be
ascertained and to this should be added whatever might be neces-
sary in order to produce to the company a fair return on their
capital and labor; the sum of these two should form the standard
of charge by which the scale of rates should be determined and
revised from time to time. Any such standard would be difficult,
if it not impossible, in practice. To ascertain exactly the rela-
tive cost and profit of each description of traffic would not
only be beyond the function of any government machinery, but also
2beyond their power.
In close connection with the proposal to fix rates according
to some standard, was the one to adopt equal mileage rates. An
equal mileage rate is a rate varying in direct proportion with the
number of miles run; it is a charge for each class of goods and
1. Joint Committee, Report, 1872, V. 13, P. XXXIII; Select Com-
mittee, Report
,
1882, V. 13, P. X.
2. The Select Committee of 1882 well pointed out that this would
involve "the finding and consideration of such items as the origi-
nal cost of the particular line; the cost of carriage of the par-
ticulargoods on that part of the line as compared with the cost of
other goods on the same line and other goods on the other portions
of the line; and the proportion of all these to the whole charges
and expenses of the company." Select Committee, 1882, Report,
V. 13, P. X.

- 118 -
passengers in proportion to the distance for which they are carried.
But the results of adopting such rates, it was urged, would be
disadvantageous both to the public and to the railway company. 1
In the first place it would prevent the railway company from low-
ering their charges so as to compete with traffic by sea, by canal
or by a shorter or otherwise cheaper route and would thus deprive
the public of the benefit of competition and the railway companies
of a legitimate source of profit. In the second place, it would
prevent the railway companies from making perfectly fair arrange-
ments for carrying at a lower rate the usual goods brought in
large and constant quantities or for carrying for long distances
at a lower rate than for short distances. In the third place, it
would compel a railway company to carry for the same rate over a
line which had been very expensive in construction or in working
at the same rate at which it would carry over less expensive lines.
Competition between railways would be absolutely impossible. The
policy of opening up distant markets to traders would receive a
serious blow. Trade would be checked and price of many articles
would rise. It was no wonder that all the Select Committee and
Commissioners who had gone thoroughly into the function of the
regulation of the rates, reported against any legislation along
2
the lines of equal mileage rates.
Parliament in 1854 changed its legislative policy in the regu-
lation of rates. Equal mileage rates had been found impracticable;
1. Report of the Royal Railway Commission, 1867, P. XLVII; Report
of the Select Committee, 1872, V. 13, P. XI; Report on Preferential
Treatment, 1906, V. 55, P. 34.
2. Han. 303, P. 555.
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revision of the rates could not very well be carried out. These
principles were abandoned. The Railway and Canal Traffic Act,
1854, was enacted on a new principle. Although the most material
complaint on the subject of the rates was that rates for convey-
ance were unequal on different railroads and on different parts
of the same' railway , and that in consequence of these unequal rates,
many trader and some parts of the country received advantages which
placed them in a favored position for competition, yet Parliament
recognized that unequal rates to some extent were necessary both
to the railway companies and' to the public."'" The Railway and
2
Canal Traffic Act, 1854, justified to some extent unequal rates.
Some preferences and advantages would not be illegal; only undue
preferences and unreasonable- advantages would be against the law.
The Court of Common Pleas, and the two Commissions of 1873 and
1888 as we shall see later, distinctly upheld the right of a rail-
way company to charge unequal rates under certain, circumstances.
Rates might be different when expenses were different. Different
circumstances would justify differences in rates.
The carrying trade brought the railway companies into com-
petition with carriers on land and water. Railway companies found
it necessary to reduce their rates in order to draw traffic to
their own lines. However much the owners of other modes of con-
veyance might have been prejudiced, the general public derived
unqualified advantages from the great increase of facilities for
1. Report of the Royal Commission, 1867, XLVII; Report, Select
Committee, 1882, V. 13, P. VI, P. VIII, and P. XI.
2. Report of the Royal Commission, 1867, P. XLVIII.
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the conveyance of merchandise. The principle which governed a
railway company in fixing a rate is that of creating a traffic by
charging such a sum for conveyance as would induce the produce of
one district to compete with that of another in a common market.
The power of granting unequal rates thus would stimulate a de-
velopment of trade which would not otherwise exist. Some of the
goods, if not carried at the lower rates, would either go by some
other route or not be forwarded at all. It must therefore be ad-
mitted that some of the inequalities of charges would be to the
advantage rather than to the disadvantage of the public.
The Act recognized this necessity but it prescribed a re-
striction. When preference was undue the law would afford a rem-
edy. A preference to be illegal, and to furnish a reasonable
cause of complaint, must be undue. It was not undue so long as
it was the natural result- of fair competition and so long as equal
rates were given for like services under like circumstances and
for like quantities of merchandise. Where circumstances, such
as steep gradients or difference in quantities to be carried, made
the cost of carriage to differ, these circumstances would justify
a difference in charge. What would be reasonable for a road of
easy grsdient and a large volume of traffic might be unreasonably
low for a road of heavy gradients and a smaller traffic. The
preference as regards quantities is recognized by the custom of
trade and is common to all branches of business. A man who buys
goods wholesale expects to and does secure more favorable terms
than the one who buys at retail; the seller by one wholesale trans-
action is saved the trouble and expense of many smaller ones as
well as the cost of storage. The fixing of railway rates is not
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that of a mechanical process; there is no one general theory which
will cover the fixing of all railway rates. 1 A railway charge is
a sum whose determining factors are numerous and constantly vary-
ing.
i
Analysis of the Decisions of the Court of Common ^leas,
1854-1873.
One great object of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act was to
compel railway companies to act with impartiality to all persons
desirous of using the railway and to secure that all should he
2
placed upon equal terms. No undue or unreasonable preferences
should be given. The legislature placed this restriction upon
the railway companies from using their powers and their railways
for the benefit of one person to the exclusion of others. The law
had the further object of preventing railway companies from be-
coming an onerous monopoly. The obligation was imposed on them
in return for the great powers which Parliament conceded to the
railway companies and for the monopoly of their carrying busi-
ness. Without the restriction the powers of a railway company and
its monopoly, under the impossibility of all competition, might
be converted into means of very grievous oppression by a difference
in charge or in point of accomodation made in favor of one man or
place at the expense of another.
What is "undue or unreasonable preference", or "undue or un-
1. Select Committee Report, 1882, V. 13, P. VIII.
2.West v. London, N. W. Ry. Co., 1870; 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic
Cases, 172.
3. Baxendale v. G. W. Ry. Co., 1856; 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic
Cases, 209.
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reasonable prejudice?" It was very hard to define them and in
fact no formal definition had been given. Judge Growder stated
in the Baxendale v. Great Western Railway Go. (Reading case), 1858,
that he did not propose to lay down any precise definition of un-
due preference which would include every case.^" Although no at-
tempt had been made to define them formally and exactly, yet thfeir
meanings could be inferred from the various decisions. The terms
of "undue or unreasonable preferences or advantage" and "undue or
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage" were not to be construed
as ruled in the Nicholson case, with reference to the interests
of the parties using the railroad only, nor to the interests of
2
the railway owners, but to both of them.
When the statute spoke of "undue and- unreasonable preferences
or advantage" and "undue and unreasonable prejudice or disadvant-
age," it did not imply that there might not be advantages to one
person or one class of traffic or prejudice to another. It rather
implied that there would be such advantages and prejudices but
they would not be simply within the Act. The preference and preju-
3
dice must be "undue" or "unreasonable" to be within the statute.
The intention of the legislature was to give equal advantages so
far as the charges and facilities were concerned to all individu-
als similarly circumstanced. The railway companies, although they
had the right to lay down certain rules in reference to particu-
lar circumstances, provided they acted bona fide with regard to
1. Baxendale v. G. W. Ry. Go., 1858; 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Gases,
209.
2. Nicholson v. G. W. Ry. Go. (No. 1) 1858; 1 Ry. & Ganal Traffic
Cases, 138.
3. Baxendale v. G. W. Ry. Co., 1858; 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases,
210.
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their own interests and the interest of the public, should not
be at liberty to make particular bargains with particular individu-
als, whereby one person was benefitted and another injured."1* In
the Ransorae Case (No. 1) Messrs. Ransome & Co., was charged a
much larger sum per ton in proportion to the distance over which
their coals were carried, than Messrs. Edward and Alfred Prior &
Co. by the Eastern Counties Railway Co. Messrs. ^ansome were
able to bring coals from Northumberland and Durham to Ipswich by
sea. Messrs. Prior could bring their coals from Yorkshire and Staf-
fordshire only by means of the Great Northern and the Midland
Railways. Messrs. Prior had made an agreement with the Eastern
Counties Railway Company to Gend a larger quantity of coals in
three years from Peterborough to various places on the line of the
railway mentioned ascertain rates to different places. The sums
charged to Messrs. Prior for the carriage of coals to different
places were fixed so as to enable them to compete in the coal trade
with Ransome & Co., who had the advantage of having their coal
brought by sea to Ipswich. The Court granted the injunction, "en-
joining the railway company" to desist from giving any undue pref-
erence to Messrs. Prior and to carry coal for Messrs. Ransome on
equal terms with Messrs. Prior, due regard being had to the cir-
cumstances, if any, which rendered the cost to the company less
in carryimg for one party than for the other."
The greatest difficulty in interpreting the law was how much
1. Ransome v. E. C. Ry Co. (No. 1), 1857; 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic
Cases, 70.
2. Ransome v. E. C. Ry. Co., 1857; Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 63.
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the interest of the railway companies should "be taken into con-
sideration in deciding a preference or prejudice, "undue or un-
reasonable." It was admitted on all sides that the interests of
the railway company should be taken into account.
1
The Court felt
greater reluctance to interpose in those cases where the benefit
of the railway company in their character of proprietors of the
particular railway was involved. The reason was partly from an
unwillingness to interfere with parties in the management of their
own affairs for their own advantage, and partly from a disposition
to give the railway companies credit for acting on an enlightened
view of their own interests as identified with those of the public.
This argument sometimes carried itself too far as in the Baxendale
v. Great Western Railway Company (Reading Case) that the Court
could not interfere to prevent a railway company from fixing the
rates of tolls to be taken on its railway in such a manner as would
2best promote its own interests.
The Court, though, took into consideration the interest of
the railway companies, yet never allowed the railway companies
to do it unlawfully, The Court always sought to satisfy itself
that a. railway company while seeking to promote its own advantages
had been using lawful means. The Court would not hesitate to in-
terfere with a railway company which used the means of establish-
ing an inequality that was unreasonable under the circumstances
1. Nicholson v. Great Western Ry. Co. (No. 1&2) 1858-1860; 1 Ry.
& Canal Traffic Cases, 121, 143; Baxendale. v. Great Western Ry.
Co., 1858; 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 191; Ransome v. E. C. Ry.
Co. (Nos. 1-4) 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 63, 109, 116, 155.
2. Baxendale v. G. W. Ry. Co., 1858; 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases,
211.
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and was operating unfairly and injuriously upon particular indi-
viduals or that was affording to one person an advantage which it
would not afford to another under similar circumstances.^ It was
true that great difficulty and nicety arose in dealing with such
cases, but when the railway company subjected others to unreason-
able disadvantage, the Court never refused to act.
Closely connected with the question of the interest of rail-
way companies was the free po?/er of making contracts or agreements
The terms which the railway companies would offer to make agree-
ments might appear to show preference or prejudice from one party
to another. Agreements for large quantities might be beyond the
means of small capitalists; agreements for long distances might
be beyond the needs of those whose traffic was confined to home
district. But the Court held in the Nicholson case that the power
of the railway company to contract was not restricted by these
2
considerations. The free power of making contracts was held to
be essential to the railway companies for making commercial profit
They possessed that power as free as any merchants. But the power
was restricted under several important conditions. In the first
place the agreement must have the only object of a legitimate in-
crease of the profits of the railway companies. In the second
place the railway companies must be willing to afford the same fa-
cilities to all others upon the same terms. In the third place
1. Baxendale v. G. W. Ry. Co., 1858; 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases,
210.
2. Nicholson v. G. W. Ry. Co., 1860; 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases,
149
3. Nicholson v. G. W. Ry. Co., 1858; 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases,
121.
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the agreement must be clearly shown that it was done in order to
prevent a competition with the railway or that there was secured
thereby to the company such an amount of traffic as to compensate
for making the reduced rates. 1 A railway might enter into a special
arrangement to give special privileges but the simple contracting
of having all goods consigned to one railway company through their
lines and not by water or other means where the purpose is not to
prevent a competition with the railway or where there was not se-
cured thereby to the company such an amount of traffic as to com-
pensate for making the reduced rates was still an undue prefer-
ence.
2 A lower charge would not amount to an undue preference
only under certain circumstances such as that when the goods were
guaranteed for large quantities and full train loads sent at regu-
lar periods with full compensation to the railway company, who
granted the lower charge.
The legitimate ground for making reduction was another im-
portant factor in deciding whether a preference was undue or un-
reasonable. If no advantage was due to one party and the advant-
age was given, the advantage would be an undue preference.
When a railway company charged different rates simply to enable
one group of traders to compete with another group as their mani-
fest object, the difference in the rates would constitute an
undue preference. 4 In the absence of sufficient proof for an
adequate motive of making a contract to meet competition or
1. Garton v. B* & E. Ry. Co., 1859; 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 218
2. Ibid.
3. Ransome v. E. C. Ry. Co., 1857; 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 70.
4. Ransome v. E. C. Ry. Co., Ibid, 63, 72, 138.
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opposition, such a contract gives an undue preference even though
for large quantities sent regularly.
1
If the view of a railway
company was simply to induce parties to engage with the company
as their carrier directly to the exclusion of rival carriers, the
favor shown in such cases and for such purposes was considered
as an undue preference.
The desire to introduce goods into a new market with a special
arrangement to carry them at lower rates, as in the Oxlade case
where the North Eastern Railway Company wished to introduce coke
into Staffordshire was not a legitimate ground to give a prefer-
ence. The lowering of the rates for such purpose, there being
nothing to show that the pecuniary interests of the railway com-
pany were effected, was giving an undue preference.
A railway company was justified in carrying goods at a lower
rate, if there were circumstances which rendered the cost of
carrying less. 4 Suppose 1,000 tons of merchandise could be
carried for a lower sum per ton per mile than 100 tons or
goods could be carried 1,000 miles at a lower rate than 100
miles, yielding an equal profit in both cases to the railway
company, the company was entitled to so regulate the charges as
to derive equal profit from both cases. The lowering of the rates
charged for larger quantity or the longer distance was not giving
1. Garton v. B. & E. Ry. Co., 1859; 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 225
2. Ibid.
3. Oxlade v. N. E. Ry. Co., 1857; Ibid, 72.
4. Ibid; Harris v. C. & W. Ry. Co., 1858; Ibid, 97.
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an undue preference. 1 The railway company in fixing rates could
consider the whole profit and not the mere profit per mile. In
order to inducepeople to carry more and longer on their line, the
railway company could agree to make certain reductions in their
rate charged.
Those circumstances which rendered a difference in the cost
of carrying, might be of a general or of a local or techniQal
character either in the nature of operation or of the traffic. The
most common circumstances under which a preference might be justi-
fied were the working of a particular portion of the railroad;
regularity and certainty of traffic; through, local and intermedi-
ate traffic; the working of competition at certain places; traffic
of a large quantity at a smaller per unit cost; and the long and
2
the short distance traffic. Circumstances which were wholly dis-
tinct from and would not affect the price or profit of the car-
riage was not taken into account in determining whether the pref-
erence was undue. 5 The Court did not recognize the opposition
of a threatened construction of a tramway to divert the traffic
of a railway company, as a sufficient ground to justify e vari-
ation in the rate of charge. The guiding principle of the Court
in judgung whether a circumstance could be legitimate ground for
justifying preference depended on whether or not it would affect
4
the cost of conveyance.
1. Ransome v. E. C. Ry Co., 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 69.
2. Harris v. C. & W. Ry Co.; 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 102.
Oxlade v. N. E. Ry. Co.; 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 83.
3. Baxandale v. G. W. Ry. Co.; Ibid, 200.
4. Ransome, v. E. C. Ry. Co.; Ibid, 71, 120.

- 129 -
The grouping of districts together with a uniform scale of
charges might be justified, if it did not subject any one of the
districts to disadvantage, nor it appeared to be disadvantageous
to the public at large or objectionable in other respects. 1 But
if the effect of such a scale of charges was to diminish the nat-
ural advantages by annihilating in point of expense of carriage,
a certain portion of the distance, just in proportion by which
that natural advantage was diminished, an undue preference was
2
given.
Gases which involved charges incidental to conveyance were
ruled under the same principle of undue preference. Rates for
conveyance and charges for collection and delivery were by nature,
separate. The railway companies were not allowed, as in the Bax-
endale (Reading case) to combine them into one charge for the
purpose of compelling persons to employ the company to collect or
deliver such goods and thus to secure the business to the company
as well as to give an undue preference to one party in competing
with another. 5 The Court held that though no profit was made
in a charge including delivery and collection, yet the system of
not making the charges separately was an undue preference to those
persons who did not wish to have their goods collected and de-
4
livered for them by the railway company. A railway company had
no right to impose a charge for the conveyance of goods to or
1. Ransome v. E. C. Ry. Co.; 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 111.
2. Ibid; ' Ibid, 114.
3. Baxendale v. G. W. Ry. Co.; Ibid, 212.
4. 1 Garton v. G. W. Ry. Co., 214; Baxendale v. G. W. Ry. Co.;
1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases. 212.
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from their station where the customer did not wish such services
to be performed by them.
1 If a railway company gave special fa-
cility or advantage to their own agents and not to others, such
as a station which was closed to the public except the agents of
the company after a definite time, as in the Garton v. the Bristol
and Exeter Railway Company case, this facility or advantage was
considered as an undue prejudice to those who did not wish to have
their goods conveyed through the hands of the company's agents.
The law made it the duty of the railway company to receive and
deliver goods and not to throw difficulties in the way. The Rail-
way and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, gave the consignees the right to
receive their goods at the station without being obliged to em-
ploy any intermediate hands. It was not lawful for a railway com-
pany to give an advantage to themselves over other carriers in the
carriage of goods to and from the station, as in the Parkinson
3
case
.
The effect of the decisions by the Court of Common Pleas had
been summarized by the Joint Committee of 1872. A railway company
was .bound to give the same treatment to all persons equally under
the same circumstances but there was nothing to prevent a railway
company if acting with a view to its own profit, from imposing
such conditions as might incidentally have the effect of favoring
one class of traders or one town, or one portion of their traffic,
provided the conditions were same for all persons and were such
as lead to the conclusion that they were really imposed for the
1. 1 Garton v. B. & E. Ry. Co., 218.
2. 1 Garton v. B. & E. Ry. Co., 218; Baxendale v. G. Y.7 . Ry.; 1 Ry.
& Canal Traffic Cases, 212.
3. Parkinson v. G. W. Ry. Co.; 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 280.
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benefit of the railway company.
1
No important complaints had been made of the inadequacy of
the existing accomodations except in two cases, which were not of
much importance.
The Regulation of Railways Act, 1868.
The Regulation of Railways Act, 1868, was generally in-
cluded as one of the Traffic Acts, but it had more to do with fi-
nance than rates. The Act as passed was divided into seven parts:
1 and 2, accounts, audit, etc.; 3, provisions for safety of passen-
gers; 4, compensation for accidents; 5 and 6, light railways, and
7, miscellaneous. Fares and rates were to be posted and to be
charged all alike. 5 The provisions of the Traffic Act, 1854, re-
garding the above were extended to include steam vessels. A rail-
way company was required to distinguish a charge, on application,
4
how much for conveyance and how much for terminal services. In
case of through traffic the distance was to be reckoned continu-
ously as on one railway. The power of appointing arbitrators
and fixing remunerations was given to the Board of Trade.
1. Report of the Select Committee, 1872, 213, P. XIII; also Re-
port of the Royal Commission, 1867, P. XLIX.
2. 1. Oxlade v. N. S. Ry. Co., 73; 162; 1 West v. L. & N. W. Ry.,
167, L. R. S. C. , P. 622.
3. Act, 1868, s. 15, 16.
4. Act, 1868., S. 17.
5. Act, 1868, S. 18.
6. Under the Railway Company Arbitration Act, 1859, Board of Trade
possessed the power of appointing arbitrator or umpire only when
the railway companies failed to do so; renumeration was left in
the discretion of the arbitrator and to be paid by the companies
equally.

CHAPTER VII.
The Regulation of Railways Act, 1875, and the
Work of the Commissioners appointed under it.
The events that led to the passage of the Regulation of Rail-
ways Act in 1873 were in general the same as those of 1854. ^he
rate problem was, however, much more acute. ^ Competition among
railway companies and between railway and canal companies was less
effective. Amalgamation in spite of the various reports against
2
it was still going on. Railway rates had gone up considerably.
The question of undue preference was still unsolved, interchange
of traffic was almost as difficult as in 1854. i'here was appar-
ently no way of maintaining competition as an effective regulator. 5
In 1872 as in 1853 there were again many Bills in Parliament seek-
ing amalgamation, only on a much larger scale. One Bill was pe-
titioning for an amalgamation of the London and North-Western
Railway Company with the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Com-
pany.
4 Competition, in charges at all events, was almost extinct.
The imperative and immediate necessity of maintaining the remain-
ing portion of that valuable competition in route, in accomodation,
in facilities, and in all those advantages which would result from
having two or more parties to deal with on the side of the public
instead of one, was evident to all. Traffic was not always al-
1. Westminister Review, 1866, PP. 297-331; Edinburgh Review, 1857,
V. 105, PP. 242-266; 1858, V. 107, PP. 396-419; Fortnightly Re-
view, 1873, PP. 557-580; Quarterly Review, 1873, V. 134, PP. 195-207.
2. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1894, V. 8, P. 283; Economist,
1868, P. 145, 645.
3. Han. 214, P. 241; 215, P. 1545; Economist 1872, April 13, P. 450.
4. Han. 214, P. 229.
5. Han. V. 214, P. 231.
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lowed to take Its proper routes; the shortest and best routes were
often artificially barred by the imposition of prohibitory tolls.
These tolls, like the "bar tolls" on canals, were imposed for the
express purpose of diverting traffic from its natural and proper
courses.
1 The constitution of a Railway Commission and legislation
on "undue preference" and "unreasonable facilities for through
traffic," led again to the postponement for nearly twenty years
2
of the direct regulation of railway rates.
Between 1854 and 1873 two valuable reports on railways were
made j the first by the Royal Railway Commissioners in 1867 and
the second by the Joint Select Committee on railway amalgamation
in 1872. The inquiries went into questions of railway charges,
amalgamations and railway legislation. They all recommended that
the principle upon which was based the Railway and Canal Traffic
Act, 1854, was sound but that its enactment was defective, chiefly
in two respectst In the first place the railway companies did
not have the power to make through rates and in the second place,
theact could not be efficiently discharged by the ordinary Court
of Law such as the Court of Common Pleas. A new tribunal for en-
couraging the public to make complaints of unjust use of their
great powers by the railway companies should therefore be created.
The original recommendation on this by the Select Committee of
1872 is worth quoting.
1. Han. V. 214, P. 241.
2. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1894. V. 8, P. 286.
3. Economist, Aug. 17, 1872, P. 1013; Comments on the Report of
1872.
4. Report of the Commissioners, 1807, V. 38, P. LXXVI; Report of
the Joint Select Committee. 1872, V. 13, P. XIV.
5. Joint Select Committee, P, eport , 1872, V. 13, P. LIII.
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"To perform the various duties referred to in this report, a
special body should consist of not less than three members. They
should be persons of high standing, of whom one should be an emi-
nent lawyer, and one should be thoroughly acquainted with the de-
tails and practices of railway management.
"Their effect will be:
"1. To preserve the competition which novf exists by sea.
"2. To give immediately such support as is practicable to com-
petition by canal; and both immediately and ultimately to develop
and utilize the capabilities of canals.
"3. To let the public know what they are charged and why they
are charged; and to give them better means than at present exist
for getting unfair charges remedied.
"4. To enforce the harmonious working and development of the
present railway and canal systems so as to produce from them the
greatest amount of profitable work which they are capable of doing."
The Select Committee further recommended that every railway
company should be bound to make a through rate for goods over every
other company's line.
1
The proposal of giving every railway com-
pany general compulsory running powers over the lines of every
other, was rejected on the same grounds as those taken by the Se-
lect Committee of 1853. 2
As a result of these reports, Mr. Chichester Fortescue, Chair-
man of the Select Committee of 1872, moved in 1873 to bring in a
Bill to make for better provision for carrying into effect the
1. Report, Joint Select Committee, V. 13, 1872, P. XIV.
2. Fourth Report, 1853, P. 6.
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Railway and «anal Traffic Act, 1854.
1
The Bill was founded upon
the report of the Joint Committee and in principle did not differ
in principle from the Act of 1854. The objects of that act were
to secure uninterrupted facilities for the convenient interchange
of traffic from one system to another and to observe especially
2
the rule of equal charges under the same circumstances. But as
to securing the equal treatment of railway companies by railway
companies or the free and uninterrupted forwarding of traffic over
all the lines which Parliament had sanctioned, the success of the
Act had been most imperfect. In controlling the dealings of rail-
way companies, the Act had been to a great degree a dead letter.
This want of success was in the opinion of the Committee, as we
have said, due to two defects. What the new Bill aimed at was only
an improvement in these two important respects, namely the lack
of more specific enactments within the Act itself and the want of
an authority better fitted than the Court of Common Pleas for
putting the Act in motion and carrying its intentions and pro-
visions into effect.
Experience since the passing of the hailway and Canal Traffic
Act, 1854, had vary conclusively shown that a Court of Law was
not an authority fitted for giving effect to an Act so peculiar
4
and special as the Railway and Canal Traffic Act. The reason
that Parliament made use of the Court of Common Pleas in the Act
was at that time there was a distinguished Judge - Chief Justice
1. Han., 1875, V. 214, P. 229.
2. Han., 1873, V. 21&, P. 233.
3. Han., 1873, V. 214, P. 234.
4. Han., 1873, V. 214, P. 230.
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Jervis of the Court of Common Pleas - who, differing from all his
brethern, thought that his own Court could undertake the task in
spite of the protests of other judges that it was not a code.
Lord Campbell, a famous judge, confessed in Parliament that he knew
not what was a reasonable fare or what was an undue delay. * His
prediction was found to have been entirely fulfilled. At the end
of 19 years it was thought that it would be well to take his ad-
vice to remove this jurisdiction from the Court of Common Pleas
to some other tribunal. The Bill proposed to create such a tribu-
nal in the form of Railway Commissioners. Jn the second place,
instead of granting general compulsory running powers, the Bill,
following the recommendations of the Select Committee, proposed
that under proper conditions, every railway company should have
a right to require and obtain through rates over the lines of
every other railway company. As the question of determining and
apportioning the through rates was a very vexatious one, the Bill
proposed to invest with the Railway Commissioners ample power to
settle this matter among the railway companies. The large powers
of the Railway Commissioners over through rates was urged more
on the ground of necessity and expediency than of any correct prin-
ciple. It might be criticized as an unjust interference which
had for its object the prevention of that kind of charge which
was imposed in order to close a route against traffic not by a
physical, but by a fiscal obstacle, the object of that charge
being to direct traffic over a course more profitable to the rail-
1. Han. 1855, V. 153, P. 1137.
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way company."^" besides, the making of through rates must be to a
great extent at the discretion of the railway company, 'i'hrough
rates might be fixed according to mileage, but that was a rule
which was not capable of being always rigidly observed. So the
Bill proposed that every railway company should have power to make
through rates. If the rates were objected to, the Railway Com-
missioners should have power to allow or refuse them. The Bill
also proposed to transfer the power of private arbitration, as
hitherto exercised under the special railway acts, to the Railway
Commissioners
The Bill, after long discussion in both Houses, finally re-
ceived the Royal assent on July 31, 1873 and became the Regulation
of Railways Act, 1873. The Act as passed was divided into five
parts: first, the method of appointment and the specification of
the duties of the Railway Commissioners; second, amendment of the
law; third, conveyance of mails; fourth, regulations as to the
work of the Railway Commissioners, and fifth, miscellaneous. A
4
year later, by the Board of Trade Arbitrations, etc. Act, 1874,
powers were given to the Railway Commissioners to hear and decide
cases by arbitration; 5 and the Board of Trade could appoint Rail-
way Commissioners to be arbitrators or umpires. This part of
the Act is usually construed, together with the Act of 1873 and
7
1874. The Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, as originally pro-
1. Han., 1873, 214, P. 238.
2. Han., 1873, V. 214, P. 240.
3. 36 and 37, Vict. C. 48.
4. 37 and 38, Vict. C. 40.
5. Ibid, Section 7.
6. Ibid, Section 6.
7. 37 and 38, Vict C. 40 Sect. 8.
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posed, was to be in force only five years as a sort of an experi-
ment."
1
" The work done by the Railway Commissioners, however, was
so satisfactory and found so necessary that the provisions of the
Act were continued in force until the end of 1882 by the Regulation
2
of Railways Act of 1873 and 1874, Continuance Act, 1879 , and was
subsequently continued again to 1888. It was finally displaced
by the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888.
As to the provisions of the Act, two points need detailed
description; the rest are either out of the scope of our inquiry
or are not of suffiicent importance. The first is the revision
and amendment of the Railway and ^anal Traffic Act, 1854 and the
second, the organization and the powers of the Railway Commission-
ers. The eleventh section of the new law revised the second
section of the Railway and °anal Traffic Act, 1854. Reasonable
facilities were now interpreted so as to include those at through
rates, Every railway company was given the power to propose or to
object to a through rate. lhe Railway Commissioners were to con-
sider and decide, if any objection were made whether the granting
of the through route were reasonable. In deciding disputes aris-
ing out of the apportionment of through rates, the Railway Com-
missioners were to take into consideration all the circumstances
of the case, including operating conditions. No railway company
should be compelled to accept a lower mileage rate than the mile-
age rate which the railway company was charging for like traffic
carried by a like mode of transit on any other line of communi-
1. 37 and 37, Vict.C. 48 Sect. 37.
2. 42 and 43, Vict.C. 56.
"id o
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cation between the same points, being the points of departure and
arrival of the through route. The power of making complaints was
extended to include local authorities and public corporations
.
^
At every station, books should be kept, showing every rate charged
from that station to every other station and must be open to pub-
2
lie inspection without the payment of any fee. The Railway Com-
missioners on the application of any person interested might order
the railway company to distinguish in the rate book how much of
each rate was for the conveyance, including tolls for the use of
the road, of carriages or locomotive power and how much for other
expenses, specifying the nature and detail of such other expenses.
Power to fix terminal charges and to determine what would be a
reasonable sum for services incidental to conveyance, was granted
to the Railway Commissioners. 4 Any agreement between railway
.
5
and canal companies must be sanctioned in order to be valid.
Canals owned by railway companies must be maintained in good work-
ing order.
The Railway Commissioners were to be composed of three Com-
missioners, of v.'hom one must be of experience in law and one in
the business of railway and two assistant commissioners might be
appointed. The Lord Chancellor could remove any one of the three
7
commissioners for inability or misbehavior. The salary of a
1. 36 and 37, Vict. C. 48, Section 13.
2. Ibid, Section 14.
3. Ibid, Section 14.
4. Ibid, Section 15.
5. 36 and 37, Vict. C. 48, S. 16.
6. Ibid, S. 17.
7. Act, Section 4.
H3
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Commissioner was fixed at three thousand pounds a yeart. in the
exercise of any jurisdiction in the Act, the Commissioners might
call in the aid of one or more assessors of engineering or other
o
technical knowledge.
The Commissioners were empowered to hear and determine all
the complaints under section two of the Railway and Canal '-i-'raffic
Act, 1854 and 1873 or under section 16 of the Regulation of Rail-
ways Act, 1868. They could exercise all the powers conferred by
section three of the Traffic Act, 1854, on the several Courts
and Judges empowered to hear and determine complaints under that
Act. The Commissioners might communicate the violation of law
to the railway company before requiring any formal proceedings. 4
The approval of working agreements and the supervision of railway
companies as to their powers in relation to steam vessels, formerly
exercised under the Railway Clauses Act, 1863, Parts 3 and 4 re-
spectively were now transferred from the Board of Trade to the
Railway Commissioners. In the case of any differences between
the various railway companies the disputes might be referred to
the Commissioners for its decision in lieu of being referred to
arbitration. 5
Any objection regarding through rates or routes must be re-
ferred to the Commissioners for hearing and decision. The Com-
1. Act, Section 22.
2. Ibid, 23.
3. Ibid, 6.
4. Act, Section 7.
5. Ibid, 8, 9.
6. Ibid, 4.
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missioners were to have full power \o decide whether a through
rate was reasonable and to make apportionments.^ The decision
of the Commissioners as to the apportionment of through rates were
to be "retrospective." Disputes in matters of terminal charges
could be determined by the Commissioners and they could decide
what was a reasonable sum to be paid for loading and unloading,
covering, uncovering, collection, delivery and other services o f
2
a like nature.
It would be within the jurisdiction of the Commissioners (1)
to decide all questions whether of law or of fact, (2) to prose-
cute inquiries and to make inspection either personally or by ap-
pointment of a person as substitute, (3) to require the attendance
of any person as a witness, and (4) to require the production of
all books, papers and documents.^ Any decision or order of the
Commissioners might be made a rule or order of any Superior Court.
But the Commissioners might review and rescind or vary any pre-
4
vious decision or order made by them. Every decision and order
of the Commissioners should be final except in the case of appeal
on a question of law. On points of law, the Commissioners, at
the instance of any party to the proceedings before them, might
state a case in writing for the opinion of any Superior Court.
The order of the Superior Court to which the case was transmitted,
should be final and conclusive to all parties, ^he costs of any
proceeding before the Commissioners would be fixed at the dis-
1. Act, Sections 11, 12.
2. Act, Section 15.
3. Act, Section 25.
4. Ibid, 26.
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cretion of the Commissioners
.
The duties of the Assistant Commissioners were to make inquir-
ies and reports and to perform other services as directed by the
Commissioners.-*- They might be authorized to undertake certain
kinds of arbitration.
In the Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, for the first time,
a power to hear and determine disputes with respect to terminal
2
charges was given to the Railway Commissioners. As the question
of terminal charges has important bearings on English railway
charges, it will be of great help to the understanding of the
whole rate problem to examine its nature and origin. In the early
days when railway companies were only owners of lines, there was
no question of terminal charges. Later, as railway companies
became common carriers as well as owners of lines, they were
sometimes enabled by words in their special acts to make, in ad-
dition to the toll or rate per mile for conveyance, some additional
charges for services in connection with the conveyance. Railway
companies further held that they were authorized by Acts of Par-
liament to make additional charges for the expense of constructing
terminal stations, sidings as well as working them.
The question of terminal charges involved three different con-
tentions, the first being terminal station charges; the second,
terminal service charges; and the third, special terminal charges.
Terminal station charges, usually called "station terminals", are
1. Act, Section 21.
2. Act, 1873, S. 15 .
3. Report, Select Committee, 1882, P. XXXIII; Report on Classi-
fication, 1890, V. 64, P. 10, 13.
1
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charges made for the use of the accomodation at stations and duties
undertaken thereat, before and after conveyance. In through traf-
fic, it means the sum allowed, where goods pass over two or more
lines at through rates, to the company owning the station at which
the goods have been received and to the company owning the station
at which the goods have been received and to the company owning
the station where the goods are delivered. The terminal service
charges, usually called "service terminals," are charges made for
actual services other than haulage performed in connection with
conveyance. Generally these are charges for loading and unloading
covering and uncovering; collection and delivery. The special
terminal charges, sometimes known as simply special charges, are
charges made by railway companies for services other than station
terminals and service terminals. They are charges for the use
of sheds, platforms, warehouses, cranes, turntables, weighing ma-
chines, hydraulic press, and the working thereof, including re-
pairs, renewals and insurance and for clerkage, stores, shunting,
gas and taxes. These three include charges for every expense in-
cidental to conveyance. Railway companies have always claimed
the right to charge these terminals; they asserted that the right
was based not only on the words of particular sections of particu-
lar statutes but also on the general recognition of that general
right to be paid for accomodation which they provide and services
they render.
In the special acts, Parliament had not expressly given the
railway companies the right of making terminal charges, nor had
it stated definitely what terminal service could be charged for
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or how much for each. About 1841, the "short distance" clause
took the following form, viz:
"For articles and persons conveyed a less distance than six
miles, the companies may demand, in addition to the tolls and
charges, a reasonable charge for the expense of stopping, loading
and unloading."-1'
Judging from this clause, Parliament seemed to intend that
originally the maximum mileage rates for distances beyond six miles
were to cover all services of loading and unloading. The "short
distance" clause was put in as a means of remunerating a railway
company in those cases where the traffic was carried so short a
distance that the mere mileage rate would not cover expenses of
this nature. Subsequent legislation pointed out that this inter-
pretation was not quite correct. Parliament recognized a charge
for services performed at the station in addition to the mileage
rate, Some of the later Acts read as follows:
"A reasonable sum for loading, unloading and covering, and
for delivery and collection of goods, and other services inci-
dental to the business of a carrier, and a further reasonable sum
for warehousing and wharfage and for the extraordinary services
which may be reasonably and properly performed by the railway
companies •
'
Some railway companies were given power to charge, in ad-
dition to these tolls and charges such as for loading, covering,
etc., a reasonable sum for the use of station and sidings.
1. Reoort of the Royal Commission, 1867, (3844) P. 2.
2. Ibid.
.1
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Disputes constantly arose between the railway companies and
the public as to the right of railway companies to make terminal
charges. A Bill was introduced by the rail?/ay companies, first
in 1865, and again in 1866, to give them statutory authority to
make terminal charges but it failed to pass.
1
The Royal Commission,
1867, urged that it was extremely desirable that some general rule
should be laid down by Parliament as there was great diversity
in the working of the clause relating to terminals in the special
2
acts."' The Select Committee of 1873 reported that the law as
to terminals was absurd and recommended that Parliament should
distinctly recognize not only service terminals, but separate
terminals. They also expressed the opinion that it was not de-
sirable to fix a maximum, because it must necessarily be fixed
3
at a higher rate than the actual charge. Hence, power was given
to the Railway Commissioners in the Act of 1873 to hear and de-
termine disputes with respect to terminal charges without at-
tempting to formulate a precise law.
But the contention regarding terminal charges was not ended
by giving power to the Railway Commissioners to hear and determine
the disputes for we find it carried over to 1888 and again to
1891 and 1892. The traders contended that railway companies had
no right to make terminal charges, and that maximum rates in-
cluded all terminal charges and charges for station accomodations,
use of sidings and wharves. They complained that when rates were
1. Report of the Royal Commission, 1867, PP. XXII, LXVII.
2. Ibid, P. LXVII.
3. See Han., 1888, V. 323, P. 1031. Herapath's Railway Journal,
V. 50, March 17, 1888, P. 290.
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not kept down by competition, railway companies were enabled to
use the terminal charges as a means of levying on shippers more
than the maximum rate. In 1888 they wanted a distinct clause in
the Railway and Canal Traffic Bill. The railway companies, on
the other hand, pointed out that many millions had been spent in
erecting sidings, wharves and warehouses. They expected to be
repaid for their outlay by terminal charges. it would be unreas-
onable to sweep away all terminal charges withput paying regard
to the different circumstances sanctioned by different Acts of
Parliament. In short distance traffic it would be impossible to
make rates cover terminal charges. The right of making terminal
charges was definitely recognized by the decision of the Hall
case
1
in 1885, but as to the nature and amount of these charges,
they were settled only after the passing of the Provisional Orders
Acts of 1891 and 1892.
Analysis of the Decisions of the Railway Commis-
sioners, 1873-1888.
The principal object of the Regulation of Railways Act , 1873,
was the constitution of Railway Commissioners to facilitate re-
course to the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854. The change
did produce the effect anticipated, for in the three years be-
tween 1873 to 1876, there were already as many applications under
the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, section 2, as there were
2
between 1854 and 1876. Not only then was an increase in the num-
1. See Ante, F. 159-161.
2. Third Annuel neport of the Railway Commissioners, 1877, V. 27
(c 1699) P. 1.
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ber of complaints against the company but also the interpretation
of the law as given by the Commissioners showed some important
differences. We shall examine here the important decisions on
undue preference, through rates, disintegration of rates, and termi-
nal charges. Special attention will be given to the interpre-
tation of the law and the principles upon v;hich cases were decided.
The Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, left the question of
undue preference untouched except that Section 11 amended section
2 of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, by extending its
operation to steam vessels end their traffic. Cases on undue
preference were decided by the Railway Commissioners under sub-
stantially the same principles ss those adopted by the Court of
Common Pleas, but there were some important deviations. According
to the Act of 1854, charges on traffic using the same railway
under the same circumstances ought to be after the same rate per
ton per mile. But the interpretation as given by the Court and
Commissioners did not render the law so rigid that any scale which
was not in conformity with it was illegal.
1
* preference might
be due or undue and the rates were lawful or contrary according
to the nature of the preference in respect of "its being due or
undue, reasonable or unreasonable. 2 Reasonableness was held to
be a question of fact to be decided in each particular case. A
preference meant a preference over some others, but to b© an un-
due preference it must be a preference at the expense of ethers.
1. Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. M. S. & L. Ry. Co., 1880; 5 Ry. &
Canal Traffic Cases, 429.
2. Rhymney Iron Co. v. R. Ry. Co., 1888; 6 Ry. & Canal Traffic
Cases, 60.
3. Sklnningrove Iron Co. v. N. E . Ry. Co., 1887; 5 Ry. & Canal
Traffic Jases, 244.
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A lower rate might be a reasonable one, as held by Commissioner
Peel in the Skinningrove Iron Go. case, provided it is not in-
jurious to the public or to the individual. 1
An unequal rste must be justified on some ground of commercial
advantage to the carrying company or it must be undue and unreas-
2
onable. The Commissioners in hearing and determining a case of
undue preference took into consideration either whether the traf-
fic was able to be carried at a less cost to the railway company
than the others, or whether the traffic was under different con-
ditions as regards competition of routes or other special circum-
stances. 3 The railway company in, fixing rates was justified to
4
take local circumstances more or less into account." >;7hat would
justify a preference might be considered under three principles;
1. Cost of working; 2. Competition; 3, Interest of public.
The first factor that may justify a difference in the cost
of carriage is the difference in the cost of carrying and hand-
ling the traffic. The Commissioners held in the Nitshill and
the Lesmahagow Coal Company case that if by reason of gradients
or otherwise, the cost of conveyance on the one railway was dif-
ferent from the cost on the other a proportionate difference
5
might be made in its mileage rate. Greater cost of handling
traffic might justify a difference in the charges to a certain
1. Skinningrove Tron Co. v. N. E. Ry. Co., 1887; 5 Ry. and ^anal
Traffic Cases 244
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid,
4. Broughton v. G. W. Ry. Co., 1882, 1883; 4 Ry. & Canal Traffic
Cases, 191.
5. Ibid.
6. Nitshill & Lesmahagov-j Coal C . v. Caledonian Ry. Co., 1874;
2 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 39
'J
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extent."
1
" In connection with the cost of handling the traffic,
considerations on such questions as the average weight of truck
2
load, certainty of backload, etc., could be taken into account,
as in the Girardot, Flinn and Company case.
The second element that may justify a difference in the cost
of carriage was distance. It was ruled in the Broughton and Plas
Power Coal Company case, that a difference in the distance the
traffic was carried was not of itself valid justification of undue
preference. Distance only under certain circumstances and within
certain limits, was a recognized factor in the difference of
charges. A railway company might he justified to make rateable
4
charges according to distances. A group rate would not be a
violation of law, but if the grouping system was carried too far,
it might subject traders to an undue or unreasonable disadvantage.
Quantity of traffic, and certainty and regularity in shipment
might justify differences in the cost of carriage. If a trader
engaged to supply traffic with regularity and certainty in a
large quantity for the accomodation of a railway company so that
a lower rate in his case was renumerative to the railway company
as a higher rate, such ah arrangement would not be a violation
6
of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854.
1. Girardot, Flinn and Co., v. -Midland Ry. Co., (No. 2) 1885; 5
Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 60.
2. Girardot, Flinn and Co., v. Midland Ry. Co., 1883, 1884; 4 Ry.
& Canal Traffic Cases, 291.
3. Broughton v. G . W. Ry. Co., 1882, 1883; 4 Ry. & Canal Traffic
Cases, 191.
4. Denaby Main Colliery Co., etc., 449.
5. Ibid, 432.
6. East and West Junction Ry. Co. v. Great Western Ry. Co., 1875;
2 Ry. and Canal Traffic Cases, '147, 153.
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Messrs. Flagsollet Freres guaranteed to send between Boulogne
Quay and London by the South Eastern Ry. Company's steamers and
railway, 850 tons of goods each calendar month. In consideration
of the agreement the railway company allowed Messrs. Freres cer-
tain reductions in rates. Upon complaint by ureenop and others,
it was held that as there were circumstances which enhanced the
value to the railway companies of the guarantee of quantity, cer-
tainty and regularity and compelled the traders who guaranteed
them to incur considerable expense and labor to earn the allowance
and as the railway companies were ready to contract with other
traders on similar terms, no injustice had been done."^ Although
quantity was a factor in the cost of carriage, yet a difference
of charge could not be sustained on the general ground that the
aggregate traffic of one town exceeded that of the other, pro-
vided that nothing exceptional in the natural position affecting
2
the charge.
Competition might justify a difference in charge. The three
preceding factors would cause a difference in the cost of carriage
Competition and public interest might not cause a difference in
the cost of carriage, but they would be, nevertheless, factors
which might justify a preference. The decision on the two latter
principles were not very clear at this period; they assumed more
importance after 1888. The primary consideration in applying
these two principles was still whether they would affect the cost
1. Greenop v. South Eastern Ry. Co., 1876; 2 Ry. & Canal Traffic
Cases, 319.
Richardson v. Midland Ry. Co., 1881; 4 Ry. & Canal Traffic
Cases, 1.
2. Girardot, Flinn and Co. etc., 290.
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of carriage. Competition would justify a preference, if it af-
fected also the cost of carriage. Public interest had not yet
assumed a distinct principle. Where it appeared, the interest of
the railway company had the first consideration.
Competition could justify a difference in charge only under
certain circumstances."1' A railway company must not merely for
the sake of increasing traffic, reduce rates in favor of individu-
als unless there was sufficient consideration for such reduction,
2lessening the cost of conveyance to the company.
The mere desire to enable a railway company to compete with
water carriage, would not justify an undue preference. In the
Budds case, the London and North Western Railway Company charged
Ystalyfera Iron Company, which was nearer to the competing market,
Liverpool, a higher rate (12 s, 6 d and 11 s , 4 d per ton for the
carriage of iron and tin plates) than was charged the manufacturers
whose works were situated within a radius of six miles from the
seaport of Swansea and thus further from Liverpool by rail. There
was communication by sea between Swansea and Liverpool. The Com-
missioners held that the lower rate was not justified.
The intention of enabling one trader to compete with another
would not be a sufficient justification of a lower charge. Dis-
advantage of a trader in his competition, arising out of a lower
1. Foreman v. ^reat Eastern Ry. Co., 1875; 2 Ry. & Canal Traffic
Cases, 202; Denaby Main Colliery, etc., 426.
2. Thompson v. L. & M. W. Ry. Co., 1875; 2 Ry. & Canal Traffic
Cases, 115, 121.
3. Budd (P. 0.) v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., 1887; 36 L. T. (N. S.)j
802; 25 W. R. 752; 4 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 393.
4. Skinningrove Ircn Co. etc., 244.
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charge, without any commercial advantages to the railway company
would render the preference concerned unreasonable and undue.
^
Goods which were competitive and substitutive must be charged
equally, although their differences in the separate charges might
not amount to an undue preference. For an example splint and
cannel coal had enough in common of gas-producing quality to be
competitive; the carriage of them at unequal rates was ruled in
the Nitshill and Lermahagow Goal Company case as undue preference.
The same principle was applied to the carriage of such goods as
grain and flour in the James Greenwood and Sons case, A differ-
ence in the mileage rates for grain carried for competing millers
when taken in connection with the fact that the flour of these
millers would compete at various common points, might amount to
an undue preference, although the difference in the grain rates
when taken alone might not have been sufficient to establish the
infringement. If the distance carried was same, a difference in
the charge for flour greatly in excess of that of grain would be
2
an undue preference.
hen a preference was given for the object of discouraging
the construction of a competing line, the preference was undue,
even though the trader might have agreed to send all his goods
over the company's line for a fixed number of years. A railway
company had no right to use its position to enable it to enter
1. Nitshill, etc., 39.
2. James Greenwood and Sons v. L.& Y. Ry. Co., 1888; 6 Ry. & Canal
Traffcc Cases, 39.
3. Diphwys Casson Slate Co. v. Festiniog Ry. Co., 1874; 2 Ry. &
Canal Traffic Cases, 73.
i
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competition with other carriers by giving special advantage to its
traffic over that carried by other persons, such as by appointing
a special agent to perform the service of carting to the station
as in the Menzies case. 1 If a railway company gives a worse serv-
ice in one direction than it supplied in the other, either in
facility or about the hours of trains, the company was guilty of
2
giving an undue preference.
No case had been decided purely on the principle of public
interest by the close of this period. Clear opinion had, however,
been expressed at least in three distinct cases. Commissioner
Peel stated in the Rhymney case that "it is not for the public
interest that one railway company should be able by means of dif-
ferential rates to diminish the accomodation and availability of
the railway of another company, or should be able to limit the
freedom of consignors or consignees to use either railway as they
please or obliged them in their use of one of these railways to
use it upon the terms of paying higher rates to the railway COm-
lt
«
pany than are paid by others using the same railway. ,J In the
Greenop case, the Commissioners held that the plan of delivering
goods between London and Paris at one fixed sum for the entire
service, and free of any intermediate charges, was a great con-
venience to the public and did not involve any infringement of
the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854. 4 An agreement in order
1. Menzies v. Caledonian Ry. Co., 1887; 5 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases,
306, 315.
2. Ashgeshire and Wiglbwshire Ry. Co., v. G-. & S. W. Ry. Co., etc.,
1886; 6 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 26, 29.
3. Rhymney Iron Co., etc., 64.
4. Greenop, etc., 319.
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to be valid must not conflict with the public interests. When it
was not or went beyond the fair regard which a company might pay
to its own interests, the agreement left untouched the rights of
all under the law. 1
when a railway company charged more than it was authorized as
specified in its special Acts, the case was to be heard and de-
cided in any ordinary Court of law but not before the Railway
Commissioner. A trader might complain of an overcharge as involv-
ing a case of undue preference, which would bring the complaint
under the jurisdiction of the Railway Commissioner. 2 The Railway
Commissioner held that where such overcharges involved the giving
of preference or a denial of reasonable facilities, the companies
were violating the law. Such cases were overruled by the Court
of Appeal. In the Brown case it was stated that the Commissioners
had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, because the mere
fact that a railway company charged beyond the maximum sums con-
tained in their special Act, did not amount to a refusal to afford
"reasonable facilities." In the Distington Iron Company case
the same jurisdiction of hearing the complaint on an overcharge
was also denied to the Commissioners for the same reason.
As to through rates, the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854,
section 2, gave a shipper a right to require any number of railway
companies in Great Britain to combine to form a continuous route by
1. Dipwys Casson Slate Co., etc., 79.
2. Brown v. Great Western Ry. Co., 1883; 4 Ry. & Canal Traffic
Cases, 247.
Distington Iron Co., v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., etc., 1889; 6 Ry.
and Canal Traffic Cases, 108.

which his traffic might be sent at a single hooking and for a
single payment.
1
In 1873 the Regulation of Railways Act amended
the law as to reasonable facilities under the Railway and Ganal
Traffic Act, 1854, to include through rates under certain con-
9
ditions. The law limited that only a railway company, not a
shipper, could apply for through rates. The object of the law
was to prevent rates being raised merely as a consequence of
amalgamation so far as that could be done by regulating the charges
on through traffic and to cause railway companies to adjust their
rates with reference not alone to their own interests, but to
3
the interests of other companies as well.
Through traffic meant all traffic that was not local - and
local traffic could only include traffic which began and ended
on the same line. 4 It was the traffic for which a certain rail-
way company provided the shortest and most convenient route. A
5
through rate was not a rate per mile at all. It was a gross sum
of a small amount for conveyance over a long route. The amount
of a through rate was not supposed to vary proportionally with
slight differences of distance.
A through rate must fulfill two conditions; first, whether
the route was a due and reasonable facility in the interests of
1. Great Western Ry. Co., v. S. & W. *c S. B. Ry. Co., etc., 1886,
1887; 5 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 170, 171, 182, 189.
2. Act, Section 11 and 12; Severn and Wye and Severn Bridge Ry. Co.
v. G. W. Ry. Co., (No. 11), 1886; 5 Ry. Sc Canal Traffic Cases, 156,
158.
3. Great Northern Ry. Co., v. B. C. Ry. Co., etc., 1880; 3 Ry. &
Canal Traffic Cases, 411.
4. Eastern and Midlands Ry. Co., v. Midland Ry. Co., (No. 2) 1887;
5 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 235.
5. Lloyd v. N. & B. J. Ry. Co., 1878; 3 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases,
259.
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the public; and second, whether the route was a reasonable one.
1
Yftien the conditions were fulfilled, the Railway Commissioner pos-
2
sessed power either to allow the through rate or to refuse it.
It would be to the interest of the public that there should
be at least two through routes open between any two given places.
Shippers would be entitled to have their traffic conveyed by the
route of any railway company. 4 Public interests might not be merely
in the best route even though the route was to be judged from
the point of a trader. It would be sometimes to the public interest
in favor of the existence of an alternative route at equal rates.
Between the two or more through routes there must not be simply
5
mere paper competition but actual competition.
The Swindon, Marlborough and Andover Railway Company formed
an alternative route between certain stations on the ureat West-
ern Railway and other stations on their o\m line. The route pro-
posed by the company would affect a great saving in time and
distance. 6 Upon an application by the company, the Commissioners
allowed the through route and rates as proposed on the ground
of public interest. The Commissioner stated that the rates that
1. Great Western Ry. Co. etc., 190.
Newry and Armagh Ry. Co. v. G. N. Ry. Co., 1877; 3 Ry. & Canal
Traffic Cases, 28.
2. Great Western Ry. Co. etc., 170, 190.
Newry and Armagh Ry. Co. etc., 28.
3. Swindon Marlborough and Andover Ry. Co. v. G. W. Ry. Co., 1884;
4 Ry* & Canal Traffic ^ases,, 349*
Victoria Coal & Iron Co. v. Neath and Brecon and Midland Ry. Co.
1877; 3 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 37.
4. Victoria Coal and Iron Co. etc., 37.
5. Great Western Ry. Co. etc., 193; Swindon Marlborough & Andover
Ry. Co., etc., 349.
6. Swindon Marlborough and Andover Ry. Co. etc., 349; Newry and
Armagh Ry. Co. etc., 25.
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excluded traffic from the shorter of two through routes must he
at the expense of the public policy, thereby giving undue prefer-
ence. The Railway Commissioners never refused a through rate
unless it was so high as to make it useless to the public or so
low as tp prevent the companies from making an equitable appor-
tionment.'1' An important exception should be noted in connection
with this.
The interest of the railway company was not to be wholly
sacrificed at the interest of the public. A railway company had
the right to carry the traffic that it collected as far as it
could by its own line and to hand it over to the company which was
2
to forward it at a point most convenient to itself. A railway
company could also disregard the order of consignors as to route
which the traffic would be actually conveyed, provided the through
3
rate was not affected and no undue preference was caused. If
a railway company had more than one through route at its command,
it might make use of either one at its convenience without violat-
4ing the law of undue preference.
In apportioning through rates, as a general rule, it would
be reasonable for the railway company having the shorter distance
to receive more in proportion than the company having the longer
5distance. In the case of differences as to the apportionment
of a through rate, the differences might either be referred to
1. Great Western Ry. Go. etc., 170.
2. Ibid.
3. Donald v. N. E. Ry. Co., 1888; 6 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 53.
4. Ashyr shire and Wigtownshire Ry. Co. etc., 33.
5. Severn and Wye and Severn Bridge Ry. Co. etc., 157;
Tal.-y-llyn Ry. Co. v. Cambrian Ry. Co., 1886; 5 Ry. & Canal
Traffic Cases, 122.
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arbitrators or to the Commissioners to decide. In arbitration,
commissioners would not possess full authority to grant or appor-
tion through rates under the eighth section of the Regulation of
Railways Act, 1873, this authority of apportioning through rates
was only co-extensive with that of the arbitrators. But when
arbitration failed and the dispute was referred to the Commission-
ers to hear and to decide, the Commissioners would apportion the
through rate according to the law mentioned in section 10, sub-
section 7, the Regulation of Railways Act, 1873.
The Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, section 14, required
that railway companies must distinguish a rate and inform the per-
sons interested as how much of each rate in its entirety was for
2
conveyance and how much was for other expenses. The words
"specifying the nature and detail of such other expenses" were
held to require a railway company to state in the rate book the
kinds of terminal services performed and charges for each. The
details to be given must be such as to enable one to say whether
an expense charged for in the rate was an expense for which the
railway company could properly charge and whether the amount
charged for that expense was a reasonable amount. 4 Rates must
5
be distinguished, even though the difference was very small.
1. Greenock and Wemyss Bay Ry. Co. v. Caledonian, (No. 2) 1875; 2
Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 136.
2. Watkinson and others v. Wrexham, Mold & Connaks May Ry. Co.
(No, 3) 1880; 3 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 446.
3. Colman v. G . E. Ry. Co., 1882; 4 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 108.
Cairns v. N. E. Ry. Co., 1883; 4 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 221.
4. Brichgrove Steel Co. v. Midland Ry. Co., 1887; 5 Ry. & Canal
Traffic Oases, 229.
Bailey v. L. C. & D. Ry. Co., 1875; 2 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases,
99.
5. Hall & Co. v. L. B. & S. C. Ry. Co., 1884, 1885; 4 Ry. 8c Canal
Traffic Cases, 398.
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Rates for parcels must be likewise distinguished.''" But the rail-
way company was not required under section 14 to show how the
through rates quoted by it were divided between the railway com-
2
panies receiving them.
Under the Regulation of uailways Act, 1873, the Railway Gommis
sioner possessed pov,rer to say whether any given service performed
by a railway company was one for which a terminal charge could
be made. Terminal charges, their kinds and amounts, and not been
specified in the special acts. Much was left to the discretion
of the railway company and the approval of the Railway Commis-
sioners. In none of the decisions was there a complete statement
of all the terminal services which were chargeable. As in the
other cases, terminal charges were decided in each instance on
the merits of the case; the question was of fact. The right of
making terminal charges was definitely recognized in the Hall
case
Messrs. Hall & Co. complained before the Commissioners on
February 6, 1S84 that the London, Brighton and South Coast Rail-
way company had charged them more than the maximum rate for con-
veyance. The railway company stated the reason of this to be
that they performed various terminal services not covered by the
4
rate of conveyance. For their terminal services they were author-
ized by their special act to make charges in addition to the
1. Robertson v. G. S. & 7/. Ry. Co., 1876; 2 Ry. & Canal Traffic
Cases, 574.
2. Greenock etc., 140.
3. Hall & Co. v. L. B. & S. C. Ry. Co.; 4 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases
398
.
4. Ibid 5 Ibid.
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rate."'" Messrs. Hall & Co., on the other hand, maintained that
the mileage rate for conveyance included most of the terminal ser-
2
vices as claimed by the railway company. The Commissioners made
separate rulings on each complaint of- terminal charges. But the
right of making charges for terminals was denied. As the railway
company
was not satisfied, they appealed to the High Court on June 5, 1886.
1. In the special Act, the railway companies were authorized to
charge rates not exceeding stated sums per ton per mile and the
clause was usually qualified with the following words: "The maxi-
mum rate of charges to be made by the company for the conveyanc e
of animals and goods, including the tolls for the use of their rail-
ways and wagons or trucks, and for locomotive power, and every
other expense incidental to such conveyance, except a reasonable
sum for loading, covering and unloading of goods at any terminal
station of such goods, and for delivery and collection, and any
other service incidental to the duty or busimess of a carrier, where
such services or any of them are or is performed by the company."
The London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Company based their
right on this clause to make terminal charges,
2. The terminal services for which the railway company' claimed the
right to charge were as follows:
a. Loading.
b. Covering and uncovering and use of sheets.
c. Weighing, checking, clerkage, watching, labelling.
d. At Croyden, use of locomotive and haulage across the main
line to or from Messrs. Hall & Co.'s private siding to or
from the goods yard.
e. Use of the company's wagons off the company's premises.
f . Same as d only at Redhill.
g. At Horley - special shunting.
h. Use and running of company's wagons.
j. Special haulage and supply of empty wagons for loading.
k. Haulage of wagons loaded.
1. Use of wagons before conveyance.
n. Use of locomotives or horses for placing. wagons in position
for loading and use of cart roads,
o. Same as n for unloading,
p. Wharfage.
s. For use of station accomodation and sidings.
5. Hall & Co. Etc
.
, 398.
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The decision which was given on April 17, 1886 by the Court of
Appeal, upheld the right of the railway company to charge for termi-
nals.
1
The contention involved the correct interpretation of the
word "Conveyance" mentioned in the special act, upon which the
2
Railway Commissioner and the Court of Appeal did not agree.
Conveyance was interpreted by the Railway Commissioners in
its widest sense as including the whole course of the company's
work as a railway carrier from its acceptance of goods brought
to it for the purpose of being forwarded to the moment of delivery
at the termination of the journey. The words "everything inci-
dental to conveyance" must, therefore, comprise station accomoda-
tions and services. This interpretation was overruled. It was
pointed out that a railway company in the early days might be a
conveyor without being a carrier; conveyance meant nothing more
than "finding the highway and the rolling stock or locomotive
4
power.
Mileage rates were held to include every expense "incidental
to conveyance," except loading and unloading and such other ser-
vices. Railway companies were bound under certain exceptions to
receive and forward traffic under the mileage rate and free of any
charge for terminal services.
1. Hall & Co. etc., 5 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 28.
2. See the twelfth Annual Report of the Commissioners.
5. Hall & Co. etc
.
, 398.
Kempson v. G. W. Ry. Co., 1885; 4 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 426.
4. Hall & Co. etc.; 5 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 30-38 - judgment
delivered by Justices Matthew and Wills.
5. Chatterly v. N. S. Ry. Co.; 3 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 244.
Coxen v. N. E. Ry. Co. 4 Ibid 284.
6. Walkinson v. W. M. & C . I. Ry. Co.; 3 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases,
5.
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The ordinary station services were considered a part of the
services prima facie included in the contract of conveyance. It
was held that shunting and marshalling the traffic; finding, pro-
viding and maintaining siding accomodation together with facili-
ties for loading and unloading, were not services for which a
2
charge could be made under the maximum rates in the special acts.
When a branch line was not a private one, such service as provid-
ing, maintaining, and working, signalling and interlocking ap-
3paratus should not be charged.'" No terminal charges could be made
for services such as invoicing and taking accounts of consignments,
keeping a staff for this purpose and providing and maintaining of-
fice accomodations, giving notice to the consignees of each con-
I 4
signment. Weighing, checking, clerjtage and watching were services
incidental to conveyance and no charge, could be made. A charge
a
for warehousing was not a proper ingredient in a railway rate.
The Railway Commission held a distinction between services
which were and which were not required by the trader. In the
cases where traders wished to do or did perform the terminal ser-
1. Hall k Co., v. L. B. & S. C. Ry., 28; 15 Q. B. D.J 505; see also
the remarks of the Railway Commission in their 12th annual reports.
"Some reasons exist for doubting whether it may not be erroneous."
2. Howard v . Midland Ry. Co., 1878; 3 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 253.
Chatteriy v. N. S. Ry. Co. 1878; 3 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 238.
Lock v. N. E. Ry. Co., 1877; 3 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 44.
Watkinson and others, etc., 5.
Isle of Wight (Newport Junction) Ry.. Co. v. Isle of Y/ight Ry.
Co., 1882; 4. Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 128.
3. Neston Colliery Co. v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co. etc., 1883; 4 Ry. &
Canal Traffic Cases, 267.
4. Isle of Wight (Newport Junction) Ry. Co. etc., 128.
5. Berry and others v. L. C. & D. Ry. Co., 1884; 4 Ry. & Canal
Traffic Cases, 310.
6. James Greenwood & Sons, etc., 39.
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vices, themselves, a rebate was usually ordered."*' Railway com-
panies were bound to pay a reasonable sum to the person vrtio had
2performed the collecting services. In deciding whether a termi-
nal charge caused an undue preference, the Railway Commissioners
usually went into the detail of the charge. In one case it was
held that 9 d. for loading and unloading was excessive and must
be reduced to 4-1/2 d. An undue preference was given where a
railway company charged one trader 9 d. for the use of the wagons
off the line and another trader nothing and a demurrage after 20
hours in the case of the first trader and 30 hours in the case of
I 4
the second. It was undue preference to charge one trader 1 d.
m 5per ton for shunting and to make no such charge on other traders."
It would be an undue disadvantage when a railway refuged a rebate
which was due.
The decisions of the Railway Commissioners showed that the
Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854 and the Regulation of Rail-
ways Act, 1873, received better interpretation in the hands of the
Commissioners. Although cost of carriage was still as that in
the former period the primary factor in deciding whether a pref-
erence would be undue, yet more consideration had been given to
such factors as quantity, regularity and certainty. Railway com-
panies were allowed under certain circumstances to open new mar-
1. Bellsdyke Coal Co. v. North British Ry. Co., 1875; 2 Ry. & Canal
Traffic Cases, 105.
2. Menzies, etc., 306.
3. Bell v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co. etc., 1875; 2 Ry. & Canal Traffic
Cases, 185.
4. Diphwys Casson Slate Co., 73.
5. Locke, etc . , 46.
6. Menzies, etc., 308.
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kets by lowering rates, and they could also make a difference in
charge to meet competition. The Acts were interpreted much closer
to the actual demand of the railway business.

CHAPTER VIII.
The Railway and Canal Traffic Act , 1888.
In the early days railway legislation in England, as we have
said, started on the wrong assumption that the railway was a com-
1 a-
mon highway. Railway companies were de^Lt with more as owners
of lines than common carriers. The result of the early legis-
lation was wholly ineffective; the evils of railway business were
left unregulated for nearly thirty years. The real starting
point of railway rate legislation in England was the passing of
the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854. But it was only a par-
tial attempt; it did not reach the heart of rate problem. Re-
gulation against exorbitant charges was not touched at all; the
schedule of rates and the classification of commodities being
wholly under the power of railway companies, they could make rail-
way charges whatever amount they desired. What was enacted by
the Traffic Act of 1854, was but one phase of the question of un-
equal rates and it was soon found very satisfactory. The pass-
ing of the Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, did not change the
situation much. The railway legislation between 1854 and 1888,
was enacted rather more for the purpose of checking combinations
as that of the earlier date before 1854 for public safety rather
than for lower rates. It might, therefore, be said that the
problem of rate regulation in 1888 was the same as that in 1854,
or before. It is not surprising, therefore, that the agitation
for more restrictive regulation of railway rates had continued to
1. Han., v. 512, 1887, P. 129.
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increase in strength until it reached the climax about 1888. This
was the fundamental cause
1
of the need of passing the Railway and
Canal Traffic Act, 1888. The opposition to strict regulation of
railway rates was equally great; it took many years to pass the
Bill into law, after the failure of several attempts.
The more immediate cause was that about the year 1888 there
2
was great depression in trade and agriculture. Public interest
was again centered on the matter of transportion charges, espec-
ially excessive and unequal rates'. Equal mileage rates were ad
1. A general idea of the causes may also be gathered from the com-
plaints against railway companies submitted to the Select Committee
of 1882. They were given as follows:
"1. That rates in excess of the m aximum authorized by the special
Acts are in many cases exacted.
"2. That on the same line of railway, higher rates are charged on
some kinds of goods as compared with others, although the cost to
the company of performing the service is no larger in the one case
than in the other.
"5. That in many cases lower rates are charged from goods import-
ed or for export than for the same articles produced or for con-
sumption in this country.
"4. That preferential rates are granted to one port or town as
against another.
"5. That rates are now in certain instances, much higher than they
were many years ago, and that excessive, although not illegal,
rates prevent the development of traffic to the prejudice of the
public and of the railways themselves.
"6. That the difficulties in the way of obtaining redress by pri-
vate individuals against railway companies for overcharge or il-
legal preference are almost insuperable.
"7. That in consequence of the multiplicity of private Acts, im-
perfect classification, and defective rate books, it is almost
impracticable to ascertain the particular class to which any
article belongs, and the rates which the railway companies will
charge or authorized to charge for its conveyance. "
Report of the Select Committee, 1882 v. 15, P. III.
2. Han. V. 305, 1886, P. 554.
3. Railway Rates and Fares by Joseph Parsloe: Fortnightly Review,
1875, pp. 75-92; Equalization of Railway Rates; - Fortnightly
Review, 1882, V. 58, pp. 174-190.
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vocated and proposed 1 in spite of the condemnation by the Royal
commission of 1867, and the Joint Select Committee of 1872.
The fight against undue preference was renewed with redoubl-
ed strength, when it was charged that foreign products were pre-
p
ferred against home products. A further cause was that the use-
fulness of the Railway Commissioners was much curtailed by their
temporary appointment and restricted power. The Commissioners
were really doing good service for the community; their decisions
gave general satisfaction to the traders. It was generally be-
lieved that they were capable of doing much better and more useful
work, if only their positions were strengthened and made perman-
ent. The third immediate cause was that the rate books which
railway companies provided under the Regulation of Railways Act,
1873, were not of much assistance to the public in ascertaining
the rates which the railway companies were charging. 4 As a rule,
different kinds of goods were neither specified nor classified in
the rate books, but rates were quoted by classes. To ascertain
to which class any particular kind of goods belonged, reference
had to be had to a separate book of classification. This increased
the difficulty of the investigation, if it did not make the act
ineffective, especially as there were numerous exceptions.. There
were cases where railway companies refused to exhibit the rate
1. Han. V. 505, 1886, pp. 555-6, V. 512, 1887, pp 127-128.
2. Han. V. 505, 1886, pp. 557-565
The Earl of Jersey urged the following amendment :-
"That no general measure dealing with railway traffic can
be considered satisfactory which does not prevent preferential
rates in favor of foreign imports."
Han. 522, 1888, pp. 1796-1800.
3. Han., V. 505, 1886, P. 555; Report of the Select Committee,
1882, V. 13, P. XIII.
4. Report of the Select Committee, 1882, V. 15, P. VII, XX.
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and classification books. Charges for conveyance and terminal
services were not distinguished as accurately as the trader de-
sired. The public were still unable to know what they had to pay
and what their rivals were paying. The necessity for legislation
determining what would be reasonable charges for terminal services
was just as urgent and important as the regulation of rates for
conveyance itself. The fourth cause was the difficulty of obtain-
ing redress against railway companies. 1
On February 15, 1881 a Select Committee was appointed with
Mr. Evelyn Ashley as Chairman, to inquire "into the charges of
railway companies and canal companies, and the railway and canal
companies for the conveyance of merchandise, minerals, agricul-
tural produce, and parcels on railways and canals, into the laws
and other conditions affecting such charges and into the working
of the Railway Commission of 1873; and to report as to any a-
mendment of the laws and practice affecting the said charges and
the power of the said Commission that may be desirable." Its
final report was made on July 27, 1882; the questions of exces-
1. The Report of the Select . Committee of 1882 gave three reasons:
"1. Because the expense of obtaining redress is so great that
the traders even when completely successful, will almost in-
variably sustain pecuniary loss;
"2. Because experience has shown that railway companies are pre-
pared to litigate to any extent which few traders would dare to
contemplate; and
'
"3. Because railway companies have so many opportunities of put-
ting traders to inconvenience and loss by withholding ordinary
trade facilities and otherwise, that traders are afraid of the
indirect consequence of taking a railway into court."
Parliamentary papers, V. 13, 1882.
pp XII-XIII; See also Joint Select Committee Report, 1872, V. 13,
P. XII; Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed by the
Board of Agriculture and Fisheries on Preferential Treatment,
1906, V. 55, P. 3, 27.
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sive charges, unequal rates, increase of rates, classifications
and povfers of the Railway Commissioners were all carefully analysed.
The whole report showed, that the only remaining solution of the
problem of rate regulation was the revision of the schedule of
maximum raters and the classification of goods. As this report was
the basis of a Bill that was later passed and became the Railway
and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, some of its important recommendations
out of the total thirteen will be worth quoting.
1
"1. That chambers of Commerce and of Agriculture as well as
other similar associations of Traders or Agriculturalists, have a
Locus standi before the Railway Commission on a certificate of the
Board of Trade that they are a bona fide Association.
"2. That one uniform classification of goods be adopted over
the whole railway system.
"3. Terminal charges to be recognized, but subject to pub-
lication by railway companies and in case of challenge to sanction
by Railway Commission.
"6. That the Railway Commission be made permanent and a Court
of Record.
"7. That the powers and jurisdiction of the Railway Commis-
sion be extended to cover;
(a) . All questions arising under special acts or the public
statutes for regulating railway or canal traffic affecting pass-
engers or goods.
(b) . The making of orders which may necessitate the coope-
ration of two or more railway or canal companies within the statu-
1. Report of the Select Committee, 1882, V. 15, P. XVI.
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tory obligations of the companies.
(c) Power to order through rates on the application of traders,
but no such order to impose on a railway company a rate lower
than the lowest rate of such railway company for similar articles
under similar circumstances.
(d) The revision of traffic agreements.
(e) The granting of damages and redress for illegal charges
and undue preferences.
(f) The Commissioners to have power, on the joint applica-
tion of parties, to act as referees in rating appeals.
"8. That the Railway Commissioners should deliver separate
judgments when not unanimous.
"9. One appeal to be granted as of right from the judgment
of the Commission and "prohibition" as well as "certiorari" to be
forbidden.
"10. High Court of Justice to have powers to refer to the
Railway Commission cases which involve questions under the Railway
and Canal Traffic Acts."
Bills dealing with these recommendations, were introduced
by successive Presidents of the Board of Trade, but they failed
to receive the sanction of Parliament. In 1886 both Mr. Chamber-
1
lain and Colonel Nolan brought in separate Bills, Both were
finally withdrawn. That of Colonel Nolan aimed to secure equal
charges for home producers. 2 On March 8, 1886,
3 Mr. Mundella intro
1. In 1886 the agitation was so great that every railway's share-
holders and employees were effected and railway property was de-
preciated on the Stock Exchange. Han. 325, 1888 P. 1841.
2. See Bill 25, Parliamentary Papers 1886, v. V. Bill to secure
equal rights of railway freight to the agriculturists, manufactur-
ers, and others of Great Britain.
3. Han. V. 303, 1886, P. 553.
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duced into the House of Commons a Railway and Canal Traffic Bill,
nearest to the one passed into the Traffic Act of 1888, which re-
ceiving on the whole a more favorable receiption, yet failed to
1
pass for want of time after its second reading. Practically the
2
same Bill was twice introduced in the House of Lords, for second
3
reading by Lord Stanley of Preston, first on March 14, 1887, and
4
again on March 1, 1888. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach introduced the
5
same Bill in the House of Commons on May 10, 1888. It was this
Bill which was passed on August 10, 1888 and became the Railway
and Canal Traffic Act, 1888.
g
The passage of the Bill was strongly urged, as it had been
agitated for a considerable number of years and it was the eighth
Bill on the subject which in one form or another had been brought
into Parliament. Lord Stanley, in connection with his Bill, point-
ed out that no advantage was to be gained by the prolongation of
the controversy, but that there were good reasons for desiring its
7
close as soon as possible. The Bill, as proposed by Lord Stanley
and later by Sir Michael Hicks-beach, differed from the previous
Bills in that questions of safety, etc. in connection with pass-
enger traffic were all excluded. Its provisions were confined to
questions of goods traffic such as rates, terminal charges, class-
Q
ifications and other similar matters. The Bill consisted of 46
clauses with a schedule of railway acts repealed. It was divided
1. Han. V. 512, 1887, P. 128.
2. Fortnightly Review, 1886, V. 45 pp. 449-471; Edinburgh Review,
1887 V. 165, pp. 533-555.
3. Han. v. 312, 1187, P. 125
4. Han. v. 322, 1888, P. 1793.
5. Han. v. 325, 1888, P. 1831
6. Han. v. 312, 1887, P. 125-167
7. Han. v. 322, 1888, P. 1795
L 8. Herapath's Ry. Journal, V. 49, 1887, P. 290.
f
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into four parts; the first related to the constitution, procedure
and the jurisdiction of the Commission; the second, to provisions
concerning traffic charges; the third, to canals, and the fourth,
to miscellaneous matters of minor importance. As the last two,
fell without the scope of our inquiry, a brief account of the first
two alone will be given.
The first part of the Bill proposed to abolish the existing
Railway Commission and to establish a new one under the title of
the Railway and Canal Commission to sit in England, or if the nature
of a case required, in Scotland or Ireland. The new Commission was
to consist of three permanent Commissioners and three ex-officio
Commissioners. Of the former, thehead must be a lav/yer of ex-
perience appointed on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor and
the other two who were termed "lay members 1 ' were to be appointed
on the recommendation of the Board of Trade, the only condition
laid down being that one of them should possess railway experience.
The three ex-officio Commissioners were to be the three judges of
the Superior Courts for the country, (England, Scotland and Ireland)
respectively in which the case was being heard. The second part of
the Bill related particularly to traffic charges. Within twelve
months from the passing of the Act, every railway company was re-
quired to submit to the Board of Trade a revised classification of
goods and a schedule of maximum rates and charges. After the
classifications and schedules were made, the Board of Trade would
arrange to remove objections. The results thus arrived at would
be embodied in a Provisional Order Act. In case of failure to
agree with the railway companies, the 'Board of Trade was empowered
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to prepare a fair classification and schedule and to submit the
same to Parliament. Larger power was given to the Railway and
Canal Commission to decide unequal rates. In deciding the same,
the Commission was required to take into consideration whether the
difference in treatment was necessary to secure the Traffic. The
latter point formed the gist of the dispute during the discussion
in Parliament. The Bill provided also a system of voluntary arbi-
tration for settling disputes under the auspices of the Board of
Trade. In general the object of the Bill was to secure publicity
and fairness in the conduct of traffic, to let the public know
what the charges were and to afford better means for the remedy-
ing of unfair charges. The Bill was said to represent a fair com-
promise between opposing interests and to afford means of reestab-
lishing trade on a sound basis.*'"
While the Bill was in Parliament, much valuable discussion
o
took place on both sides. No former railway Bill had ever been
3
so carefully considered or so hotly debated. Much new light was
thrown on the principles of railway charges. The discussion,
though based on the text of the Bill, can be grouped under three
heads; first, the Railway and Canal Commission; second, terminal
charges, and third, unequal rates. Of these, by far the most im-
portant, from the theoretical point of view, was the last. All we
can do here is to review very briefly the chief points under each
head and to point out the important changes made in the Bill.
1. Han. V. 322, P. 1794; Herapath's Railway Journal, V. 50, 1888,
March 3 P 258
2. See Handard,'l886, V. 303,305; 1887; V. 312, 313,314, 321; 1888,
V. 322, 323, 325, 326, 329, Under the Railway and Ca. Traffic Bill.
3. See also the resolutions of the Council of the Railway and Canal
Traders' Association: Herapath's Railway Journal, 1887, V. 49, P
433.
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Under the first head, the Earl of Jersey proposed an amendment to
make the Railway and Canal Commission consist of two permanent
Commissioners instead of three, with a Judge of the Supreme Court
permanently attached. 1 Under this system there would be no ex-
officio Commissioners. The object of the proposal was to
strengthen the Court and to inspire confidence, but it was defeat-
ed by 42 against 15. The Marquis of Salisbury raised the import-
ant question whether the Court ought to be dominated by a legal
official or by expert laymen or in other words, whether the inten-
tion was purely to establish a tribunal to determine questions of
2
law or whether something beyond this was intended. It was urged
as a wise policy to provide that the expert element should predom-
inate in the Court. Under the Regulation of Railway Act, 1873, the
Railway Commissioners might declare practices illegal but they had
no power to award damages for past illegal practices. It was con-
tended that the new Railway and Canal Commission should possess
power to award damages back for a certain number of years. Ob-
jections were raised against allowing appeal only on questions of
law but not on questions of fact. 4 The purpose of granting one
appeal was, it was pointed out, to reduce expenses of litigation.
Under the second head - terminal charges - the Bill propos-
ed to recognize the right of the railway to impose terminal
charges, subject to the discretion of the Railway and Canal Com-
cission as to whether in each case they were legal or not. The
contention of the public was that these terminal charges were not
1. Han. V. 312, 1887, P. 1745.
2. Han. V. 312, 1887, P. 1851.
3. Han. V. 312, 1887, P. 1756.
4. Han. V. 312, 1887, P. 1758.
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justifiable and hence should not be recognized. Lord Henniker
moved an amendment to Clause 24; "And in every case those maximum
rates and charges shall be deemed to include all terminal charges
of every description other than charges for loading, unloading,
collection and delivery of traffic where such services are per-
formed by the company, and every company shall state in such classi-
fication and schedule, the nature and amount of the charge pro-
posed to be authorized for loading, unloading, collection and de-
livery of each class of traffic when such services are performed
by the company. What the shippers wanted was that, as embodied
in the first part of the above amendment, terminal charges of
every description should be included in the maximum rates, taking
no notice whatever of the vast amount of capital invested in erect-
ing sidings, wharves and warehouses, etc. The railway companies
contended that it would be unreasonable of the legislature to sweep
away all terminal charges without giving regard to the different
circumstances sanctioned by the different Special Acts. Moreover,
it was impossible, in the case of short distance traffic, to make
rates cover terminal charges. After a long discussion it was
thought best to follow the principle laid down by the Queen's
Bench in the Hall's case, 2 that in the determination of terminal
charges regard was to be had only to expenditure that was reason-
able and necessary to provide proper accomodation for the goods
in respect of which the charge was made; goods were not to be made
to pay for the expensive passenger stations, and the amendment was
finally withdrawn.
1. Han. V. 323, 1032.
2. Hall Se Go. v.L.B.fc S. C. Ry. Co.; 4 Ry. & ca. Tr. cases, 398.
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Under the third head the controversy was on undue preference
or more correctly on unequal rates. Unequal rates formed the rate
problem most difficult of solution. 1 The controversy was em-
bittered for two reasons. Firstly, a strong demand was made that
equal mileage rates under all circumstances should be adopted.
Secondly, it was insisted that protection should be given to home
produce. What the Bill proposed to do was to prevent undue pre-
ference without depriving the public of the advantage of compe-
tition. With this object in view, it threw upon the railway com-
panies the burden of proof that a lower charge or a difference in
treatment did not amount to an undue preference. At the same time
the Railway and Canal Commission was empowered to take into con-
sideration, in addition to other factors, whether such lower charge
or differences of treatment was necessary for the purpose of secur-
ing, in the interests of the public, the traffic in respect of
which it was made. The Bill still readjusted the principle of
equal rates with equal services, but it permitted exceptions under
differing circumstances. The controversy was over the clause that
it should not provide for those exceptions. It would be inconsist-
ant with the principle of the Bill, it was urged, as in one part
of the Bill undue preference was absolutely prohibited while in
another it was justified. Not a few members went even further.
Parliament, they claimed, had no right to interfere with private
industries. Parliament would have broken its faith, if it intend
ed to fix railway rates, as the right of making charges had been
1. Economist V. 46, 1888, May 12, P. 591-593.
2. Han. V. 325, 1888, pp. 1037-1060; V. 325, 1888, pp. 1840-1934;
Economist, V. 46, 1888, May 12, P. 591.
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granted irrevocably to the railway companies and money had been
invested on the understanding that they were to be allowed certain
1
powers
.
The government maintained that any hard and fast rule for
the regulation of railway rates would be productive of much harm
but^some general regulation was absolutely necessary. Much of the
trade of the country was created by, and could only be continued
by special rates. Difference of treatment must obviously be justi-
fied by differences of circumstances. Persons dealing in large
quantities shipped at regular intervals ought to be allowed certain
advantages over those who did not deal in such large and regular
shipments. It was, moreover, to the interest of the consumer that
some difference in rates under special circumstances should be
justifiable. 2 The words "in the interest of the public" were in-
serted in order to require that where a railway company carried at
discriminatory rates, the inequality must be not merely in the
interest of the railway company itself, but also in that of the
general public. To do away with all special rates would be to
place the large towns in the same position as they would be if
there were no competition between railways. It would prevent many
agricultural countries from sending the produce which found its
way to the metropolis and many large towns. The consumer should
get the article required at as low a rate as possible.
1. See also, Herapath's Railway Journal, 1887, V. 49, P. 290.
2. See the special article in the Economist, V. 45, March 19,
1887, P. 560.
3. Report on preferential Treatment, 1906, V. 55, P. 16; Economist,
1887, V. 45, P. 360.
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What was discussed in Parliament under the head of unequal
1
rates was really a preference of a double kind. There were the
preferential rates among home industries, involving questions of
preference such as thoseoccurringbetween one port, or one class
of traffic and another. Then there were the preferential rates,
as between home and foreign industry." The latter question of
preference as between home and foreign produce naturally in-
volved such controversal topics of free trade and protection. The
complaint of preferential treatment at this period was mainly re-
lated to the rates charged on foreign produce as compared with
home produce.
5 Sometimes, it was charged, greater accommodation
was provided, lower rates charged and more services rendered for
foreign traffic. The preference in many cases amounted to a dis-
tinct bounty given to the owner of the foreign goods. If bounties
were to be given at all,, it would be more reasonable to give them
in favor of home produce. The Bill was severely attacked on the
ground that it legalised the exactions of preferential rates to
the detriment of the native industries and in favor of foreigners.
The existing state of things amounted to a system of bounty, which
placed foreign goods in the English market under the most favored
conditions and kept the English goods out. At the bottom of the
contention was the question of protection and free trade. One
side contended that, under no circumstances whatever, should it be
allowed that foreign goods should be carried more cheaply than
1. Han. V. 329, P. 445; Report on Preferential Treatment, 1906,
V.55, pp. 10-11.
2. There is copious material on this topic; besides the Parliament-
ary debates, there is the Report of the Select Committee of 1882,
and the Report on preferential treatment, 1906.
3. Report, Select Committee, 1882, V. 13, P. IX.
4. Han. V. 322, P. 1798.
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English goods,
1
The other side ergued that the public would be
benefited by the foreign goods coming into the markets; if compe-
tition was eliminated, price would rise. The regulation of rail-
way rates was made much simpler by eliminating entirely the
question of protection and free trade. Origin of traffic could
neither justify nor condemn a preferential treatment. It must be
justified on grounds irrespective of home or foreign produce.
The Bill in spite of many prophecies as to its probable
fate, received the Royal Assent on August 10, 1888 and became the
Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888. The Act repealed portions
of the Railway Regulation Acts 4 but it did not codify the remain-
ing sections which were consequently still in effect. The railway
and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, was divided as was the original Bill,
into four parts, only the first two of which concerns us here.
The first thing that the Act accomplished was the recon-
struction of the old Commission. The new Railway and Canal Com-
mission, as established under the Railway and Canal Traffic Act,
1888, consisted of two appointed and three ex-officio Commission-
ers. They were appointed on the recommendation of the Presi-
dent of the Board of Trade and one of them must be of experience
7
in the railway busines s. As provided in the Act of 1873, Com-
1. Han. V. 322, 1888, P. 1804.
2. Editorials on the Bill, Ry. Times and Herapaths Ry. Journal,
1886-1888.
3. 51 and 52, Vict. C. 25.
4. See the table attached to the Act.
Railway Clauses £ct, 1854; Railway and Ca. Traffic Act, 1854;
Regulation of Rys.Act, 1868; Regulation of Rys.Act 1873,
5. Act. 1888, S. 2.
6. Letter of Appointment--Letter addressed by the Board of Trade to
the two Railway Commissioners appointed under the provisions of
the Railv;ay and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, British Parliamentary
papers, 1888 Vol. LXXXVIII (C 5594), P. 1.
7. Act. 1888, S. 3. Sub. 1,2.
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missioners must not own any interest in railway stocks. Any one
of the two appointed commissioners could be removed as before only
for inability or misbehaviour by the Lord Chancellor.
1
The three
ex.-officio Commissioners in each case were to be the judge of a
superior Court. The Lord Chancellors in England and in Ireland
2
and the Lord President of the Court of Session in Scotland, would
make from time to time the assignments respectively for the three
countries, such assignments would be made for a period of not less
than five years. At the hearing of any case, there must be three
Commissioners and the ex-officio Commissioner was to preside. The
opinion of the ex-officio Commissioner, in a question of law should
prevail. The central office of the Commission was to be in Lon-
don, but a sitting might be held in any part of the country as the
4
convenience of the proceedings would demand.
The power of making complaints was extended to include more
persons and organizations than those mentioned in the Act of 1873.
Any individual trader who was directly prejudiced had a right to
complain. Any organization could make complaint even without
1. Act, 1888, S. 5, Sub. 3^,5
2. Act, 1888, S. 4.
3. Act, 1888, S. 5, Sub. 3.
4. Act. 1888, Section 5, subsection 1, 2.
5. Act, 1888, Section 7.
I. Local Authorities.
a. Harbor Board.
b. Conservancy authority
c. Common Council of the City of London.
d. Council of a city or borough
e. Representative County body.
f. Justices in quarter sessions
g. Commissioners of supply
h. Metropolitan Board of Works.
i. Urban Sanitary Authority,
j. Rural sanitary authority.
II. Ass'n. or traders of freighters. Chamber of Commerce or
6. 14, London v. South, 172. (Agriculture.
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representing any individual trader and without proof that any in-
dividual trader was aggrieved.''" The powers which were conferred
on the former Commission were now transferred to the new Com-
2
mission. The new Commission was further empowered to hear and
decide cases of traffic facilities and undue preference both under
special Acts granted to individual railway companies and under the
3
Traffic Acts regulating all railway com-panies . Any question or
dispute involving the legality of charges could be heard and de-
termined by the Commission. Railway companies could not refuse to
afford reasonable facilities in the interest of the public and no
agreement between railway companies could stand in the way of the
Commission enforcing the law.* The Commission was given power to
5
award damages, including repayment of overcharges. Arbitration
as to the differences between railway companies by the Commission
6
was continued in force under the present Act.
7
An appeal could be made to a superior Court on points of
law. Its decision would be final but in the case of any difference
in opinion between any two of such superior courts of appeal, the
difference might be appealed to the House of Lords. No appeal
should be made on questions of fact or upon any question regarding
the Locus standi of a complainant. The general powers of the
Commission to enforce orders, to make rules and to appoint officers
L Forwood Brothers v. G.N.Ry. Co. 1914; 12 Ry. & Canal Traffic
2. Act, 1888, Section 8. (Cases, 89, 93.
3. Ibid, 9.
4. Ibid 11.
5. Ibid 12.
6. Ibid 15.
7. Ibid 17.
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were practically the same as under the Act of 1873.
Any objection as to a through rate or route was to be refer-
red to the Commissioners for their decision. In deciding, the
Commission must consider whether the rate or route was reasonable
and in the interest of the public.
1
Apportionment of a through
rate, if not agreed between the railway companies, could be deter-
2
mined by the Commission. The decision of the Commission as before
was made retrospective. In apportioning the through rate the Com-
mission should take into consideration all the circumstances of
the case, including any special expense incurred in respect of the
construction, maintenance, or working of the route. A railway com-
pany must not be compelled to accept a lower mileage rate than the
mileage rate which the railway company was charging on another part
of the system for like traffic and similar services, but could be
compelled to accept a less amount out of the through rate than the
3
maximum rate which the company was entitled to charge.
In deciding whether a lower charge or difference in treatment
amounted to an undue preference, the Commission must take into con-
sideration , in addition to other factors, whether the lower charge
or the difference in treatment was necessary for the purpose of
securing in the interest of the public the traffic in respect of
4
which it was made. The Commission possessed power to direct that
no higher charges should be made on any merchandise carried over
a less distance than those in effect for similar services over a
5greater distance on the same line of railway. Group rates in
1. Act, 1888, Section 25, sub. 5.
2. Ibid, , 6.
3. Ibid, , 9 and Section 26.
4. Section 27, Subsection 2.
5. Section 27, Subsection 3.
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order to be valid must not create any undue preference.
So far as the nature of the Commission was concerned, the
most important changes were the Court status granted to it and
limitation of the right of appeal. Under the Regulation of Rail-
ways Act, 1875, the Railway Commissioners were regarded as being
in the same position as any inferior Court and might be prohibited
1
from proceeding in matters over which it had no jurisdiction.
Now by giving the Commission a permanent Court organization and by
making its decisions definitely final on questions of fact, much
strength had been added. The jurisdiction given by the Act of
1888, to the Railway and Canal Commission was much wider than that
given by the Act of 1875 to the former Commissioners. The most im-
portant function from the standpoint of the public were (1) legal-
ity of rates, (2) undue preference, (5) facilities for traffic,
(4) through rates, (5) terminal charges. The fact was emphasised
however, that the Commission was simply a Court and therefore not
concerned with rate making. An amendment to place the revision
of classification of goods and schedules of charges in the hands of
the Commission was defeated. The control of rates was divided.
Powers in regard to conciliation of rate difficulties were given
to the Board of Trade by the Conciliation Clause. The Commission
had to deal only with the question as to whether a rate was legal
or not.
Under the head of traffic, the Act contained twelve sections.
Four important things were specified; (1) the revision of the
classification of goods and schedule of charges; (2) the enlarge-
1. Toomer, V. L.C.D. Railway Co. and S. E. Railway Co.; 2 Ry &
Canal Traffic Cases, P. 98.
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merit of the existing law on unequal rates; (3) the enactment of the
conciliation Clause; (4) and the requirement as to the procedure of
increase in rates. The revision of classification and schedules
provided for in Section 24 and 35 will be discussed in a separate
chapter. Sections 25 to 30 enlarged the scope of the lav; relating
to reasonable facilities, through rates, undue preference, and
powers of different parties to make complaints. Section 31 em-
bodied the famous Conciliation Clause. Section 32 dealt with the
requirement of making annual returns and statistics, section 33 to
34 with the publication of rates. Section 2 of the Railway and
Canal Traffic Act, 1854 was amended by Section 25. Reasonable
facilities were made to include all the facilities at through rates
for receiving, forwarding, and delivering of traffic. The privi-
lege of applying for through rates was extended to both corporations
and individual persons. Objections to through rates or to the ap-
portionment of through rates can be referred to the Commission for
decision. Higher charge on merchandise carried over a less dis-
tance than over a greater distance on the same line of railway
and in respect of the like description and quantity was prohibited?"
This has sometimes been misnamed the English "Long and Short
Haul Clause." As a matter of fact, the intention of the Legis-
lature was simply to make it a subdivision of the same law on un-
due preference. The Courts have never treated this clause sepa-
rately and apart from undue preference.
traffic
All rate books containing classification of merchandise and
schedules of charges should be kept open for inspection and copies
1. Section 27, Subsection 3.
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of classifications and schedules should be kept for sale. On
application the railway companies must distinguish rates from con-
veyance charges and terminal charges; the later must be further
divided according to the nature and detail of such charges. Ytfhen
railway companies intended to make any increase in the toll, rates
or charges, the increase must be published in a prescribed manner
and there must be fourteen days' notice before itcouldtake effect."1"
Complaint as to unreasonable rates of charge, or any other com-
plaint might be made to the Board of Trade under the Conciliation
2
Clause. If there were reasonable ground for the complaint, the
Board might call upon the railway company for an explanation and
endeavor to settle the differences amicably. The Board of Trade
was also required to report to Parliament from time to time the
complaints made to them under the provisions of the section. The
Clause provided for such cases where the individual traders or cor-
poration of traders would not care to go into Court against a
powerful railway company. Many shippers felt unlike to complaint
against a railway company, for in the first place it was very dif-
ficult to obtain redress, in the second place, railway companies
would be ready to litigate to an extent which few shippers would
dare to contemplate, and in the third place, railway companies
would have many opportunities of putting a shipper to inconveni-
ence by with holding facilities, and such like methods. The Con-
ciliation Clause provided for those cases where the individual
shippers or corporation of shippers would not care to go into
Court against a powerful railway company. The Clause was, therefore
,
1. Section 33.
2. Section 31; Economist 1888, V. 46, P. 392, 541.
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very useful and it had worked very successfully. 1
The following table condensed from the reports from 1889 to
1911, 2 made by the Board of Trade under the Conciliation Clause
shows the nature, and the number of complaints.
NATURE AND NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS.
1889- : 1899- : 1906- 1908- 1910-
.
ii i
.
rH
1898 : 1905 i 1907 1909 ! 1911 as
•p
6 :: 3 10th 11th 12th O
Reports
,
Reports Report Report : Report En
1. Rates unreason-
able or excessive :
in themselves. : 335 : 186 : 38 :: 39 : 29 : 627
2. Undue preference :. 175 : 118 : 59 : 65 87 : 507
3. hates unreason- :
ably increased. : : 134 :: 22 •; 22 : 17 : 195
4. Classification : : 30 : 47 : 77
5. a. Delay In transit 23 : 27 : 27
b. Liability : 16 : 17 : 9
c. Rebates : 173 : 213 17 23 : 23 : 738
d. Through rates : 20 : 15 : 9
e. Miscellaneous 48 42 36
Total 683 : 651 :: 243 : 280 : 284 :2,141
The nature of complaints was classified differently in the
earlier reports. In the first report*5 it was classified into (1)
rates unreasonable or excessive in themselves, (2) higher rates for
shorter distance on the same lines, (3) disproportionate rates on
higher rates for shorter distance not on the same line and (4) un-
classified. The second and the third were later combined under
Undue Preference and the unclassified were further classified as
above. The table shows that the number of complair ts which ?;ere
handled by the Board of Trade through the Conciliation Clause was
increasing. Between 1889 to 1898 there were less than 100 com-
plaints per year made to the Board of Trade but in 1910-1911 there
1. 3rd Report by the Board of Trade of Proceedings under sec. 31 of
the Ry. & Canal Traffic Act, 1888. Parliamentary Papers, 1893, v. 7£
(C 7083), P. 3; Report on Preferential Treatment, 1906, v. 55, p. 25.
2. The last report available.
3. 1st report 1891.
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were 284 complaints. As to each class of complaints there was
a decidedly increase of complaints under undue preference, class-
ification, delay in transit, and rabates. The number of complaints
as shown in the other classes was decreasing.
The following table shows the result from 1889 to 1911, of the
proceedings of the Board of Trade upon complaints made under
section 31 of the Railway & Canal Traffic Act, 1888, including
complaints of increased rates made under section 1 of the Railway
& Canal Traffic Act, 1894 i
1
RESULTS OF THE COMPLAINTS.
,. -
.. — 1 II
1889- 1899- 1906- 1908- 1910-
1898 1905 1907 1909 1911
Six
Repts
.
Three
Repts
.
10th
Report
11th
Report
12th
Report Total
1. Casses satisfact-
orily settled. 218 221 87 94 88 708
2. Cases not follow-
ed up by the com-
plainants. 234 184 58 62 97 635
3. Cases in which
the complainants
not satisfied. 231 246 98 124 98 797
4. Cases under con-
sideration when re-
port made. 1 1
Total 683 651 243 280 284 2,141.
From the above table it can be seen that cases satisfactorily
settled and cases not follo?;ed up by the complainants were in-
creasing. Of the total number of complaints more than 30$ were
satisfactorily settled and in only 26% of the total number of
complaints, the complainants were not satisfied. About 50% of
the total number of complaints were not followed up by complain-
ants.
1. Annual Reports 1889-1911 by the Board of Trade of Proceedings
under section 31, of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, and
under sectional of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1894.

CHAPTER IX.
Decisions of the railway and Canal Commission
Bearing upon Undue Preference.
1889 - 1914.
The decisions of the Railway and Canal Commissioners hearing
upon the laws of rate regulation will be discussed under two heads
undue preference and increase of rates. The latter is chiefly
concerned, as we shall see, with the interpretation of the Rail-
way and Canal Traffic Act, 1894, and will, therefore, be better
discussed with the Act.'1' The present chapter will deal only with
the decisions bearing upon undue preference^ from 1889 to 1914.
During this period the decisions of the Railway and Canal Com-
mission have been upheld by the Court of Appeal, except that in
the North Staffordshire Colliery Owners' Association case which
deals with the increase of rates. 5
Since the passage of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888,
the question whether an inequality in railway charges would amount
to an undue preference would not rest solely, as it did before
on section 21, Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, but upon
section 27 Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, as well. 4 Before
1888 the Railway Commissioners were obliged to give a very narrow
1. See Chapter XI.
2. The history of "undue preference" under the Railway and Canal
Traffic Acts, • 1854-1894 was given in the form of a memorandum by
Sir Francis Hopwood of the Board of Trade for the information of
Lord Jersey's Committee. See Report on Preferential Treatment,
by the Departmental Committee, 1906, V. 55, P. 322.
3. See Appendix IX.
4. Liverpool Corn Traders' Association v. London & North Western
Railway Company, 1890; 7 Railway & Canal Traffic Cases, 125, 140.
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construction to undue preference., The law discouraged nearly every
-ing
consideration except that justify differences of charge by differ-
ences in the way in which the traffic of one trader as compared
with that of another had to be conducted. In a word, it was the
differences in costs of working or differences, such as greater
quantity, affecting profit received from the traffic, which formed
the chief determining factor. 1 Under the Railway and Canal Traf-
2
fic Act, 1888, section 27, the Commissioners were given much
greater freedom. They could base their decisions not merely on
the grounds previously taken, but also on public interest and on
"any other considerations affecting the case." The insertion of
the words "in addition to any other consideration affecting the
1. ^airweather & Co., and others v. Corporation of York, 1900; 11
Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 201, 211.
2. Section 27, sub-section 2 of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act,
1888: -"In deciding whether a lower charge or difference in treat-
ment does or does not amount to an undue preference, the Court
having jurisdiction in the matter, or the Commissioners, as the
case may be, may, so far as they think reasonable, in addition
to any other consideration whether such lower charge or difference
in treatment is necessary for the purpose of securing in the in-
terests of the public the traffic in respect of which it is made,
and whether the inequality cannot be removed without unduly re-
ducing the rates charged to the complainant; provided that no
railway company shall make, nor shall the Court or the Commission-
ers, sanction any difference in the tolls, rates, or charges made
for, or any difference in the treatment of, home and foreign
merchandise, in respect of the same or similar services."
5. Fairweather & Co., and others v. Corporation of York, 1900; 11
Ry. & Canal Traffic J ases, 201, 211.
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case" in section 27 and the words "in any respect" in s ection
55
1 indicate very clearly the intention of Parliament to extend
and enlarge the grounds on which the Commission could decide whether
i a lower charge amounted or not to an undue preference. The law
would be applicable to cases where the railway companies charged
unequal rates for the same service as well as where they made a
difference in treatment.
The nature of the law on undue preference, was not,however
,
of the
changed. It was still based on section 2, Railway and Canal Traffic
4
Act, 1854. A mere preference would not give ground for complaint.
5
It must be, as before, proved undue or unreasonable. The law
still demanded from railway companies that if they enjoyed the
advantage of serving two places, however far apart, they must not
sacrifice the one set of local interests to the other by undue
inequality in the rates, railway companies must be neutral to all
shippers who were competing with one another . If they were not
neutral and the rates were unequal, they must justify their de-
1. Section 55 "Undue ^reference " of the Railway and Canal Traffic
Act, 1888:- The term "undue preference" includes an undue prefer-
ence, or an undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage, in
any respect, in favor of or against any person or particular class
of persons or any particular description of traffic.
2. Liverpool Corn Traders' Association, etc., 140.
Pickering Fhipps and others v. L. & N. Ry. Co., and others, 1892;
8 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 83, 111.
3. Lever Brothers v. Midland Ry. Co., 1909; 13 Ry. & Canal Traffic
Cases, 301, 330.
4. Abram Coal Co. v. Great Central Ry. Co., 1903, 1905; 12 Ry. &
Canal Traffic Cases, 125, 133.
5. Ibid.
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parture upon grounds legally valid."
1
" The burden of proving that
a difference in charge would not amount to an undue preference
was now made to lie not on the complainant but on the railway com-
pany. The Commission as before had no general power to reduce
rates; it could make an order only when rates were so high in re-
3
lation to other rates as to amount to an undue preference. Un-
due preference was still confined to the treatment of traffic on
or to come on the railway.
Neither the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1854, nor that
of 1888 afforded the Commission any distinct guide as to what would
be undue or unreasonable. It was left entirely to the judgment
4
of the Commission on a review of the circumstances. In proving
a preference undue, a railway company might rely on any circum-
5
stance calculated to affect men's mind. The law did not make
every inequality of charge undue preference, and it rather im-
plied that there were preferences which might be justified by cer-
tain circumstances. In deciding whether a preference would be
undue or unreasonable, it was not alone the interestsof the cus-
tomer which were to be considered, a fair regard must also be paid
Q
to the interest of the railway companies. But whether in par-
ticular instances there had been an undue or unreasonable preju-
1. Liverpool Corn Traders' Association, etc., 131.
2. Pickering, Phipps, etc., 97.
3. Castle Steam Trawlers v. G . W. Ry. Co., 1907, 1908; 13 Ry. &
Canal Traffic Cases, 145.
4. Pickering Phipps, etc., 89, 100.
5. Abram Coal Co., etc., 125, 133.
6. Ibid. 134.
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be
dice would a question of fact which must be decided on its own
merits
.
It was further held as in Pickering Phipps case, that
what was "undue" was a question of degree. The sentence of un-
due preference would depend upon a variety of circumstances. It
would be impossible for any one to say that a difference of cir-
cumstances represented or was equivalent to such a fraction of
a penny difference of charge in one case as compared with another.
A much broader view must be taken and it would be hopeless to
attempt to decide a case of undue preference by any attempted cal-
culation, arithmetical or mathematical. The power of the Com-
mission could not be questioned on the ground that too much or
too little weight had been given to some one factor such as com-
petition in determining a case of undue preference, for it was a
question of fact and of degree, not of law.
The law of 1888 specially specified that in addition to any
other consideration affecting the case, the Commission might take
into consideration two things - first, whether the lower charge
or difference in treatment complained of was necessary for the
purpose of securing, in the interest of the public, the traffic
in respect of which it was made, and, second, whether the in-
1. Dublin and Manchester Steamship Co. v. L. k N. W. Ry. Co., 1912
15 Ry. k Canal Traffic Cases, 88, 89; see also Palmer v. L. & N.
W. Ry. Co., 1868; 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 162; Denaby Main
Colliery Cck etc., 426; Pickering Phipps, etc., 95.
2. Pickering Phipps, etc., 87-89, 96, 100.
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equality could not be removed without unduly reducing the rate
charged.
1
Undue preference then must be examined first, as to
whether it would be a commercial necessity to the railway company;
it thus would eliminate any improper purpose or preference for
the sake of a preference; secondly, as to whether the interests
of the public were served by the fact that the railway company
secured the traffic; thirdly, as to whether the inequality could
not be removed without unduly reducing the rates charged, When
a difference in charge was established not for the purpose of giv-
ing a preference but of securing the traffic, the difference might
still be considered as undue preference, for a preference given
for the purpose of securing traffic could par se be a justifi-
cation. It must be established that for different reasons the
lower rate ought not to be lowered and that the public interest
justified the inequality of rates."
What would justify undue preference might be considered, as
in the previous chapter, under three heads; first, cost of work-
ing; second, competition, and third, interest of the public. Cost
of working, was not in this period the predominating factor in
deciding a preference undue or unreasonable. Increased cost of
working might arise in various ways. In the first place, it might
not
be due to operating causes. It could be considered as an infringe-
1. Liverpool Corn Traders' Association v. L. & N. W. Ry. Go., 1890;
7 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 125, 132-136; Liverpool Corn Traders'
Association v. Great Western Ry. Co., 1892; 8 Ry. & Canal Traffic
Cases, 114, 128-136.
2. Pickering. Phipps, etc., 83, 103.
3. Mansion Hoase Association on Ry. & Canal Traffic for the United
Kingdom v. London & South Western Ry. Co., 1895; 9 Ry. & Canal
Traffic Cases, 20, 35; Tower Commissioners of Newry v. Great North-
ern Ry. Co. (Ireland) ,1889, 1891; 7 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 184.
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ment of the law that a railway company should charge a higher rate
per ton per mile for any portion of its line which was more expen-
sive to v/ork than other portions. In the second place, it might
be due to the length of haul; longer distance would usually justi-
fy a lower charge, mileage compared. This established principle
"long, lead low rates" was definitely recognized in the Companies
2
Charges Confirmation Order Acts of 1891-92 which established
differences in rates per mile with regard to distances and quan-
tity. In the third place, a preference might be justified by
the guarantee of the regular shipment of a certain quantity.'
Messrs. Hickleton Main Colliery Co., and Messrs. Denaby and Cadeby
Colliery Co. were competitors. The railway company charged the
Denaby Co. on the following terms:
(a) For any quantity up to 200,000 tons a year, 2s, 5d per ton.
(b) From 200,000 to 300,000 tons a year, 2s, 4d per ton.
(c) For any quantity above 300,000 tons a year, 2s, 3d per ton.
These rates were charged under a guarantee to send a minimum
quantity of 200,000 tons of shipment coal per annum which in prac-
tice, came up to about 500,000 tons per annum during 21 years
from 1891. The same rates were granted to Messrs. Hickling Main
Colliery Company, but it was proved that the applicants sent only
some 60,000 tons of coal a year. Upon complaint in 1903 the Com-
mission held that the difference of 2d a ton up to 200,000 and
the still greater difference for larger tonnage was justi-
1. Mansion House Association, etc., v. L. & S. V/ . Ry. Co., 1895;
9 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 20, 35; Town Commissioners of Newry,
etc., 184.
2. See the following chapter.
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fied. 1
The railway company could make a difference in charge for a
guaranteed quantity, if such difference was allowed by the railway
company in good faith for the protection of its own interests and
in the belief that the guarantee was worth to it the difference
in charge. A difference in the mode of packing might justify a
preference if it could be shown that a greater quantity could be
o
carried in the same wagon as a result of such packing."
Competition might justify a preference. The decisions of
the Commission on this principle were not as well-defined as we
would ' wish. A few points, however, were clear. Competition, to
be recognized as a justification of a preference, must be direct
and effective.
In the Lanceshire Patent Fuel Company case"; the railway com-
pany was complained to carry shipment coal at a lower rate than
they carried another kind of coal, which was in the form of slack.
The shipment coal was manufactured into patent fuel for shipment.
Upon application, the Commission decided that no competition ex-
isted between the coal carried for shipment and that carried for the
trader. The fact that the jsrader manufactured the coal carried
for him by the railway company into an article which might ulti-
mately compete with the coal carried by the railway company for
shipment was not bound to be taken into consideration by the rail-
way company in regulating their charges. In the Eastwood & Co,
lHickleton Main Colliery Co. v. Hull, Barnsley and West Siding Junc-
tion Ry. & Dock Co., 1903; 12 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 63.
2. Guernsey Mutual Transport Co., and William Entwisle v. L. B. & S.
C. Ry. Co., etc., 1908; 13 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 153.
3. Lancashire Patent Fuel Co. v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., etc., 1904;
12 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases', 77.
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case, the Commission held that the mere fact that competit6rs of
a trader had shorter routes by another railway would not justify
the lowering of the rates to the same level as that by the shfcrter
route. 1 A traffic which differed from other traffic only in
being competitive could not have any distinction made in its favor.
The real difficulty of the question was how much consider-
ation should be given to effective competition in justifying un-
due preference. Railway companies had always maintained that the
commercial necessity of competition ought to justify a rate other-
wise indefensible. The traders on the other hand insist upon the
contrary. The Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888 was not plain
upon this particular point. Section 27, sub-section 2 showed all
3
the appearance of a compromise. It did not state how far effect-
ive competition would justify a lower charge and prevent a prefer-
ence undue, nor did it limit circumstances from receiving con-
sideration. In the Pickering Phipps case, the difference in the
charges was justified by the Commission purely and solely on the
ground that there was competition.
The Pickering Phipps case involved two questions: a re-
bate of 4d per ton on coal and iron traffic, and an undue prefer-
ence to the owners of Butlins and Islip furnaces. We will dis-
cuss here only the second question. The sidings of the Butlins
1. Eastwood & Co. v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., 1907; 13 Ry. & Canal Traf-
fic Cases, 137; compare Budd (P. 0.) 393.
2. Liverpool Corn Association v. L. & N. W. R£. Co.; 7 Ry. & Canal
Traffic Vases, 140-143.
3. Ibid.
4. Pickering Phipps v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., 1893; 8 Ry. & Canal
Traffic Cases, 83, 1Q0-143.
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and Islip furnace had access both to the London and North Western
Railway and the Midland Railway. The sidings of the Duston fur-
naces ?/hich belonged to Messrs. Pickering Phipps and others had
access to the London and North Western Railway only, but their
sidings were nearer to the iron markets - 60 miles, 71 miles and
82 miles respectively. "The London and North Western Railway
Company who carried the Butlins pig-iron 11 miles further, and
the Islip pig-iron 22 miles further than the Duston pig-iron,
charged Butlins 95 d per ton per mile, and Islip 0. 84 per ton
per mile, while they charged Duston 1.05 d per ton per mile, so
that the total charge per ton of pig-iron from Duston to the west-
ern markets was 5s, 2d, while the total charge per ton from
either Butlins or Islip, was 5s Sd." 1 The Commission held that
the preference was not undue. The fact that a trader had access
to a competing route for the carriage of his goods might be taken
into consideration by the railway companies in deciding a question
of undue preference. This advantage would be a circumstance
which might be treated in deciding a case of undue preference as
any other advantageous geographical situation. But a railway
company was not bound to take into consideration in fixing their
charges such facts as that the goods carried for one trader would,
after being manufactured, ultimately compete with those of an-
other. 2
Absolutely equal mileage rates could not be insisted upon,
for they would practically exclude one of two competing railways
1. Pickering Fhipps, etc., 84-85.
2. Lancashire Patent Fuel Co., etc., 77.
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from the traffic. There was traffic which would not come into
the market; unless very low rates were charged; railv/ay companies
were sometimes justified for charging lower rates on traffic from
a distance of such a character that it competed with the traffic
nearer the market. The object of the company was simply to get
such traffic but the public had an interest also in getting the
traffic. 1 It was definitely agreed that where actual effective
sea competition existed, a difference in charges was justified. 6
In 1892 the Liverpool Corn Traders' Association complained
of an undue preference given by the Great Western Railway Company
in respect of the rates charged for grain and flour from the Severn
ports and Birkenhead respectively to Birmingham and Wolverhampton.
The distances and rates were:
Birkenhead to Birmingham 98 miles, rate lis 3d
Cardiff \ j to Birmingham 113 miles, rate 9s 6d
Bristol to Birmingham ' 141 miles, rate 8s 6d
i
Avonmouth ^Severn Ports to Birmingham 150 miles, rate 8s 6d
Portisheadj Ito Birmingham 153 miles, rate 8s 6d
Sharpness to Birmingham 86 miles, rate 7sl0d
The railway company gave the reason to be that they were
competing for the carriage of grain and flour between the Severn
ports, and Birmingham and Wolverhampton, with carriers by water-
between the same places, and the railway rates were controlled by
1. Corporation of Birmingham v. Midland Ry. Co., etc., 1909; 14
Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 24, 25.
2. Muntz v. L. & N. W. Ry.-Co., 1910; 14 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases,
284, 292.
3. Liverpool Corn Traders' Association v. G. W. Ry. Co., 1892; 8
Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 114.
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the rates charged by such carriers. The decision of the Commis-
sioners were divided. Two Commissioners held that the preference
was justified, for there was effective competition both by rail
and by water and no locality was prejudiced. Sir Frederick Peel
pointed out, however, that there was still the question whether
or not the Birkenhead rate might not be reduced.
An undue preference could neither be justified by cost of
working nor by competition, if it was in direct violation of public
interest. The law required that in considering a question of un-
due preference, the Commission must not only consider the legiti-
mate desire of the railway company to secure traffic, but also
whether it was in the interest of the public that the company
should secure the traffic rather than abandon it or not attempt
to secure it. It was only in such cases where, though the object
of the railway company is to secure certain traffic for its own
purposes upon its own lines, the very fact that they sought to
obtain it by certain rates, operated in the interest of the public
that the Commission would not interfere. The law contemplated
the possible existence of such traffic that might not be in the
interest of the public. An undue preference might be justified
on the ground of public interest if there was no evidence that
2the rates complained of were unreasonable or excessive. But if a
lower rate was given on the ground of public interest, the railway
company, in justifying the lower rate, must point out what particu-
lar public interest was involved. Otherwise, the lower rate would
1. Pickering Phipps, etc., 102.
2. Castle Steam Trawlers, etc., 145; Spillers and Bakers, Ltd. v.
Taff Vale Ry. Co., 1903; 12 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 70.
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In 1890 the London and North Western Railway Company defended their
unequal rates in a case on the basis of public interest."1" They
charged 8s 4d for the distance - 173 miles - between Cardiff and
Birmingham and lis 3d for the distance of only 98|- miles from
Liverpool to Birmingham. The Commissioners held that the rates
were an undue preference, for the interests of the public did not
require the maintenance of the low rates from Cardiff to Birmingham.
The railway company failed to point out any important public in-
terests would be affected, if the traffic from Cardiff to Birming-
ham should go by some other route.
What is in the "interest of the public" and to what the word
"public" refers were practical difficulties to the Commissioners.
Justice Wills found it hard to say what precise public interests
were intended to be respected. Naturally, "public" referred to
nothing wider than the British public; but to the majority of the
British public, it might be a matter of profound indifference
through what route goods might come. In the Liverpool Corn Traders 1
case it was held that the word "public" referred to in section 27
was the public of the locality or district affected. A consider-
able proportion of the population in general as opposed to any
individual or association of individuals would satisfy the de-
scription. Later in 1907, the term "public" was considered as
including any considerable portion of the population not being
1. Liverpool Corn Traders' Association, etc., 125.
Richton Local Board v. L. & Y. Ry. Co., 1893; 8 Ry. & Canal Traf-
fic Cases, 74, 80.
2. Liverpool Corn Traders' Association, etc., 125, 137.
3. Liverpool Corn Traders' Association v. Great Western Ry. Co.,
1895; 8 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 114, 127.
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the parties concerned or their servants* including, therefore, the
inhabitants of any district dependent for its prosperity on any
given industry or trade. ^
The Great Western Railway Company charged the following un-
equal rates for the conveyance of fish traffic from and to the
respective places :-
Swansea to London, distance miles 198f-rate per ton per mile 3
" Birmingham
" " Bristol
" "• Exeter
Milford to London,
" Birmingham
*
•
" Bristol
"
" Exeter
16li- "
9l|- "
167^ "
267 "
230 "
160 "
236 "
2.97d
3.93d
3.41d
2.26d
2.21d
2.62d
2.41d
The railway company stated and proved satisfactorily that the
rates complained of were necessary for the securing of the traffic
that
in the interest of the public, and there was keen competition at
Milford. The Commission held that the Milford rates "were justi-
fied, inasmuch as it was in the public interest that as many ave-
nues
(
of approach as possible should be kept open to London and
other fish markets, and also inasmuch as it was in the interest
of a considerable community at and around Milford that its fishing
industry should be enabled to continue to thrive."
What is in the interest of the public may be summarized now.
In the first place, public interest must be in the form of a bet-
1. Castle Steam Trawlers, etc., 145, 150.
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ter service. 1 In the second place it would be clearly in the pub-
lic interest that as many avenues of approach to diverse markets as
2
possible should be kept open. In the third place, it might also
be in the public interest that a certain industry should be enabled
to continue to thrive. Public interest might result from railways
4
acting in their own interest under pressure of competition.
Where a preference was given to all persons alike upon purely
business considerations, there would be a strong presumption that
5
the preference was not undue. In the absence of any disturbing
factors the Commission usually acted on the principle that similar
charges should be made fop similar services. When a railway com-
pany ignored directions to a generaTcarrier and delivered parcels
to its own agents, thus giving them a special advantage the law
7
condemns such action as giving undue preference. In the James
Bannatyne & Sons case, a trader was both a shipowner and a miller;
purely in his capacity of shipowner he was entitled to and was
given a rebate on certain traffic. It was ruled, however, that
by giving him the rebate, he was benefitted not only in his capacity
of shipowner, but also as a miller, and this was held tc be a
8
prejudice to others who were not shipowners but millers only.
1. In re Taff Vale Ry. Co,, 1900; 11 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 89.
2. Castle Steam Trawlers, etc., 149.
3. In re Taff Vale Ry. Co., 1900; 11 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 93.
.
4. Castle Steam Trawlers, etc., 145.
5. Inverness Chamber of Commerce v. Highland Ry. Co., 1901; 11 Ry.
& Canal Traffic Cases, 218.
6. Timm v. N.E. Ry. Co. etc., 1901; 11 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 214
7. Ford & Co., v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co., 1890; 7 Ry. & Canal Traffic
Cases, 111.
8. James Bannatyne & Sons, Ltd., v. Great Southern & Western Ry. Co.
of Ireland, 1904; 12 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 105, 122.
Forword Brothers v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 1904; 12 Ry. & Canal
Traffic Cases, 218.
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In complaining of the rates charged from one palce as com-
pared with those from another, account must be taken of the
differences in circumstances on different sections of the same
system, in the services performed and other factors such as
capital cost, volume of traffic, competition and the like which
entered so largely into the fixing of a rate for a particular
traffic .1 No case of undue preference could be made by comparing
the local rate of one railway company with the through rate of
another over its line.^ It would not be undue prefErence for a
railway company to serve one of two traders in the same line of
business on more favorable terms than his rival in trade was served
by another railway company.
^
of the
Group rates . - Grouping was authorized by section 29, Railway
and Ganal Traffic Act, 1888. A railway company might lawfully
group together any number of places in the same district situated
at various distances from any point of destination all places
comprised in the group to any point of destination. The law was
merely permissive. ^ There were only two Parliamentary limitations;
one was that the distances grouped should not be unreasonable and
the other that neither the group rates charged nor the places
grouped should be such as tc create an undue preference. Since
the legislature had definitely recognized the principle as a
practice beneficial to the public, any attempt to establish in a
1. Chance and Hunt, Ltd. v. Great Western Ry. Go. etc., 1911-1914;
15 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 145.
2. Lever Brothers v. Midland Ry. Co., 1909; 13 Ry. & Canal Traffic
Cases, 301, 310.
3. Ibid, 312.
4. Abram Coal Co. etc., 135; North Lonsdale Iron & Steel Co. v. Furn-
ers Ry. Co. etc., 1891; 7 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 146, 148.
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group rate a mathematical equality in respect of charges or ad-
vantages between places which were outside the group and the
different members of the group would be useless and void*
As to the reasonableness of distances in the places grouped,
it would have to be decided in each case according to its cir-
cumstances. ^ Eleven miles was held reasonable in one case and
fourteen miles unreasonable in another. ^ a grouping was held ex-
cessive, where its advantages of grouping were all in one direction!
Where there was a group rate which was justified on the grounds
of commerical convenience, the measure of what amount of prefer-
ence would amount to an undue preference would be different from
that applicable where no such rate existed. In the North Lonsdale
Iron and Steel Company case, the works of the complainant and there
other works were grouped together by the railway companies and
charged them a uniform rate of carriage, except that that the
complainants were charged 6d for a ton less than the owners of
the other works in support of coke. The distances of the four-
works from the common junction point were respectively 18, 27, 28
and 38 miles. Upon complaint, the Commission held that so far
as the rate for coke was concerned the railway companies had made
sufficient allowance for the difference in the distance between
1. Pickering Phipps, etc., 87; Port of London Authority v. Midland
Ry. Co. etc., 1911-1912; 15 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases," 23, 35.
2. North Lonsdale Iron & Steel Co. etc., 146, 153.
3. Pickering Phipps, etc., 88; Carrickf ergus Harbour Commissioners
and others v. Belfast and Northern Counties Ry. Co., 1897; 10 Ry.
& Canal Traffic Cases, 74.
4. North Lonsdale Iron & Steel Co. etc., 153.
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the works. But as regards the nig-iron rates, tfte sc$le was not
uniform; in the case of complainant, the rate for pig-iron amounted
to 73 as against 63 of a penny per ton per mile. The places grouped
together were at such distances apart as to create an undue pref-
erence in the conveyance of pig-iron.
Grouping must be elastic. Certain iron works were grouped
together. The grouping was justified "by the Commission, subse-
quently the railway company took one of the iron works out of the
group. Upon complaint the Commission stated -that a group once
formed would not be necessarily final.
"Section 29 of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, did
not prevent a railway company from grouping de novo
,
or from dis-
solving a group or taking one place out of it in the sense of leav-
ing the others in and not putting a certain one in. M If groups
were to be considered rigid and irrevocable, it would be hardly
possible to comply effectively with the provision of sub-section
2 "that the group rates charged and the places grouped together
shall not be such as to create an undue preference."
Difference of Treatment
.
A "difference of treatment" within
section 27, of the Act of 1888 meant such matters as a difference
of facilities, something resulting in a difference in advantage
given to one trader in matters other than charges. But a differ-
ence in treatment which did not result in a lower charge would not
be within the section. "Lower charge" and "difference in treat-
1. Milton and Askam Hematite Iron Co. v. Furners Ry. Co. 1903; 12
Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 1.
2. Ibid.
3. Lever Brothers, etc., 302-333.
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merit" were not the same things. Difference of treatment would
not necessarily involve undue preference, unless the latter can
be proven. Before the onus was cast upon a railway company of
showing that the difference did not amount to an undue preference,
the complainant must prove that the difference in treatment was
one which prima facie gave some advantage to his competitor and
some disadvantage to himself."'"
Preferential rates
.
The subject matter of complaints as to
undue preferences fell under two heads; first differential rates,
which we have just discussed in the preceding pages, and seconfi,
preferential rates. Differential rates were those concerned with
disparities in domestic rates and included as sub-heads, export
rates, group rates, and rebates. Preferential rates were those
concerned with disparities between home and import traffic. The
only case of importance on preferential rates was that of the
Mansion. House Association decided in 1895, the hearing of which
2lasted eight days.
Section 27 of the Act of 1888, on which the case was decided,
was interpreted so as to place home and foreign merchandise in
a position of strict equality. The la?/ did not prohibit all in-
equality in rates as between home and foreign merchandise; its
object was not to give to home traffic a" preference over foreign
traffic. Among the considerations affecting the case was not to
1. 1. Olympia Oil and Coke Co v. North Eastern Ry. Co., 1913; 15
Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 166, 173.
2. Mansion House Association, etc., 20; see also discussion in
Parliament on the case, Han. 1895, v. 33, PP. 1530-155G.
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be included the fact that the goods were foreign as distinguished
from home merchandise. If the railway companies had facts which
would justify the difference, had the goods been home goods, the
companies could not be debarred from relying on those facts as an-
swers, merely because the goods were of foreign origin.
The element of home versus foreign merchandise being elimi-
nated, the case was heard and decided as other cases of undue
preference. Cost of service was relied upon. It was shown that
the rates for the home traffic covered a variety of services, such
as weighing, loading, switching, and provision of station accomo-
dation which were not included in the rate of foreign goods. The
foreign merchandise could be more easily and expeditiously handled
and dealt with at times more convenient to the railways, always
in large quantity and generally in a much more economical manner, 1
The question of rebate involved various difficulties out of
which cases arose. The first source of contention had been with
regard to those charges that had no other Parliamentary limitation
p
than reasonableness. A rate is composed of two parts, one for
conveyance and one for incidental services. No rebate could be
made from conveyance charges. Incidental services had not been
itemized and the charges for .them specified. Shippers often con-
tended that certain incidental services formed a part of convey-
ance duty.
1. See report of Departmental Committee on preferential Treatment,
1906; v. 55.
2. Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Ry. Go. v. Piedcock &
Co., 1896; 10 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 150, 157.
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The second source of contention arose out of the fact that a
railway rate was arrived at, not by attributing to each head of
services a certain sum and then adding them up, thus determining
the total, but by fixing an aggregate sum to cover all the services
The trader, usually not recognizing this fact, did not hesitate
to accuse the railway companies of undue preference by comparing
one rebate with another. In general, rates included charges for
terminals but where a rebate had to be made on such traffic as
did not ordinarily require or use station accomodations or station
2
services, the difficulty was greatly increased.
The third source of contention was the standard of measure
of a rebate and this the Commissioners had not been able to agree
3
even among themselves. Commissioner Price urged that rebates
ought to be a reasonable sum in respect of the service performed,
while Commissioner Miller emphasized that the test should be the
cost of service to the person who performed it himself instead
of having it performed for him by the railway companies. Com-
missioners Peel and Bigham and Justice Brighton held that the
saving to the railway companies should be the measure of the
proper amount of rebate.
The London and North Western Railway Company charged rates
4
which included charges for collection and delivery. Messrs.
1. Pickford's Ltd. v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., 1907; 13 Ry. & Canal
Traffic Cases, 31, 50, 76.
2. Vickers, Sons and Maxim, Ltd. v. Midland Ry. Co., and others
1901-1902; 11 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 249, 260.
3. Pickford's Ltd. v. London v. North Western Ry. Co., 1907; 13
Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 31; Compare Menzies v. Caledonian Ry .
Co., 1887; 5 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases.
4. Pickford's Ltd. etc., 1907, 31, 51.
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Pickford who were competitors in London were entitled to a rebate,
where they performed collection and delivery themselves. Upon
complaint in 1907 that it rebates allowed, especially in the cases
of goods carried at "special" rates, were unduly low and that
the railway company thereby unduly preferred themselves, the Court
of Appeals declined to adopt the standard urged by the applicants
that rebates out of collection and delivery should be equal to
the charges made for the same services when station to station
rates were charged. A rebate must be based on the cost of each
consignment. The measure of the rebate as stated by Commissioner
Peel ought to be either the bare cost which the railway company
was saved by the competing shipper doing the work or that cost
plus the profits (if any) which the railway company would have
earned. It would be reasonable for a railway company to vary the
cartage charge in proportion to the total length of journey.
•
Apportionment of rates
.
Where a through rate stood unchal-
lenged and unthreatened, apportionment was outside the jurisdiction
of the Commission. 1 But if the parties could not agree, the Com-
mission would have power to apportion the through rate. Through
2
rates to be apportioned must be definite. Full particulars were
required of rates proposed for apportionment which should include
their amount, the termini for each rate and the rate between those
1. Manchester Ship Canal Co. v. London & North Western Ry. Co.,
1910, 1911; 14 Ry'. & Canal Traffic C a ses, 141, 142.
2. Forth and North British Ry. Co. v. Great North of Scotland and
Caledonian Ry. Co., 1397, 1898; 11 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 1;
Dearne Valley Ry. Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co. etc., 1914; 15
Ry. &• Canal Traffic Cases, 202.
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termini. Through land and sea rates were not to be apportioned
according to mileage.'1'
D i s t ingui shing rates
.
Section 14 of the Regulation of Rail-
ways Act, 1873, as amended by section 33 of the Railway and Canal
Traffic Act, 1388, enabled a shipper without the help of the
Commission, to call upon a railway company under certain circum-
2
stances to distinguish a rate for him at any time. In distin-
guishing a rate, it would not be sufficient to show the items
of service without specifying the amount of expenses for each,
nor the amount of expenses for all services whatever they were
5
without itemizing the services performed. The power of distin-
guishing did not apply to sidings or junctions, and the Commission
4
possessed no jurisdiction to order such rates to be distinguished.
The distinguishing of a rate used need not be based on the cost
of each service; it is sufficient testate how much each service
was "charged."
Who was entitled to have his rates distinguished? The an-
swer involves a correct interpretation of the words, "persons in-
terested" in the section. In several cases the railway companies
contended that "persons interested" were only those persons whose
traffic was actually conveyed on the line and who actually paid
1. Great Southern and Western Ry. Co. v. City of Cork Steam Pocket
Co., 1912; 15 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 67.
2. Pelsall Coal & Iron Co. v. London & North Western Ry. Co. (No, 1
1889; 7 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 1; Pickford's Ltd. v. L & N.W.
Ry. Co., 1905; 12 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 154, 162; British
Portland Cement Manufacturers, Ltd. and Charles Nelson & Co. v.
Great Eastern Ry. Co. etc., 1914; 15 Ry, & C anal & Traffic Cases,
213.
3. Pickford's Ltd. etc., 1905; 154, 161.
4. Pelsall Coal & Steel Co. etc., (No. 2) 1891; 36.
5. Pickford's Ltd. etc., 1907; 37.
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the rates. The Commission held that the expression included "all
persons who have a bona fide interest in knowing how the particu-
lar rates are made up.""*"
The power of the Commission, in ordering rates to be distin-
guished was limited to rates in a rate book. The Commission pos-
2 3
sessed no power of ordering quoted rates to be distinguished.
1. Tomlinson v. London & North Western Ry. Co., 1890; 7 Ry. &
Canal Traffic Cases, 22; Pelsall Coal & Steel Co. etc., ( No. 1)
1889; 1, 15; Smith, Stone and Knight., Ltd. v. London and North
Western Ry. Co. etc., 1914; 15 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 321, 327.
2. Quoted r-ates are rates quoted by a railway company on the ap-
plication of a certain shipper.
3. Pelsall Coal & Steel Co. etc., ( No. 1) 1889; 1, 17.

CHAPTER X
Revision of Goods Classification
and Charge schedules
The revision of goods classifications and maximum rate
schedules marked a distinct step of progress in the legislative
history of rate regulation. It was realized only after many
years of hard struggle. The dissatisfaction with the working of
the crude classifications and schedules reached probably as far
back as the date of the first enactment in the special acts. The
maximum rates specified and the classifactions given had become
altogether inapplicable to the changed and still changing circum-
stances. They had been enacted for the most part in the early day
of railways when the idea prevailed that railway companies were
not common carriers. The classifications were very incomplete
and no uniformity in rating goods was observed either as between
the special acts of different railway companies or even among the
various special acts of the same railway company. Railway com-
panies were basing their charges on the Clearing House classifi-
cation mutually agreed upon betv/een themselves. The public
was supposed to be protected against extortionate charges by the
maximum rate clause in the special acts of each railway company.
The protection was, however, nominal and valueless. The statutory
maximum rates as we have seen were all fixed too high for this
purpose
.
In 1890 or about' the time of revision there were found to
be 900 acts dealing with the charging powers of 976 railway com-
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panies.l jn some cases reference had to "be had to more than
fifty acts of one railway company in order to determine the rate
the railway company was authorized to charge. ^ The sections
contained in the acts relating to rates had varied very consider-
ably at different times. The charging powers of the railway
companies were not clearly defined. The power to charge terminals
where given was limited "by a clause only requiring the charge to
be reasonable. The general consequence of all these defects was
that the public were left in ignorance as to whether the charges
imposed upon them were or were not in excess of the statutory
powers of the railway companies. The need of a revised classi-
fication of goods and schedules of maximum charges was therefore
urgent and imperative.
As early as 1867 a Loyal Commission on hallways definitely
recommended a revision proposing the adoption of the Clearing
House classification as a basis. "The enumeration and classifi-
cation should be stated at length in a general railway Act."
Both the Royal Commission and the Select Committee recognized the
fact that "the Clearing House Classification is altered from time
to time to meet the varying wants and circumstances of trade." The
Royal Commission proposed to meet this need by compelling railway
companies to apply to Parliament before making such changes and
the Select Committee, by giving power to their proposed Commission.
1. Report of Board of Trade, 1890, p. 6.
2. Report Select Committee 1882, v. 13, p. VII.
3. Report Royal- Commission 1867 LXVII (245).
4. xveport Joint Select Committee 1872, v. 13, p. XXXVII.
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"A uniform classification of goods and merchandise," said the
Select Committee of 1882, "ought to be adopted by the railway
companies as between themselves and the public, such as, under
the name of the Clearing House Classification is already in use
as between themselves only."l In a memorial addressed to the
Board of Trade, 2 in 1879 by the Incorporated Chamber of Commerce
of Liverpool it was recommended, among many other important things,
that the railway companies should be compelled by law to adopt
the Clearing House Classification and that all railway and canal
companies should be required to submit for the approval of the
Commission, revised tables of rates formed on that classification.
In 1886 after Mr. Chamberlain failed to pass his Bill, railway
companies made strong efforts to introduce their own Bills em-
bodying the revision of classification of goods and schedules of
charges. Thus, the revision was urged by both parties for several
years
.
It was only after the passing of the Railway and Canal
Traffic Act, 1888 that the revision was realized. One of the
most important clauses of the Railway and Canal Traffic Bill was
the 24th Clause which, a little modified, became the 24th section
of the Act, authorizing the revision of the classifications and
schedules. Each railway company was required to submit to the
Board of Trade a revised classification of merchandise traffic
and a revised schedule of maximum rates and charges with a
1. Parliamentary Papers* 1881, Vol. XIII, P. XX.
2. Parliamentary Papers, 1879, Vol. LXIII (162).
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separate statement ss to the amount of terminal charges. 1 Any
objection to the revised, classification and the schedule was to
be lodged with the Board of Trade, which was to consider and
adjust the differences. 2 After the classification and schedules
had been agreed upon, the Eoard of Trade was to introduce to
either House of Parliament a Bill embodying such agreed classi-
fications and schedules in the form of a Provisional Order. In
the case of any railway company neglecting this duty or any differ-
ence which would not be agreed upon, the Board of Trade was to
recommend, such classification and schedule as in its opinion
should be adopted by the company and proceed as before for an act
to confirm the Provisional Order. 4 The rates and charges men-
tioned in the Provisional Order after being confirmed by an act
would come into operation, the railway company being entitled to
charge accordingly. 5 Any amendment of the classification or the
schedule might be proposed by either a person or a railway com-
pany in a prescribed manner of application to the Board of Trade,
a notice of fourteen days being given. The result of such
application would be published in the "London Gazette", taking
1. Act, 1388, £ 24, subsection 1.
2. Act, 1888, S. 24, subsection 3.
3. Act, 1888, S. 24, Sub. 4, 5.
Sub-sections 4 and 5 of section 24, Railway and Canal Traffic Act,
1888, were amended in 1892 by the Railway and Canal Traffic Act,
1892 (15 and 56 Vict. C. 44). The sub-sections provided,, in case
of disagreement, that a recess should intervene between the
report presented by the Board of Trade and the legislation conse-
quent upon that report." As there was no necessity for this delay,
a Bill was introduced by Lord Balfour to amend it and was passed
on June 27, 1892. The sole object was to enable the Board of Trade
to act in the same session in which they presented a -report-. Han.
1892, V. 5, P. 1677.
4. Act, 1888, s. 24, sub. 6, 7.
5. Act, 1883, s. 24, sub. 10.
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effect on the day of publication.
1
When the revision was actually taken up, the railway com-
panies contended that the classification mentioned in the Act
was a Parliamentary Classification but the shippers were of the
p
opinion that the Classification would be a working classification.
Irish traders were principally concerned with the proposal to make
the classification and schedules uniform. ^ These are some examples
which suggest the kind of opposition that was overcome.
On November 18, 1SS8, rules, regulations and forms with
respect to the revision of classifications of merchandise traffic
and schedules of maximum rates and terminal charges, were issued
to the Railway Company by the Board of Trade. The revised classi-
fication and schedules were required to be submitted by every
railway company "as soon as possible after the passing of the Act."
Railway Companies were required to state the proposed maximum rate
per truck per mile or per ton per mile for the first, second, or
third certain number of miles. A schedule of terminal charges,
showing their nature and amount and a statement of the existing
maximum rates were to be given. Separate forms each containing
this information were to be filled up for mineral traffic, for
goods, for animals, for exceptional articles, for small packages
and a separate statement of regulations as to merchandise traffic
was also to be filed. Where a railway company was unable to set
1. Act, 1888, s 24, Sub. 11.
2. Han. v. 539, p. 548.
3. Han. v. 539, p. 1764.
4. Herapath's Railway Journal, Sept. 8, 1888, p. 1022.
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out the existing maximum rates and terminal charges for each species
of traffic they must supply a printed schedule of the charges in
force with the authority for each of them. In all cases three
printed copies of these schedules ?/ere to he supplied, one stamped
with the seal of the railway company and signed by the secretary.
By about February 10, 1889, after making known to all the
railway companies the rules, forms and notices, the revised class-
ifications and schedules of all the principal railway companies
were in the hands of the Board of Trade. April 10 was fixed as
the last day for filing objections to these classifications and
schedules, but on the representations of the shippers, the time
was extended to June 3. There were more than 4000 objections from
over 1,500 persons and organizations. A very large percentage
of the objections referred to the details of the classifications.
Although the classifications and schedules sent in by the railway
companies were based chiefly on the Railway Clearing House Class-
ifications, yet there were many variations. As some of these ob-
jections and differences were capable of being settled by personal
conferences between the shippers and the railway companies, a
circular was sent out to this effect, with the result that many
conferences were held and numerous differences amicably settled.
But there were still left many objections which the Board of
Trade found itself bound to take up, article by article, and to
hear the arguments on both sides. Under the authority given by
the Act 1
,
two Commissioners Lord Balfour of Burleigh and Mr.
Courtenay Boyle, were appointed by the Board of Trade. They were
given the charge of the preparation and consideration of the
1. Act, 1888, s. 24, sub-section 9, Report of Board of Trade p.6,'90
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schedules and classifications. The hearing of the objections was
also assigned to them. Formal inquiry was conducted by them in
different parts of the country, beginning on October 29, 1889,
in Westminster Town Hall. They sat 75 days in London, 8 days in
Edinburgh, and 4 days in Dublin; the inquiry lasting over into
1891. At the hearings, the schedules and classifications of the
London and North Western and the Great Western Railway Companies
were taken as representative. The principles established in these
cases made to apply, however, to all other railway companies.
To meet the objections and differences on both sides, the
railway companies and the public, was by no means an easy task
for the Board of Trade. Great difficulty was experienced in
bringing to a compromise the rival contentions, the railway com-
panies on the one side demanding unswervingly non-interference of
their sanctioned power and rights on which they invested their
money, and the traders on the other urging with equal force that
those powers and rights were granted at a time when railway system
was in its infancy, when the only measure of rates was that con-
tained in the old canal acts and when nothing whatever was known
of the cost of railway conveyance. 1 The Board of Trade had no-
thing to guide it except the vague words "Just and reasonable." 2
1. Report Board of Trade, p. 7, 1890.
2. In the House of Lords an amerdment was made that the new maxi-
mum rates and charges should be such as it would be "just or
reasonable to substitute for the existing maximum rates and charges,
as upon the whole equivalent to such existing maximum rates and
charges .
"
A subsequent amendment stated that the rates were to be con-
sidered reasonable, having regard to the exis;ting statutory powers
of the railway companies and to the reasonable requirements of the
public and the shippers.
But both amendments were rejected.
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The Board aimed to be just and reasonable to both sides. It did
not accept either the old maximum rates and classifications
sanctioned in the special acts, nor the actual rates that were
then in use. However, its revisions were, to a great extent, based
on the exisiting rates, with a reasonable margin to enable the
railway companies to meet possible changes of conditions in the
future. It did not allow the demand of the traders for a uniform
reduction of all rates, based on the competitive rates nor did it
accept the method of fixing rates according to mileage run, based
on the relation of cost and profit to capital. In short, it
recognized the abnormalities occurring in the existing rates and,
whenever possible, tried to modify the same. A simple graduated
scale of maximum charges was adopted, although the railway com-
panies recommended a cumulative acale of decrease. 1 Power was
given to the railway companies to make terminal changes for such
services as were actually rendered. Under certain conditions a
trader was allowed to perform any terminal service himself.
In classifying the articles, the Board of Trade followed
mainly, though not wholly, the Railway Clearing House Classifica-
tion. The division into eight classes was retained but class S
of the Railway Clearing House Classification was changed to Class
C. In arranging articles to particular classes, the value, weight,
bulk and quantity were all taken into consideration but no special
effort was made to assign, with any degree of accuracy, the pro-
portionate value to be attached to each. All unenunerated articles
were to be charged the rates of Class 3 instead of Class 5, as
proposed by the railway companies.
After the objections had been carefully considered and met'
1. See Appendix VIII.
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as far as circumstances allowed, the Board of Trade finally sub-
mitted to Parliament, in 1891 and 1892, a series of thirty-five
Provisional Orders embodying the revised classifications of
merchandise traffic and schedules of maximum rates and charges.
These Orders were subjected to a further exhaustive examination
by a Joint Committee of the two Houses in the sessions of 1891
and 1892. After considerable modifications at the hands of the
Committee^ they became law under the Railway Company (Rates and
Charges) Order Confirmation Acts, 1891 and 1892. The leading
railway companies had each an Order to itself; the smaller rail-
way companies were dealt with in groups.
The eight classes of the now authorized classification were
A. B. C. and 1 to 5. Class A was applied to consignments to four
tons and upwards. When merchandise specified in Class A. was
consigned in quantities of less than four tons and not less than
two tons, the railway companies might charge for such consignment
the conveyance rates applicable to Class B and if less than two
tons the conveyance rates applicable to Class C. In Class A the
chief articles were minerals. 2 Class B was also applicable to
consignments of four tons and upwards. When the consignment was
less than four tons, the same rule of Class A would apply. Class
B comprised higher classes of minerals. In Class C. the consign-
ment was to be of two tons or more and the articles included were
chiefly chemicals, agricultural products and manufactured iron.
1. See Appendix IX. .
2. Railway Rates and Charges order Confirmation Acts, 1891 and
1892, c. 6832, House of Commons, 1892, v. 70, p. 21.
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From Class 1 to Class 5, comprised the rest of miscellaneous arti-
cles auch as manufactured goods of various kinds, implements,
drapery, dyewoods, fish, fruit, grain, groceries, hardware, and
oils not dangerous.
The schedule of maximum rates and charges was divided into
six parts.
Part 1. Maximum rates and charges for all the classes of
merchandise specified in the classification.
Part 2. For animals.
Part 5. For carriages.
Part 4. Exceptional charges
Part 5. For perishable merchandise by passenger trains
Part 6. For small parcels.
The maximum rates for conveyance of goods and minerals were
divided according to distances. 1 For the first 20 miles the rate
per ton per mile was on a higher scale but for the next 30 or 50
miles, or the remainder of distances the rate was on a decreasing
scale respectively according to the distances. For most of the
railway companies the same uniform scale, as that of the Great
Eastern Railway Company, of maximum rates was provided for all
the eight classes, A. B. C. and 1-5 without exception. But the
scale of maximum rates was not so simple as that of the Great
Eastern or the Midland Railway Companies. The rates were made to
adopt to the peculiar conditions and circumstances of each railway
company. For instance in the London and Northwestern Railway
Company schedule there were five scales which were again divided
into three groups (A. B. and C). The first group which consisted
1. See Appendix I (a) Part 1.
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of three scales referred to rates in respect of merchandise com-
prised in Class A only, the second group referred to rates in
respect of merchandise composed in Classes B, C and 1 to 5 and
the third to rates in respect of merchandise comprised in Class
B only. The three scales in the first group were divided accord-
ing to railways; first, applicable to such portions of the railways
as were not specially mentioned, second, applicable to the rail-
ways specially mentioned and the third, applicable to the Cannock
Chase Railway. The scale in the second group was applicable to
such portions of the railways as were not specially mentioned. The
third group which was applicable to the railways specially men-
tioned were rates in respect of merchandise comprised in Class B
only. The same principle was applied to the revision of the
schedules of the other railway companies and the same kinds of
variations appeared in their schedules.1
Besides the maximum conveyance rate specified, railway com-
panies were authorized to charge for terminal stations and services
the maximum charges for which were also prescribed. Terminal
1. The following table gives some idea of the differences in the
scale of the maximum rates of a few leading railway companies:
Maximum Rates
I
:
11 '
:
111
Identical : Slightly higher than
: List I
[Slightly higher than
: List II
London & North
Western Railway
Great Western Ry.
Great Northern Ry.;
: Midland Railway
: Great Eastern Ry.
: Brighton Railway
: South Western Ry.
South Eastern Ry.
L. C. and Dover.
Provisional Order Bills Report, 1891, Part 1, p. 432.
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Charges were divided into two kinds, maximum station terminals
and maximum service terminals. The maximum staiion terminal was
the maximum charge which the companies might make to a shipper
for the use of the accommodation (exclusive of coal drops) pro-
vided, and for duties undertaken at the terminal station by the
companies as carriers. The maximum service terminals were the
maximum charges which the companies might make to a trader for
loading, unloading, covering and uncovering merchandise which
would include all the charges for the provision by the companies
of labor, machinery plant, stores, and sheets. Service terminals
could not be charged if a shipper undertook to do the service
himself or if he requested for the same but was refused by the
company. Maximum charges for station terminals at each end were
provided for the eight classes; for the first three classes, A.B.
C. the charges were on an increasing scale and for the last five
classes, 1-5, the station terminals were the same in each case. 2
There were no charges for service terminals on Class A and
B goods, as the services were not required. The charges for ser-
vice terminals on the rest of classes (C and 1-5) were also on an
increasing scale in each case.
Railway companies also possessed power to make certain special
charges. When a Company performed at the request of a trader
or for his convenience, certain special services, a charge could
be made in addition to the maximum rate for conveyance. The
services for which a special charge could be made was specified. 5
i ., . i —
—
.i
—
t
_______
1. Analysis v. 70, 1892, p. 131.
2. See Appendix 1, (c). Maximum Station and Service Terminals.
3. See Appendix, 1, (d)
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Charges could also be made for the use of wagons not included in
the maximum rates for conveyance. These charges were limited to
certain maxima.^" The right of making charges for privare sidings,
2
etc., under agreement was sanctioned. Any service in connection
with transhipment might be charged to the trader.
Maximum charges for the conveyance of animals were also di-
vided according to distances, as in the case for the conveyance
of merchandise and minerals. Animals might be conveyed per head
or per wagon. The latter was charged by size of the wagons and
the former by the class of animals. Station and service terminals
were also specified and a minimum total charge per consignment
was required.
The conveyance of carriages could be charged only according
4
to certain maixma specified.
The exceptional class was provided for the conveyance of
merchandise or articles of exceptional bulk, weight, or value.
Parliament required only that the charge should be reasonable.
Perishable merchandise was divided into three groups. Milk
formed the first group. The maximum rates were fixed according
c.
to distances and by imperial gallons. Maximum rates for the
conveyance of empty cans were also specified. Butter, fish, fruit
and vegetables formed the second group. They were charged by
hundred weight per mile according to the distance conveyed.
1. See Appendix, 1 (d)
2. Analysis, P. 104.
3. See Appendix, II.
4. See Appendix, III.
5. See Appendix, IV.
6. See Appendix, V.
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Station and terminal charges were specified.
For the carriage of small parcels, railway companies could
-in
made an additional charge with certain maxima in addition to the
maximum rates for conveyance and maximum station and service termi-
. 1
nals
.
The rates scheduled in Parts I to VI were the maximum rates
for conveyance by the merchandise train and included the provision
of locomotive power and wagons by the company, except that in the
maximum rates applicable to merchandise specified in class A of
the classification, the provision of wagons was not included.
When the railway company did not provide the wagons for merchan-
dise in classes other than class A, the authorized maximum rates
were to be reduced. When the distance did not exceed 50 miles,
the amount to be reduced could be determined by an arbitrator to
2
be appointed by the Board of Trade.
Maximum rates for the conveyance of empties, sacks, bags,
wagons, etc., were specified. Rules for weighing and for charging
fractions of a mile, of a penny, etc., were carefully laid down,
The revision was carried out to its finish in 1892. No one
who has studied the course of the three years' controversy on the
revision of schedules and classifications from 1889 to 1892 could
fail to be impressed with the fairness with which both the Joint
Committee and the Board of Trade approached the subject as well
as with the comprehensive and thoroughness of their inquiry and
work. Three things were accomplished: first, the codification
1. See Appendix, VI.
2. Analysis, P. 102.
3. See Appendix, VII.
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and reduction into order of the scattered provisions relating to
the charging power of the railway companies; second, the revision
of classifications and schedules; third, the fixing of the maxi-
mum terminal charges and the recognition of the right of the rail
waycompanies to make such charges. The new legislation effected,
however, as Professor Mavo said, only a series of compromises by
offering a series of propitiations. ' The small shipper was pro-
pitiared by the refusal to the large shipper of the benefit of a
reduced rate for train loads. The trader in through traffic was
propitiated by the cumulative scale. The trader in heavy goods,
coal, iron were on the whole, most benefitted by a substantial re-
duction of rates. The railway companies, though greatly disap-
pointed as result of the reductions in some of the maximum rates
they proposed, yet obtained powers of increasing charges in the
higher classes of goods. The right of making terminal charges
was now definitely within the statutes. The public was enabled
to ascertain, without intricate examination of many tens, if not
hundreds of difficult and often conflicting Acts of Parliament,
what the railway companies were authorized to charge. They were
able to know exactly what was the maximum charge and of what com-
ponent parts it was made up. It remains to be seen whether the
new legislation effected chiefly by compromises had solved the
problems of railway rates fundamentally and permanently.
1. Analysis, 106.
2. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1894, V. 8, PP. 280-318, The
English Railway Rate Question by James Mavor.

CHAPTER XI.
The Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1894.
The revised classification of merchandise traffic and the
schedule of maximum rates were to go into operation on January 1,
1893. After the enactment, in 1891, of the first batch of the
Railway Rates and Charges Provisional Orders, the managers of 17
principal railway companies met together and decided upon a gen-
eral raising of actual rates to the revised maxima. This policy
was later adopted by all the railway companies of the country.
The immediate causes of the general increase in actual rates was
twofold. Railway companies had been urging before the Board of
Trade that the revision of the classification and schedules should
be so arranged that no loss of revenue would result. 1 But the
Committee of the Board of Trade did not agree with this. For
some rates it adopted the basis of the then existing rates and
others were reduced without regard to actual rates. In all cases
they left, however, a margin of profit for possible changes of
circumstances affecting either the cost of the carriage or the
2
returns of the railway company. The first cause of the adoption of
the new maxima as actual rates was a reactionary attempt to re-
coup themselves as far as possible for losses resulting in the
part of the companies from the reduction of rates. The second
1. Second Report, Select Committee on Railway Rates and Charges,
1893, V. 14, P. IV.
2. Second Report, Select Committee, 1893, V. 14, P. IV.
3. Smith and Forest v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., 1889; 11 Ry. & Canal
Traffic Cases, 164.
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cause arose from the difficulties of fixing new rates according
to the revised maxima, and of putting them into immediate operation.
To avoid this difficulty, the companies decided at the outset of
the new scheme temporarily to level charges up to the maxima al-
lowed by the Acts.
According to the law, before an increase could take effect,
there had to be a special notice of the intention to do so, pub-
lished a fortnight in advance. 1 For this particular general in-
crease the railway companies asked and secured permission of the
Board of Trade to dispense with the form of notice for ordinary
increases of rates, the rate books of each station being treated
as statutory notice. The legal maximum rates were then sent down
to the station masters who were instructed to charge them in
lieu of the old rates.
This general increase of rates naturally caused agitation
and disturbance throughout the length and breadth of the King-
dom. Numerous questions were asked in Parliament as to whether
stepshad been taken to restore the rates to their original basis
2
as that existed before 1893. Immediate action by the government
was called for. The first method which was undertaken by the
government aimed at a peaceful settlement. The Board of Trade
ordered the railway companies to reinstate the rates of 1892
but the latter, at a meeting of their Association, refused to
adopt the suggestion. Two resolutions were communicated to the
1. The Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, Section 33, sub-section,
6.
2. Han. v. 8, 9, 12 and 21. See under Increase in Rates and
Charges. Han v. 28, 786.

Board of Trade on 1Viarch 1, 1893. The one emphasized the fact
that the reductions which had been compulsorily enforced should,
be taken into consideration. They promised, however, by the
second resolution that they would make as speedily as possible
such concessions as might satisfy the reasonable requirements of
the public.
In justice to the railway companies it should be recognized
that the railway companies did yield somewhat to the general re-
quest and tried to arrange a kind of compromise with the public.
A committee of goods managers began to sit early in January, 1893,
meeting four days a week for the consideration and determination
of complaints; a committee of General Managers was sitting at
the same time to meet deputations of traders. They were dealing
p
with the complaints under three methods:
1. By adopting lower class rates for some articles when
carried under certain conditions, or
2. By restoring special rates in force prior to Dec. 31, 1892,
or
3. By granting special rates approximating to those in force
in 1892.
In their letter dated February 7, 1893, to the Board of
Trade, the railway companies claimed from the Board of Trade and
from Parliament a reasonable time to perform the enormous task of
readjustment. Though railway companies had given up by this time
the thought of raising all rates to the maxima, yet they still
1. Second Report, Select Committee, 1893, V. 14, P. VIII.
2. Han. V. 8, 1893, PP. 559-662.
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sought to have a general increase of 5 per cent and at a later
period of 2-1/2 per cent.
Had the readjustment of rates and charges been satisfactorily-
carried out within a reasonable time, Parliamentary interference
would have been unnecessary. As the direct negotiation between the
railway companies and the Board of Trade seemed to be of little
effect, members in Parliament urged the appointment of a Select
Committee. 1 So, on May 16, 1895, a Select Committee was appointed,
with Sir Michael Hicks Beach as chairman, "to inquire into the
manner in which the railway companies have exercised the powers
conferred upon them by the Railway Rates and Charges Order Con-
firmation Acts, 1891-92 and to consider whether it is desirable
to adopt any other than the existing means of settling differ-
ences between the companies and the public with respect to the
rates and conditions of charge for the conveyance of goods. Two
reports were made in the same year, one on August 22, and another
on December 14, 1893. The first consisted wholly of minutes of
evidences; the second was of greater importance.
In the second report the Committee showed that the margin
of profit which was left in the revised classifications and sched-
ules was not for the purpose of enabling the railway companies
to recoup themselves for forced reduction of other rates but to
meet possible contingencies in connection with increased cost of
carriage. It recommended that some step should be taken to pro-
1. Han. V. 12, 1893, P. 426, Mr. Mundella's motion, P. 1005 again
deferred, P. 729, Mr. Marjoribank 1 s motion, P. 1007, Sir Rollit's
motion.
2. Han. V. 12, 1895, P. 1151.
3. Second Report, Select Committee, 1895, V. 14, P. IV.
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tect traders from unreasonable raising of rates even within the
maximum charges and from the imposition of unreas6nable conditions
of transport. As such power of control had neither been given
to any tribunal nor defined in any Act, it would be necessary
for Parliament to take some action."^
Prior to the date of this report, a rate had been considered
as reasonable when it was within the Parliamentary maximum. 2 Par-
liament had refrained from interfering with rates of the railway
companies within the maxima, save in the case of "through rates."
Under the Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, the Railway Com-
mission had power to fix a "through rate" if the railway com-
panies refused or neglected to make one. For other rates, reas-
onableness was never questioned when they were within the maxima.
By the Railway Glauses Act of 1845, under section 86, railway
companies had been empowered to make any reasonable charge for
the conveyance of passengers and goods not exceeding the tolls
authorized by their special Acts. This section could be inter-
preted in such a way as to mean Parliament did intend to question
the reasonableness of a rate even within its maxima. Yet there
had come up no case between the passing of the Act in 1845 and
that of 1888 in which a trader had complained to the Court against
a rate on the ground that it was unreasonable, though within the
maximum allowed by the special Act of the railway company. No
1. Second Report, Select Committee, 1893, V. 14, P. IV.
Han. 1893, V. 17, PP. 1364-1370.
2. North Staffordshire Colliery Owners' Association v. North Staf-
fordshire Ry. Co., London & North Western Ry. Co. etc., 1907,
1908; 13 Ry. *c Canal Traffic Cases, 78.
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legal decision had been given upon the meaning of the Clause. 1
The Railway Commissioners pointed out in their annual report
of 1878 that it was true that railway charges must not exceed the
maximum tolls authorized by special acts but it had been less no-
ticed that they must also be reasonable. There were then many
complaints of charges being too high. The Commissioners had no
power to deal with these complaints. The question was put to
Parliament for consideration as whether it would not be well that
this important statutory qualification of reasonableness were
made of practical value, and that the Commissioners should be
given the power over the reduction of unreasonable charges, just
as they had the power over reduction of unequal charges."^ No
action was taken by Parliament of this recommendation since re-
ported. The Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, did not give
the Commission the power to determine the reasonableness of rates
within the statutory maxima. On the contrary, Section 24, sub-
section 20 - "that the rates and charges mentioned in a Provisi-
onal Order to be framed in accordance with the Act and confirmed
by Parliament shall from and after the Act comes into operation,
be the rate and charges which the railway companies shall be en-
titled to charge and make," - made it clear that rates charged
within the maxima were not to be questioned. The effect of this
section was responsible for the general opinion that a rate was
reasonable if within the maximum allowed by the Provisional Orders
of 1891-92.
1. Second Report, Select Committee, 1893, V. 14, P. X.
2. Fourth Annual Report, 1878, V. 25 (C. 1962) P. 6.
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The Select Committee of 1893 pointed out that it could not
be inferred that Parliament, by Section 24, sub-section 20, meant
that all rates were reasonable when within their maxima. 1 Section
31 of the same act enabled traders and in certain cases local au-
thorities to complain to the Board of Trade against which, in
their opinion was unfair or unreasonable treatment by a railway
company. Under this section, the Committee thought Parliament
clearly allowed that a rate, though within the maximum, might be
unreasonable and that the intervention of the Board of Trade might
thereby, be justifiable. It was necessary, therefore, that, where
in the case of the raising of a rate, a trader complained of the
new rate as excessive or unreasonable and the Conciliation Clause
failed to result in an amicable settlement between the railway
company and a trader, the complainant should be enabled at liberty
to go before the Commission and that in such a case, the Com-
mission should be empowered to decide whether the increase was
3
reasonable
.
In consequence of this recommendation, a Bill was introduced
in Parliament in the latter part of 1894, by iVir. Mundella. be-
fore the introduction, however, Mr. Burnie had introduced a Bill
on Feb. 1, 1893 to amend the Railway Rates and Charges Order Con-
firmation Acts, 1891-92 by forbidding any increase of rates above
4
the actual rates in existence prior to January 1, 1893. The
1. Second Report, Select Committee, 1893, V. 14, P. XI.
2. Second Report, Select Committee, 1893, V. 14, P. XI.
3. Ibid P. XII.
4. Han. V. 8, 1893, 168, Quarterly Journal of Economics, V. 8,
P. 406.
»l
f
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Bill was withdrawn on March 1, 1893. 1 Attempts had also been
made to amend the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, but they too
2failed. Mr. Mundella, in introducing his Bill stated that "when
the Traffic Act of 1888 was passed and the Provisional Orders
which followed it came into force, the traders found that they
had not only been mulcted with the legislation of terminal charges,
but had been deprived of one of the most important defenses against
extravagant rates - namely, their right to challenge the whole of
the rates of railway companies on the ground of unreasonableness." 3
The object of the Bin was to restore to traders the right of
attacking all rates in respect of their unreasonableness.
The Bill contained only three clauses. It provided that
where a railway company had, since December 31, 1892, increased
or might hereafter increase directly or indirectly any rate or
charge, it should lie on that railway company to prove that the
4increased rate or charge was reasonable. t would not be suffici-
ent for this purpose to show that the increased rate or charge
was within the provision of any previous Act of Parliament. The
chief discussion in Parliament was upon the scope of the Bill.
An amendment to limit the traders "to the right to appeal only
against the increase of the rate since December 31, 1892" was
5
rejected. It was argued that if the functions of the Commission
were limited tfc increases in rates added since 1892, the railway
|. Han. V. 9, 1893, 764-
2. Sir Hickman, un feo.l,and Mr. Williams on Peb. 6, 1893.
Han. v. 8, P. 651, V. 9, P. 764 and V. 11, P. 727, 1893.
3. Han. V. 28, 1894, P. 638.
4. Han. V. 28, 1894, P. 656.
5. Han. V. 28, 1894, P. 641.
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companies would be in a position to go before the Commission and
argue that because certain rates had been cut down they had a right
to make increase in other rates. "To say that the rates previ-
ously before 1892 were unchallengeable was most unfair to the
traders
.
M
The Bill was passed on August 25, 1894 and became the Railway
and Canal Traffic Act, 1894. 2 It consisted of five sections but
the first and the fourth were the most important. The first
section was divided into five sub-sections. The first sub-section
laid the burden of proving any increase in rates reasonable on
the railway companies. Power was given to the Commission under
the third sub-section to hear and determine those complaints which
failed of an amicable settlement. The fourth section empowered
the Commission to hear and determine cases of rebates on siding
rates. The Act was retrospective and a railway company was liable
to pay for such loss and damage. Power was given to the Board
of Trade to supervise and to inspect books, schedules or other
papers
.
The statutory provisions relating to increases of rates
were contained in the Traffic Acts of 1888 and 1894. By sub-
section 6 of section 33, Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, it
was provided that when a railway company intended to make any in-
crease in a rate, it must give 14 days notice of the intended
increase, in the form prescribed by the Board of Trade. The Board
1. Han. V. 28, 1894, P. 641.
2. 57 and 58 Vict. C, 54.
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of Trade made an order respecting the forms*1' on July 25, 1889.
The order prescribed that notice of the intended increase should
(a) be published in a newspaper circulating in each of the dis-
tricts comprising the stations between which the traffic which
was to be subject to the increased rate and (b) be printed in
o
large type and posted for 28 days in each of the said stations,"
It further specified the form of the notice and directed that no-
tice should be in that form without any unnecessary addition* The
notice was required to specify, with reference to each altered
rate, the date on which it would take effect. One point should
be noticed in connection with this. There was no obligation im-
posed by the statutes or by the order of the Board of Trade, to
set out each individual rate which it was proposed to increase.
Any complaint as to a notice being generic instead of specific
3
would lose its own ground.
Subsection 6, of section 33 of the Railway and Canal Traf-
fic Act, 1888, was wide enough in its terms to include an in-
4
crease, by a railway company of all its rates. Under the Rail-
way and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, there was nothing enabling the
Commission to prevent a railway company from increasing its rates
and charges up to the authorized statutory limit, every rate and
1. For the forms, see Boyle and Waghorn: Railway and Canal Traffic
Act, Vol. 1, PP. 367-371.
2. British Portland Cement Manufacturers, Ltd., and Charles Nelson
& Co., v. Great Eastern Ry. Co. etc., 1914; 15 Ry. & Canal Traffic
Cases, 213, 224, 230, 232.
3. Ibid, 214.
4. Ibid, 225.
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charge within that limit being regarded as reasonable. 1 The Rail-
way and Canal Traffic Act, 1894, was the first attempt made by
the legislature to control the charges actually made by a railway
company where those charges did not exceed the maximum rates al-
2lowed by statute. The Act provided that if complaint were made
that increased "rate" was unreasonable, it should lie on the com-
pany to prove that the "increase of rate" was reasonable, even
the increase was within the maxima. The procedure prescribed was
by way of complaint to the Board of Trade under section 31 of the
Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, followed by an application
to the Railway and Canal Commission.
In this connection it is important to note the real nature
and significance of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1894. The
Act, on the one hand, protected the public from any unreasonable
increase of rates, but, on the other hand, it also protected the
railway companies. The absence of any power to compel the railway
companies to reduce their charges below the level of 1892 coupled
with the right to raise them on proof that the increase was reas-
onable was regarded as affording real security to investors, in
the maintenance of existing rates of dividends. It was this dual
character of the Act that constituted the main reason why it was
charged with having made rates less elastic than they were before.
Elasticity in rate-making is what the traders need, but it
had largely done away by the Act of 1894 in three ways. The same
1. North Staffordshire Colliery Owners' Association, etc., 1907,
1908; 78, 84; Rickett Smith & Co., and others v. Midland Ry. Co., .
1895; 9 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 107, 114.
2. North Staffordshire Colliery Owners' Association, etc., 78,
84, 88.
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significant effect was preventing railway companies from varying
their rates and charges freely. In the first place, when a case
of increase went before the Railway and Canal Commissioners, as
we shall see in the latter part of the chapter, only one class of
evidence was accepted as proving the reasonableness of the in-
crease - evidence of increase in the working costs of the traffic
to which the rates applied. By enacting the Railway and Canal
Traffic Act, 1894, with such interpretations as given by the Rail-
way and Canal Commission, it implied that the variation of charges
could be based only on the differences in expense, trouble and
responsibility attending the receipt, carriage and delivery of the
different articles. It gave probably all together, a too much
undue weight* to the principle of cost of service in the process
of rate-making. In the second place, the requirement that an
increase in rates must be justified of its reasonableness is
sometimes a sufficient hinderance to prevent railway companies
from experimenting the reduction of rates. Railway Companies would
not reduce their rates and charges as readily as if there was no
such requirement. Railway companies would have no stimulus to
reduce rates and charges if the only consequence was that they
could never raise them again without going through justifications
which might be very difficult under the circumstances. In the
thrid place, the decision of the Railway and Canal Commission,
as in the case of the North Staffordshire Colliery Owners' Asso-
ciation, 1907, which we shall see later, rendered the consti-
tution of the first section of the Act of 1894 to mean that the
necessity for justification would apply also to the re-raising
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of rates which had been lowered since 1892, but re-raised to a
point not exceeding the level of 1892 » The justification of reas-
onableness was required for all kinds of future increases after
1892 - increases either above or up to the level of 1892. For
these reasons railway companies would hesitate to vary their rates
and charges very readily to meet the demands of traffic or the
expanding industry of the country. The result was that rate-
making was less elastic and that the power of the railway com-
panies to vary their rates ?*as greatly curtailed. The railway
companies were greatly dissatisfied but it did not exist very long
before there was an opportunity for the railway company to bring
about some fundamental changes.
The Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1913.
In August, 1911, a sudden and serious strike took place on
the railway system of Great Britain. The government found it
necessary to intervene, as the situation was critical not only
for national but also for international reasons. 1 A Royal Com-
mission was appointed, and proposals of settlement were recommended.
The railway companies would not accept the proposals of the Royal
Commission without a recognition of their moral right to recoup
themselves to a certain extent. The demand of the railway com-
panies was consented to and an understanding between the railway
companies and the government was reached. The understanding was
that "the government will propose to Parliament next Session
(August, 1911) legislation providing that an increase in the cost
1. Han. V. 47, P. 1571.
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of labor due to the improvement of conditions for the staff would
be a valid justification for a reasonable general increase of
charges within the legal maxima, if challenged under the Act of
1894." 1
A Bill to the effect was introduced on December 4, 1912, by
Buxton, then President of the Board of Trade. It contained only
one clause. The Act of 1894 required a railway company to justify
an increase of rate, if challenged, but did not indicate what cir-
cumstances were to be regarded as a valid justification in any
given case. Consequently, there was doubt confronting the rail-
way companies as to how far a general increase in the cost of
working due to an actual increase in the cost of labor would be
allowed to justify an increase in a particular rate. The sole
object of the Bill was to remove this doubt and to enable the Com-
mission to put the increased general cost arising from improved
conditions of labor generally on the same basis as any increased
cost arising from and directly affecting any particular branch of
traffic. 2
The Bill was carefully restricted. In the first place, the
sole possibility of justification for an increase of rates under
the Bill must be en actual and operative improvement in the con-
ditions of the employment of the staff. In the second place there
must be a net increase in the cost of labor, an actual increase
due not to normal increase of work, but to improved conditions
of the staff itself. In the third place, the Bill was worded in
1. Ian. V. 47, 1912, P. 1572-72.
2. Han. 1912, V. 47, PP. 1576-77.
3. Han. V. 47, 1912, P. 1579'; 1912, V. 49, P. 29.
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such manner as neither to weaken nor to diminish Section 1 of the
of
Act of 1894 and the onus /proof was still left on the railway com-
panies .
The Bill met considerable opportion in both Houses 1 and it
2
was termed an "unpopular Bill." There was great apprehension
that the Bill would confer on the railway companies new and ad-
ditional power to enlarge or increase a rate and that the Parlia-
mentary maximum 7^ould thus be affected. Doubts were expressed
as whether the Bill might not have already gone much further than
3
it was ever intended. But under pressure by the Government, the Bill
was passed. Mr. Lloyd George stated in the House of Commons that
"we feel in honor bound, not merely personally, but as a govern-
ment, to use whatever influence we possess with the House, to
see that the pledge is redeemed not merely in the letter, but in
4
the spirit. The government intimated at the same time that some-
thing drastic to coerce the powers of the railway companies would
5
be introduced in Parliament at a later date. There were many
members who supported the Bill purely on this understanding that
such a Bill would be soon introduced.
Q
The Bill received Royal assent on March 7, 1913, and be-
7
came the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1913. The Act contained
onlt three clauses, the first clause by far the most important.
The Railway and Canal Commission would treat the increase of rates
1. Han. V. 47, 1912, PP. 1571-1658; V. 49, 1912, PP. 29-68.
2. Han. V. 49, 1912, P. 31.
3. Han. V. 47, 1912, PP. 1599-1604.
4. Han. V. 47, 1912, P. 1638; see also the speech of Mr. Asquith
then Prime Minister in the House of Lords, V. 49, PP. 29-33.
5. Han. V. 47, 1912, P. 1622; PP. 1573-1574.
6. Han. 1913, V. 49, P. 931.
7. 2 & 3 Geo. 5, C. 29.
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or charge as justified, if the railway companies proved to the
satisfaction of the Commission:^
(a) That there had been a rise in the cost of working the
railway. 2
(b) That the whole of the particular increase of rates of
which complaint was made, was part of an increase of rates made
for the pur-pose of meeting the said rise in the cost of working.
(c) That the increase of rates made for the purpose of meet-
ing the said rise in the cost of working was not, in the whole,
greater than was reasonably required for the purpose.
(d) That the proportion of the increase of rates alloceted
to the particular traffic with respect to which the complaint was
made was not unreasonable.
It is hard to say precisely at the present moment what ef-
fect the Act of 1913 will bear on the construction of the first
section of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1894. There has
been no case decided or heard under the Act. The words "a rise
in the cost of working the railway" might be interpreted widely
as to enable the Commission to justify an increase on a broader
basis than that before 1913. The Railway and Canal Traffic Act,
1913, might thus be used to restore the elasticity in rate-making
by the railway companies. But as no case has beenid ecided under
the Act, it is premature to say anything definitely.
J.. Act, Section 1.
2. The rise in the cost of working the railway cannot include the
cost of carrying and dealing with passengers, resulting from im-
provements made by the company since Aug. 19, 1911 in the condi-
tions of employment of their labor or clerical staff.
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After the passing of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1913,
no bill had been passed into law for the regulation of railway
rates in England. Several attempts were made to introduce bills
into Parliament, but there had been no result.
A few months after the passing of the Bill, Mr. Bathurst moved
to appoint a Select Committee of the two Houses of Parliament to
inquire into the whole question of railway rates with a view to
re-classification and general revision but it was rejected as Mr.
Buxton stated, "it would not lead to useful results."^" In answer-
ing a proposal to make an inquiry into the working of the Railway
and Canal Traffic Agt, 1913, it was said that this would be al-
together premature, for there was no case in which it had been
2
sought to justify an increase of rates under the Act.
On April 21, 1914 a Bill "to make better provision for car-
rying into effect the Railway and Canal Traffic Acts, 1854 to 1913"
was presented by Mr. Barns ton. The Bill was divided into 8
clauses; its purpose was to give the Board of Agriculture the
power to hear complaints as to agricultural traffic and to settle
4
amicably the differences. The Bill was proposed to be read the
second time on April 29, 1914 but it was not read.
1. Han. V. 56, 1913, P. 24.
2. Han. V. 56, 1913, P. 21.
3. Han. 1914, V. 61, P. 776; British Parliamentary Papers, 1914,
V. 6, Bill 194.
4. In 1906 the question of preferential treatment on agricultural
produce was already vexatious. See Report of the Departmental
Committee appointed by the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries on
Preferential Treatment, 1906 (Cd 2959).
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Analysis of the Decisions of the Railway and Canal Com-
mission bearing upon the Increase of Rates.
*
1894-193 4.
The Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1894, experienced some
difficulty in its interpretation. Some contended that its appli-
cation was limited, that the Act was simply a special enactment
to meet the special evil created by the general raising of rates
on the part of the railway companies from January 1, 1893, and
that its object was to throw upon the railway companies the onus
of justifying the increase of those rates which were raised over
o
the rates in existence on December 31, 1892.
The Commission held this interpretation in the case of the
North Staffordshire Colliery Owners' Association. If this inter-
pretation was right, section 1 of the Railway and Canal Traffic
Act would not apply to any increase (a) in a new rate which was
not on a rate-book on 31st December, 1892, or (b) in a rate which
had been further increased beyond a point already justified by
the Commission since that date. The interpretation involved a
T7~~A large number of complaints on increase of rates under section 1
• of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1894, were withdrawn or set-
tled before the hearing. Of the twenty-seven cases actually, heard
before Jan. 30, 1913, by the Railway&Canal Commission, sixteen
were in favor of the railway companies and six against them and in
five cases the judgment was partly for the companies and partly
for the complainants: - Han. V. 47, 1912-1913, P. .1528. Of the
twenty-seven cases, only twelve were reported in the Railway and
Canal Traffic Cases. See Vols. 7-12. After January 30 1913, the
cases heard were as follows:
1903-1906 Two cases, both in favor of railway companies.
1906-1909 Three cases, two in favor of and one against the railway
companies; 1909-1911, three cases, two in favor of and one
against railway companies; 1911-1914, four cases, two against and
one in favor of railway companies, and one partly so.
See Railway and Canal Traffic Cases, Vols. 12-15.
2. North Staffordshire Colliery Owners 1 Association, etc., 78.
,1
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question of the most serious kind on the construction of the first
section of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1894, "whether it
means that rates cannot be raised without justification, as compar-
ed simply with the level at which they stood at the end of 1892,
or whether the necessity for justification applies also to the
re-raising of rates which have been lowered since 1892, but re-
raised to a point not exceeding the level of 1892, 1,1 The question
was barely mentioned in the case of the Millom and Askam Hematite
Iron Company, 1903, by Justice Wright.
It was only in the case of the North Staffordshire Colliery
Owners' Association, 1907, that the question was definitely settled
by the overruling of the Court of Appeal. On August 1, 1900, the
North Staffordshire Railway Company and others raised the rates
charged on coal and coke from the North Staffordshire Collieries
to Ellesmere Port and to Birkenhead in force on July 31. The
rates in question had, in November, 1895, along with others, been
reduced, but on August 1, 1900, all were increased to the amounts •
in force on December 31, 1892. In 1904 the other rates were again
reduced, but those to Ellesmere Port, and Birkenhead were retained
at its 1892 level. The reason for the railway companies to do
so was that in 1895, the coal trade was in a depressed state, but
in 1900, the trade was in a prosperous condition. The North Staf-
fordshire Colliery Owners' Association complained to the Railway
and Canal Commission that the increased rates were unreasonable.
1. Millom and Askam Hematite Co., Ltd. v. Furmers Ry. Co., North
Eastern Ry. Co., and London & North Western Ry. Co., 1903; 12 Ry.
& Canal Traffic Cases, 8.
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The railway companies stated that the rate complained of was no
higher than the rate in force on Dec. 31, 1892. Since the passing
of the Act of 1894, the rate was once lowered and the present in-
crease was up to the level at which it stood on Dec. 31, 1892,
The railway companies did not admit that there had "been any in-
crease within the meaning of Section 1 of the Railway and Canal
Traffic Act, 1894, The railway companies pointed out that if they
could not make such increase without justification of reasonable-
ness, the effect would be to prevent them from ever lowering their
rates. The Commission held that the sole object of the Railway
and Canal Traffic Act, 1894, was "to throw upon the railway com-
pany the onus of justifying any increase of the rate over the
amount charged on the 31st of December, 1 1892." The railway com-
panies could raise their rates to the 1892 level without justifi-
cation of their reasonableness.
The Court of Appeal overruled this decision and held that
no sufficient ground could be discovered for holding that the
remedy provided was limited to those rates which were incurred
by those railway companies in January, 1893, or that the standard
of 1892 was a limit up to which those companies might, at any
later date, raise rates without control. The Court of Appeal
held that Section 1 appled to every incrase,^ The legislature
intended not merely to provide a remedy for the mischief actually
wrought in January, 1893, but also to intorduce a check
1. North Staffordshire Colliery Owners' Association v. North
Staffordshire Ry. Co., London & North Western Ry. Co.; Great
Western Ry. Co., and Shropshire Union Rys. and Canal Co., 1907,
1908; 13 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, P. 82.
2, North Staffordshire Colliery Owners 1 Association, etc., 78.
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upon future increase of actural rates by throwing upon the railway
companies the onus of showing that such increases were reasonable;
in short, the act deals with two types of cases, viz., increases
in the past and increases in the future.
It was contended that the rates referred to in section 1 were
the rates existing on the last day of December, 1892, this date
being specially mentioned in the Act. The Court of Appeal held
that the specification of this date did not make the Act limited
in the enactment. 1 In such legislation, some point of time must
be fixed as the initial date in order to make the Act to a
certain extent retrospective, 2 unless traders were to be allowed
to challenge everything that had been done since railways had been
first started. 5 The legislation made the newly devised check upon
the power of the railway companies become operative simply as from
the end of December, 1892. In the case of rates raised after the
date mentioned, the law simply removed the presumption therefore
existing that rates below the maxima for their class was reason-
able, and threw upon the railway companies the responsibility of
showing that the increase was reasonable. 4
Reasonableness . The Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1894,
required a railway company to justify each separate increase of
1. North Staffordshire Colliery Owners' Association, etc., 78.
2. The Act was retrospective in the sense that it could be made
to apply not only to increases after the 25th. of August, 1894,
(the date the Act was passed), but also to increases between the
31st. of December, 1892 (Jan. 1, 1893, was the date) of the general
increase) and that date. This was assigned by the Court of Appeal
as a sufficient reason to account for the mention of the date
in the Act.
3. North Staffordshire Colliery Owners' Association, etc., 78.
4. Rickett, Smith & Co. etc., 107, 111.
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rate, whenever challenged. The law did not specify the manner,
nor state the method of justifying an increase. It might be open
to the railway companies to show that the previous reduction had
been found too great or that it was made under circumstances which
no longer existed.
1
The railway company did not, however, dis-
charge the onus of proof "by simply showing that the increased rate
was within the maximum. It must satisfy the Railway and Canal
2Commission that the increase was reasonable.
What is reasonable? Reasonableness in a particular case
was held to depend on a group of particular circumstances. Reas-
onableness would involvea consideration of circumstances and events
of previous years before the increase was made. The reasonable-
ness of an increase must be measured by reference "to the service
rendered and the benefit received." 4 In the Rickett case, in-
creased cost of working was held as an element in determining the
question of reasonableness
.
,J In the exparte Great Southern and
Western Railway Company case, the Commission held that the in-
crease in the expenses of performing the service would be a main
factor in judging the reasonableness of an increase.
!• North Staffordshire Colliery Owners' Association, etc., 78, 95.
2. Ex Parte Great Southern and Western Ry. Co., 1914; 15 Ry. &
Canal Traffic Cases, 282, 291.
Smith and Forest v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co. etc., 1889, 1900; 11 Ry.
& Canal Traffic Cases, 156.
3. North Staffordshire Colliery Owners' Association, etc., 78, 110.
Ex Parte Great Southern and Western Ry. Co. etc., 282, 298.
4. Rickett & Smith & Co. etc., 113.
Smith and Forest, etc., 156, 161.
5. North Staffordshire Colliery Owners' Association, etc., 78,118.
6. Ex Parte Great Southern & Western Ry. Co., 282, 291.
/I
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The difficult question was by what standard the question of
reasonableness could be decided. The standard of reasonableness
could not, of course, be measured by the affluence or indigence
of the carriers; nor was reasonableness to be decided by its
effect upon the trade of the persons who had to pay the rate.-1
The mode of proof that was usually resorted to in the Court and
approved by the Commission was a comparision of expenditure with
receipts. This method was not a proper one and the Commission
did not hesitate to confess it. "The principle of ratio is not
wholly satisfactory and requires the closest scrutiny and is only
considered as prima facie evidence of a rise and is not in itself
conclusive. It is, on the other hand, difficult to suggest a
better method of proof. Some basis or standard of comparison
must be set up, whether it be the ratio of expenditure to re-
ceipts, the expenditure and receipts per train mile or per ton
carried. Of these the first was found to afford the least in-
tricate and deceptive method of instituting the required justi-
fication, as it would need only to be shown that there had been
no decrease of receipts to establish the fact that the whole of
the increase of the ratio of expenditure to receipts had been
attributable to increased expenditures. A comparison of expendi-
tures and receipts was held a fair method where no special elements
could be proved to exist. 4 In adopting this method the Court
1. Rickett, Smith & Co. etc., 107, 112.
2. Society of Coal Merchants v. Midland Ry. Co.m 1909; 14 Ry. &
Canal Traffic Cases, 100.
3. South Yorkshire Coal Owners' Assurance Society v. Midland Ry.
Co., 1897; 10 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 28, 49.
4. Ibid.
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recognized that it was impossible to give an absolute figure for
the cost of moving a ton of goods.
^
To justify a permanent increase of rates, changes affecting
cost of working only temporarily, would not be sufficient." Causes
of a fluctuating and transitory character resulting in increased
expense to carriers could not justify permanent increase of rates.
In the Ex Parte Great Southern and Western case it was held on
the same ground, that the year 1892 which was prior to the amal-
gamation could not be accepted as a proper year of comparison and
that the year succeeding the amalgamation should be adopted un-
less abnormal too.
Upon a complaint by Smith and Forest, 1899, on certain in-
creases being unreasonable, the railway companies produced elabo-
rate tables and proved to the satisfaction of the Railway' and
Canal Commission that there was an increase after 1888 in the
general cost of working the traffic and that the increase was
4permanent and progressive. The railway companies further showed
that there was no compensatory circumstance to meet the increase
in the cost of working the traffic, after taking all the elements
of economy into consideration. The Commission granted the rail-
way companies the increase in 1893 to the extent of 3 per cent.
In the Society of Coal Merchants case, the complaint was that
certain indirect increases were unreasonable. The Midland Rail-
1. Rickett, Smith & Co. etc., 107, 117.
2. Black and Sons v. Caledonian Ry. Co. etc., 1901; 11 Ry. & Canal
Traffic Cases, 176.
3. Ex Parte Great Southern and Western Ry. Co., 291.
4. Smith and Forest, etc., 156, 163.
5. Society of Coal Merchants, etc., 100.
t
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way Company charged their rates on the carriage of coal, first
on the basis of 21 cwt. to the ton, later in 1891, of 20-g- cwt.
and finally in 1907 of 20 cwt. to the ton. Upon a complaint that
the increase of about 2\ per cent was unreasonable, the Commission
held that the railway company justified its increase of rates by
showing an increase in the ratio of working expenses to receipts
at least equal to the increase in rates and that such increase
was due to an increase in the cost of working and not to decrease
in receipts. In the Charlow and Sacriston Colliers Co. case1
the railway company, in proving the increased cost of working,
considered four elements: (1) the increased cost for locomotive
power, owing chiefly to the shortening of the hours of labor;
(2) increased wages; (3) greater number of wagons having been al-
loted; (4) increased taxes. In the Ex Parte Great Southern and
Western Railway Company case, 2 the increase was rejected, for
there was a decrease in the percentage of working expenses to
receipts with net increase in the train mileage and tonnage re-
ceipts as between the year succeeding the amalgamation and the
period preceding the application.
The fact that other traders paid higher rates similar traffic
would not, in itself, justify an increase on such traffic. 3 If a
railway company could show that an increase was made in bona fide
1. Charlaw and Sacristan Collieries Co. v. North Eastern Ry. Co.,
1896; 9 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 140-146.
2. Ex Parte Great Southern and Western Ry. Co., 283,
3. W. T. Beesley & Co., and others v. Midland Ry. Co. etc., 1914;
15 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 306.
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obedience to an order of the Court t avoid a preference found
undue, by levelling up a rate and it could also show that the lev
el ling down a rate at other similar places to the same standard
would
would risk an annual loss, such increases/be reasonable and justi
fiable. 1
Making a charge for something for which no charge had been
made before would not constitute an increase, direct or indirect,
2 3
of any rate or charge. A rate would be considered as increased
if evidence showed that the railway company knew the contents of
the parcels consigned and charged a higher class rate in lieu of
the lower class rate formerly charged.
The statute required that every rate for the time being
charged should be shown in the book or books kept at the station.
The question arose in connection with an increase of rates, how
should the increased rates be entered in the rate book. Messrs.
British Portland Cement Manufacturerd, Ltd., contended that the
old rate in the rate book should be erased out and the new rate
put in. The Great Eastern Railway Company and others in their
"notice of increase of rates," 1914, added simply a separate col-
umn at the side of the column of the old rate, showing the sum
to be increased in the case of each rate in the new column. Upon
complaint the Commission held that since no difficulty or compli-
cated calculations was necessary to arrive at the increased rate,
1. Richworth, Ingleby and Lofthouse, Ltd., and others v. N. E. Ry
Co., 1903; 12 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 34.
2. Manchester and Northern Counties Federation of Coal Traders'
Associations v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co., 1897; 10 Ry.
& Canal Traffic Cases, 127.
3. W. T. Beesley & Co. etc., 306, 307.
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it was unnecessary to erase every existing rate in the rate book
and to substitute the increased rate therein.^
not
Railway companies did/possess the power to increase their
rates under the same conditions. Some railway companies could
raise their rates at any time, while others could do so only by
obtaining first a sanction of the Commission. Both were subjected
to the statutory restriction, imposed by the Act of 1894, of being
compelled to justify the increase before the Commission, if its
reasonableness was challenged. In dealing with the second group
of railv/ay companies the Commission was not limited and governed
in the exercise of their duty by precisely the same conditions
and circumstances as usually followed in adjudicating on complaints
2
under Section 1, Act of 1894. The restrictive provision against
any increase of rates without first securing the sanction of the
Commission was imposed by Parliament as a condition of amalga-
mation, in the interest of, and for the protection of the public,
who were deprived of the benefits of competition then existing.
In sanctioning the amalgamation, Parliament prohibited them from
raising their rates without first securing the approval of the
3
Railway and Canal Commission.
1. British Portland Cement Manufacturers, etc., 215, 215, 216.
2. Ex Parte Great Southern and Western Ry. Co., 299.
3. Ibid 282-305.

CHAPTER XII.
Future Problem of Railway Regulation in England.
The preceding chapters have shown the progress of Parlia-
mentary regulation of railway rates, as manifested in the various
railway Acts of the past century. At this stage of our discussion
it may be of advantage to relate briefly the attempts made to es-
tablish some sort of executive control of railways and the powers
delegated by Parliament to the Board of Trade for the regulation
of railways in order that we may realize more fully how little
actual control of railway rate policy exerted prior to the legis-
lation of 1873-88 and what problem lies in the future regulation
of railway rates in England. The powers delegated to the execu-
tive government were not specially for the regulation of railway
rates. In fact there was none at all. The discussion will show,
however, in the first place, the attitude of Parliament towards
the regulation of railways in general, and in the second place,
whether Parliament was an agency fit for the regulation of rail-
way rates.
The early growth of the railway system in England was so
rapid and so extensive that it was soon felt that the problem of
railway control was an important and difficult one. The necessity
of a special executive department to look after the proper regu-
lation of railways was recognized. The Select Committee of 1839
stated that a supervising authority should be exercised over all
arrangements in which the public were interested, and that this
control should be placed in the hands of the executive government,
perhaps in a Board attached to the Board of Trade of which the
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President and Vice-President should be members, together with two
or more engineers of rank and experience.^ The same conclusions
were reached and again recommended by the Select Committee of
1840. 2
As a consequence of these recommendations Lord Seymoure in
1840 moved for leave to bring in a Bill to establish a Board of
Superintendence of Railways in connection with the Board of Trade.
The Bill was passed on August 10, 1840, under the title of the
4Regulation of Railways Act, 1840. The Act was soon found to be in-
complete. In the first report of the Railway Department, it was
stated that the powers given to the Board of Trade by the Act were
totally inadequate to enable it to carry into effect the measures
5
of the Act. Mr. Gladstone in 1842, therefore, introduced a Bill
for the better regulation of railways. The purpose of the Bill
was to enlarge the powers of the Railway Department of the Board
of Trade. The Bill was passed on July 30, 1842, and was known
7
as the Regulation of Railways Act, 1842.
The powers which were given to the Railway Department of the
Board of Trade under these two Acts had practically nothing to do
1. Second Report, 1839, P. XIII; see also Second Report of the
Railway Department of the Board of Trade, 1842, P. XVI.
2. First Report, PP. 3-4; third Report, PP. 4-5, 12; Railway Times,
1840, P. 433.
3. Han. 1840, V. 54, P. 894.
4. 3 & 4 Vict. G. , 97.
5. First Report, 1841, P. 11.
6. Han. 1842, V. LX, P. 165.
7. 5 & 6 Vict. G. 55.
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with the regulation of railway rates. ]" They may be grouped under
L p
some four heads.
1. Enforcement of the provisions of railway acts.
2. Revision of the by-laws and regulations of the railway
companies
.
3. Collection of statistical returns.
4. Inspection of railway construction, equipment, etc., in
the interest of public safety.
The power to enforce the provisions of railway acts was actu-
ally very limited at this time. In the first place, there were
no general regulation acts but only special acts which differed
from company to company. The most important parts of those early
special acts relating to powers and rights of the public were, as
we have previously shown, practically inoperative, since they
were enacted on the wrong assumption that railways could be open
and free to all as in the case of canals. In the second place,
the maximum toll and rate clauses were not effective; they were
all fixed too high. The revision of by-laws, rules and regulations
was of more importance. There were two kinds of by-laws. The
1. The nature of the Acts may be gathered from Mr. Gladstone's ob-
jection to attach a clause proposed by Ivir. Hanson Hinde to the Bill
while in Parliament. This clause dealt with railway charges; it
stated that "it may be lawful for any railway company to affix a
printed list of rates and tolls in a conspicuous situation within
every station, house or other buildings where such rates or tolls
are collected instead of affixing a table of rates and tolls painted
on boards to the toll house or building." Mr. Gladstone opposed
it on the ground that it did not come within the object of the Bill
which was solely for public safety: Han. 1842, V. LXIV, P. 173.
2. See also the Fourth Report, Railway Commission, 1851.
3. First report of Railway Commission, 1847, P. 15.
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first were the by-laws for regulating the conduct of officers and
employes of the railway companies and other matters relating to
the internal management of the corporation. The second were by-
laws regulating the travel upon and the use of the railways. By
giving power of approval of by-laws to the Railway department, uni-
formity in the by-laws of the various railway companies and hence
some further protection of the liberty of those subjected to them
1
could be secured. But even this power was of limited nature, as
it was confined to "by-laws, orders, rules and regulations which
imposed penalties for the enforcement thereof upon persons other
than servants of the company." In a majority of cases no such
,
by-laws or regulations existed. The collection of statistical
returns was very important but its effect on the regulation of
railway was at the best negative. By far the most important and
the most effective of all the powers was the inspection of rail-
way construction, equipment, etc., for public safety. The Rail-
way department could require a railway company to alter or to
make additions to certain structures, if those structures were
liable to jeopardize the public safety.
The part of the Acts relating to railway charges was in con-
nection with the collection of statistical returns and simply re-
quired each railway company to make up and deliver to the Rail-
way Department tables of all tolls, rates and charges from time
1. Second Report of Railway d epartment, 18*2, P. XVI. The rules,
by-laws and regulations of some railway companies were said to be
"in the highest degree vexatious and annoying, if not tyrannical."
See Railway Times
.
1840, P. 473.
2. First Report of Railway Department, 1841, P. 18.
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to time levied on each class of passengers and on cattle and goods
conveyed on the railway. 1 This requirement was simply for infor-
2
mation and not to afford a basis for positive regulation.
The power of control over railways as given to the Railway
Department of the Board of Trade by the Regulation of Railways Acts
of 1840 and 1842 was limited in scope. The powers were dealing
with only one phase of the railway problem. Other problems of
more significance and involving wide interests, the matter of ex-
cessive charges and inadequate facilities, were pressing for
solution. Mr. Gladstone in his reports of 1844 emphasized the
point that regulation of railways should be made from the point
of national interest5 . The Railway Department should be given
more power and made more independent of Parliament. On the 19th
of July, 1844, he procured authority to re-organize the Railway
Department. 4 He obtained also a standing order of the House re-
quiring that all those documents relating to railway bills which
Parliament required for its information should be deposited with
the Railway Department of the Board of Trade. 5 A separate railway
was
T
established on August 6, 1844 with Lord Dalhousie as its head.
1. See also 1st. Report, Railway Department, 1841, P. 11.
2. The nature of the Railway Department can be seen from the follow-
ing instance. In 1841 an attempt was made to invest the Railway
Department of the Board of Trade, with a discretionary power of
issuing regulations for the prevention of accidents upon railways.
The belect Committee which was appointed to consider it recommend-
ed that the Board. of Trade should not have the discretionary power
and that their supervision should be exercised in the way of
suggestion rather than in that of positive regulation." - Report
Select Committee on Railways, 1841, PP. Ill, V and VI.
3. Fifth Report, 1844, P. X, XV.
4. Han. 1845, V. 77, P. 351; Railways and the Board of Trade, 1845.
5. Parliamentary Papers, 1845, V. XXXIX (479) Minutes of the
Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade; rian. 1845,
V. 77, P. 256.
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Its life was but short, however, as it came to an end on July 10,
1845, when all the business relating to the control of railways
was again thrown in with the ordinary business of the Board of
Trade,
The chief duty of the new board was to report to Parliament
upon new railway schemes and bills with reference to their positive
and comparative advantages to the public, and especially with re-
ference to questions of extension, amalgamation and competition;
it still had nothing to do with the regulation of railway rates,
A series of reports upon the merits of the railway schemes of 1845
was presented to Parliament for the special purpose of furnishing
guidance to the Private Bill Committee of the House, In making
these reports, the Board did not hold their proceedings in open
court and the discussions presented by it in their reports were
strongly objected to. The public were infuriated at what they
considered the secrecy of the Board - its publications of summary
decisions without giving reasons for them. Sir Robert Peel, in
Parliament , ignored the Board and its reports.
1 He declared that
the government intended to leave the railway bills as before to
the judgment of the Private Bill Committee. When the special Rail-
way board was abolished, the function of reporting on the actual
or comparative merits of railway schemes was left to the Board
of Trade as previously constituted and if it saw fit, the Board
could make special reports on various questions. The chief reason
1. Han. 1845, V. 77, PP. 271, 279, 285; see also Han. 1845, V. 77
P. 138, 152, 170, 185.
2. Joint Committee, 1872, V. 13, P. VII.
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fcr the fall of the new board, outside of the inadequacy of its
powers, was its lack of support from Parliament. So far from ask-
ing the House to work in harmony with the board, Sir Robert Peel
said that every railway scheme must be re-discussed - practically
setting aside the work of the board. The failure of the Dal-
housie Board as explained by the Select Committee of 1846, was
not due to any incompetence on its part, but simply to the faulty
system pursued by it in receiving evidence in private and to lack
of support on the part of the government.
1
Dalhousie Board was abolished, but the pressing need for an
executive board in the regulation of the railways became more and
more urgent. Such regulation could not be efficiently discharged
by a few members possessing, perhaps, little knowledge and no
experience of railway business. Parliamentary acts might be
drawn with great care but those acts could not control railways
under all circumstances and could not protect the public adequately
and completely. The Select Committee of 1846 saw this need and
2
recommended very strongly the establishment of another board.
In its opinion this new board should possess not only power to
consider all railway bills but also power to regulate rates, to
protect the public from excessive exactions and to take due ad-
vantage of every suitable opportunity for obtaining a reduction
of charges and also uniformity of rates and classifications.
1. Second Report from the Select Committee on Railway Acts Enact-
ments, 1346, P. XIX.
2. Second Report, Select Committee on Railway Acts Enactments.
1846. PP. XIX - XXII.
3. Second Report, Select Committee on Railway Acts Enactments,
1846, P. XIX.
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After the report was made by the Select Committee, both Houses
passed resolutions urging the appointment of a railway board.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer moved on August 19, 1846, for leave
to introduce a Bill to that effect.
1 The chief topic for dis-
cussion in connection with the Bill was the granting of greater
power to the board than that which was already granted to the
Railway Department of the Board of Trade. It was originally in-
tended that its powers should be extended along the line of the
recommendations of the Select Committee of 1846. As the session
was drawing to its close, the Bill was passed on August 27, 1846,
without granting the Board any new power, but with the understand-
ing that additional powers would be granted in the following ses-
2 '
sion. This Act - Act for Constituting Commissioners of Railways
authorized the appointment of not more than five Commissioners
of Railways including a president who was to have a salary of
£2000 a year. The two paid members were to receive L1500 a year-
each. The new Commission came into office on Nov. 9, 1846 with
the Right Hon. Edward Strutt as its President. Its chief duties
were not to regulate railway rates but simply to report as be-
fore on special cases referred to them and also upon private
bills and especially on competing schemes and on amalgamation.
In accordance with the original intention of granting more
powers to the Railway Commission, a bill to that effect was in-
troduced into the House of Commons early in the session of
1. Han. 1846, V. 88, P. 89.
2. 9 and 10 Vict. C. 105.
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1847.
1
It is interesting to note that the powers asked for in
this bill were much larger than those outlined in the first re-
port, especially those regarding the regulation on the increase
of rates. The bill proposed that the Commission should have the
following powers :-
1. To regulate future applications to Parliament for new
lines
.
2. To examine into the compliance with the Standing Orders
of Parliament.
3. To call for returns of tolls and charges actually levied
by railway companies. Railway companies were to publish at the
stations either the whole of their tolls and charges or such
portions of them as the Commissioners might direct. The com-
panies were not to raise these tolls and charges without 15 days'
notice and were to report annually to Parliament.
4. To settle disputes.
\ 2
The Bill went no further than its second reading. ~ After
the Bill failed to pass, the idea as to the necessary powers for
discharging the duties underwent a considerable modification.
The powers regarding railway bills recommended by the Select Com-
mittee of 1846 to the new board would be inconsistent, stated the
first report of the Commissioners, with the existing legislative
policy. 1 They would be regarded as a serious and objectionable
1. The Bill met two classes of objection in Parliament, some com-
plained that the provision did not go far enough in the way of
regulation, while others condemned them as improper interference
with private affairs. First Report, Railway Commission, 1848, P.
52; see also Report, Royal Commission, 1867, P. 16.
2. First Report of~Railway Commission, 1848, P. 47.
3. First Report of Railway Commission, 1848, PP. 47-49.
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interference with the functions of the legislature. The proper duty
of the administrative department of the government, as conceived
by the Railway Commissioners, was rather to advise and assist than
to supersede the deliberations of Parliament. As to the additional
power for the supervision of existing railways, the report was
very careful to point out that they were not intended to go fur-
ther than inquiry, report and publicity.
1
It recommended, there-
2
fore, that a new bill should provide for the following objects:
1. For instituting preliminary proceedings with respect to
railway bills.
2. For amending the existing statutes with reference to the
opening of railways, by-laws, cheap trains and continuous rail-
ways
.
3. For enabling the Commissioners of Railways to obtain full
information on all matters connected with the working of the
railway system and to report their opinions thereupon to Par-
liament .
3
The Bill was never introduced.
In the meantime the Right Hon. Edward Strutt was superseded
as President of the Commission by the Right Hon. Labouchere, then
President of the Board of Trade. The latter naturally brought
the Commission and the Board of Trade into touch with each other
and facilitated the resumption by the Board of its railway duties.
At first, it was only partially reunited to the latter but under
1. First Report of Railway Commission, 1848, PP. 49-54.
2. Ibid, P. 54,
3. First Report of Railway Commission which was published on March
31, 1848, was signed by Edward Strutt, Lord ^ranville and Edward
Ryan, but the second report which was published on May 1, 1849, was
signed by H . Labouchere, Lord Granville and Edward Ryan.
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the Board of Trade (Railway Act), 1851,
1
it ceased altogether to
exist as a separate department. The power and the work of the
Railway Commission was transferred by the Act to the Board of
Trade.
The work of the Commission was not to regulate railway rates
but to make reports to Parliament. Four reports were made from
1848 to 1851. These reports were more or less along the same
lines as those of the Railway Department of the Board of Trade
from 1840 to 1846. It was only in the third and fourth reports
that the question of the regulation of railway rates was some-
what touched upon. 2 For an illustration, on February 19 and March
13, 1850, orders were passed in the House of Commons, directing
the Railway Commission to report their opinion on any railway
Bills introduced during the session in which it was proposed to
raise or alter the rates and tolls authorized to be taken under
previously existing Acts of Parliament. In the fourth report,
1851, the question was first analyzed by the Commission through
its maximum rate clauses, and then how far competition was ef-
fective and how far ineffective in controlling rates, was con-
sidered. Conclusion was reached only by taking into account all
the peculiar circumstances of each line.
Various reasons have been given for the fall of the Railway
Commission of 1846. Mr. Hadley, in his famous book on railway
transportation says that Dalhousie's Board died of too much work
and too little pay; the Railway Commission died of too much pay
1. 14 and 15 Vict. C. 64.
2. Fourth Report of Railway Commission, 1851, PP. XIX-XXIV.
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and too little work. 1 To say that the Commission had too little
to do is not fair to them, for their reports showed the contrary.
Again it has been said that the railway mania which was about over
when the Commission began its work,first gave rise to the demand
for the establishment of such a Commission, and thereby its collapse
2largely destroyed the need for it, after it had been established.
If this was a reason for its fall, it was not the primary one,
for we know that in the latter part of the forties and the early
part of the fifties, the railway problem was just beginning to be
realized and Parliament was seeking for a solution. As regards
certain lines of its work, the need for the Railway Commission
may be questioned, perhaps, but if Parliament had really wished
to have a fair trial of the supervision of railways by an execu-
tive department of government, the Railway Commission could have
been made of great service. Parliament showed no such desire.
The fall of the Railway Commission must be attributed, therefore,
to the jealousy of Parliament. It has been truly said that it
was "difficult to please the House on questions of railway leg-
islation; the House was always disposed to quarrel with what ex-
isted, to demand a change and then to quarrel with the alteration."
Parliament was keenly alert to gaurd against any encroachment upon
its own power. The work of the Railway Commission in respect of
railway bills naturally came into clash, to some extent at least
4
with the power of the Private Bill Committee. The fact that
1. Hadley: Railroad Transportation, Ch. 9.
2. Cleveland-Stevens, English Railways, their Development and their
Relation with the State, P. 153.
3. Han., 1848, P.- 1080; Cleveland-Stevens: English Railways, P. 149.
4. See Cleveland-Stevems : English Railways
,
153.
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Parliament refused to grant the Railway Commission new power in-
timated that Parliament was of the opinion that railway regulation
belonged only to its own proper function.
After the fall of the Railway Commission no attempts were
made either by or in Parliament to establish a separate and in-
dependent executive department for the general regulation of rail-
ways. The previous analysis shows that Parliament refused on dif-
ferent occasions to grant to any executive department adequate
power for the positive regulation of railways. Of the powers
delegated, aside from the question of undue preference and the
like, the regulation of railway rates has not been included. Par-
liament persisted in the regulation of railway rates only through
the various acts.
It may now be asked whether the problem of rate regulation
in England can be regarded as solved. It will be easier to an-
swer this question, if we consider the general result of the Par-
liamentary legislation as secured through the various Acts. Par-
liamentary regulation of railway rates in England resulted in
the establishment of three checks upon railway rate-making. First,
rates and charges must be within the statutory maxima; second,
rates and charges must be such as not to constitute an undue pref-
erence; and third, no increase of rates and charges may take
place, unless increase in the cost of service is proved.
The three checks have not been fully satisfactory in actual
practice. Each had -its inherent defect. The first check up to
the time of 1891-92 when the revision of classifications of mer-
1. See also Railway Times, August 22, 1846, PP. 1165
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chandise traffic and schedules of maximum rates was c arried out,
was but nominal. The old classifications were too crude to pos-
sess working value and the maximum rates were all fixed too high.
After the revision in 1891-92, the classifications and schedules
left little room for adjustments of actual rates according to
circumstances and traffic requirements. The second check was of
some use to the public against undue preference. But, the pro-
hibition of undue preference is still as vague and uncertain now
as it was when first incorporated in the Railway and Canal Traffic
Act, 1854. Even when the law against undue preference is fully
and efficiently enforced, it touches only a part of the problem
of rate regulation. Besides, there is the unsettled question
of preferential rates for foreign merchandise, which may differ
in nature from the question of differential rates, but is of no
less importance to the welfare of the nation. The third check
may be regarded as a necessary consequence of the first two. It
has its utility but it is conducive to inelasticity in rate-mak-
ing. A railway company will not reduce rates very readily, if it
knows that future increases will need justification. Parliament-
ary legislation in the form of these three checks cannot be con-
sidered as a great success, the problem of rate regulation is
still to a large extent unsolved.
^
Prior to 1888, regulation of railway rates was less restric-
tive, so the problem was less acute. With the passing of the
Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1888, the power of the railway
company to determine its charges was largely curtailed and the
difficulty of rate regulation was also increasing. The djffj-
1. See also Fortnightly, 1881, PP. 432-440; Westminister, 1902, V.
158, PP. 258-273.
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culty was due, perhaps, to a change in the railway situation, an
era of construction merging into an era of administration, a change
from a dynamic to a static state. But there is no doubt that
the problem was made more acute by the strict regulation of 1888*
From 1888 to 1894 there was a continuous battle between the ship-
pers and the railway company regarding the revision of schedules
and classifications. After 1894, increase of rates exercised pub-
lic attention. Since 1906 railway companies had to face organized
labor in the form of increased wages.
Such is the brief survey of the struggle between the railway
company and the public since 1888. There is little promise that
the struggle will not be renewed, unless this is changed by the
war that is now going on in Europe. Wide dissatisfaction is still
felt everywhere. 1 The public is not satisfied because it is in-
clined to think that the English railway charges are unduly high.
Railway companies are not satisfied because they can level down
rates without leave but have to get leave to put them up again.
Experience of rate regulation in England points to the conclusion
that the legislature has not discovered a complete solution of the
problem of regulation of railway rates. Such a high authority
as Justice Moulton admitted that "the remedy proposed by the leg-
islature (referring to the Act of 1894) is an imperfect one and
is not of itself sufficient to s ecure that the rate charged shall
in all cases be reasonable. The failure is due chiefly to the
almost insuperable difficulty of effectively regulating railway
rates by legislation." It was repeatedly pointed out by the
1. Westminister, V. 158, P. 258.
fc.North Staffordshire Colliery Owners' Association, etc., 78, 95.
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various Select Committee that the railway system was so compli-
cated that no enactments could provide for all contingencies. No
legislation can secure elasticity in rate-making. .Furthermore
,
Parliament has never settled upon any definite railway policy in
so far as this may be said to be the case with regard to its per-
sistent effort to maintain competition. It has shown a marked
inability and a stubborn resistance to legislate on broad and
permanent lines. Parliament has been particularly unfit for
the regulation of railway rates.
In October, 1913, one year before the war broBce out, a Royal
Commission on Railways was appointed with the Earl of Loreburn
as chairman "to inquire into the relationship between the railway
companies of Great ^ritain and the state in respect of matters
than
other safety of working and conditions of employment and to re-
port what changes, if any, are desirable in that relationship.
1,1
The Commission received many representations from individuals as
well as from associations with regard to rates and facilities
or accomodations provided by, or expected from railway companies.
Before it could report, the war broke out. What will be done
with the railways after the war is interesting to speculate upon.
That something must be done is clear both from the railway situ-
ation which we have described, with its unsatisfactory results
in rate regulation? and from the greater demand that will surely
develop after the war upon the transportation system for assist-
ance in the work of national reconstruction. Of course it is
impossible for us to say precisely what specific method will be
1. Railway News, Nov. 11, 1916, P. 567.
2. Westminister, 1900, V. 153, PP. 167-182.
1
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best for England to adopt in order to solve her railway problems
completely and finally. But in general, there are two alternative
policies which have been suggested and which may be used as means
out of the difficulty that has arisen in the regulation of rail-
way rates. The first is the complete nationalization of all rail-
ways, the state to purchase and operate them. The second is to
increase general state control through the agency of a special
executive department, leaving railways as they are, in private
hands
.
The question as to the desirability of the acquisition and
management of the railways by the state has been widely discussed
2
ever since the beginning of railways. ' Whenever the railway
problem has been found hard to handle, railway nationalization
has been suggested as a way out of the difficulty. Railway na-
tionalization has not been provided by any special Parliamentary
Act except in the Act of 1844 which dealt with State purchase
of railways as an option to the periodic revision of rates. The
Act provided that at the end of twenty-one years new lines would
be liable to be purchased by the government for a sum equal to
twenty-five years' purchase of the average of the annual divisible
profits for three years before such purchase. As a practicable
method of nationalization, the chief defect of this Act was that
it excluded all the railways sanctioned before the session of
1. See also the articles published by the Royal Economic Society;
1911.
2. Quarterly Review, 1844, V. 74. P. 227-271; Blackwood, 1845, V.
58, P. 633-649; Edinburgh Review, 1846, V. 84, P. 526; Journal of
Statistical Society, 1873, V. 36, P. 177-256; Report, Royal Com-
mission, 1865; Report, Select Committee, 1872.
3. See also Fortnightly, 1886, V. 45, PP. 737-771; Westminister,
1875, V. 103, PP. 20-49.
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1844—that is to say about 2,300 miles of railway, which was
specially stated in the Act. The main trunk line system of the
country excluding the Great Northern Railway was thus outside the
Act and could not he purchased except by agreement. Th6se railways
which were constructed before 1844 no longer exist as independent
railways ,having been amalgamated with other railways constructed
at a later period, forming the various trunk lines.
1 Government
purchase was urged chiefly for two reasons; first, for the sake
of its direct financial advantages and second, as affording means
of introducing an improved system of management in the form of
lower charges and better facilities. Both were examined in detail
by the Royal Commission on Railways of 1867, but the advantages
1. Other reasons as to the impracticability of State purchase may
be worth while to point out.
"By another section of this Act, the second, the Lords of the
Treasury are empowered, after the expiration of twenty-five years,
to purchase the railways, whatever the rate of divisible profits
may be, upon giving three calendar months' notice in writing of
their intention, on payment of a sum equal to twenty-five years
purchase of these profits, estimated on the average of the three
preceding years.
"This power to purchase on such extravagant terms and such limi-
tations, held out small hopes of relief; so that, upon the whole,
the position of the public with regard to railways, was not there-
by materially improved." Second Report, Select Committee on
Railway Acts Enactment, 1846, P. VII.
The purchase of the 2,300 miles was was subject to the Act of
1844, "which would be absolutely necessary to carry out the scheme,
could only take place with the consent of the proprietors and this
could only be obtained by the offer of liberal terms."
"As the government would have to enter the market to borrow
400 or 500 million pounds to carry out the operation, the terms
upon which this could be raised would in all probability be ma-
terially affected." The total capital paid up in 1912 was LI, 334,-
963, 518 as against L529,908,673 in 1870: -Report Royal Commission,
1867. PP. XXXIV-XXXV; Railway Returns, 1870 and 1912.
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alleged were found most illusory.*
In 1912, after the railway strike, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald pro-
posed nationalization of railways in a proposed amendment to the
King's speech. The amendment received due consideration in
Parliament but the financial difficulty was carefully pointed out.
The capital invested in railways was about 1,300 million pounds,
nearly twice the amount of the funded national debt, and it would
be suicidal, it was urged, to attempt to raise such a sum with
consols at the price they were and railway returns averaging only
3
about 3|- per cent.
On April 30, 1914, a Bill "to provide for the nationalization
of railways, the establishment of a Ministry of Posts and Railways,
and for the purposes connected therewith" was presented to the
1. Report, Royal Commission (3844), 1867, PP. XXXIV-XXXVI; Sir
Rowland Hill, one of the Commissioners, differed from the majority,
favoring government purchase. See his special report, 1867, PP.
CXII-CXXIV.
2. The amendment was the following:- "But humbly represent to
Your Majesty that this House regrets Your Majesty's Gracious Speech
contains no specific mention of legislation securing a minimum
living wage and for preventing a continuance of such unequal di-
visions of the fruits of industry by the nationalization of rail-
ways, mines and other monopolies":- Han. 1912, V. 34, P. 44.
3. Han. 1912, V. 34, P. 65.
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House of Commons by Mr. Chiozza Money. 1 The Bill was proposed
to be read a second time on May 18, 1914, but it was not read.
Thus we see that nationalization of railways has been agi-
tated for a long time and in different periods as a means of the
solution of railway problems arising chiefly out of the regulation
1. Han. 1914, V. 61, P. 1887; Parliamentary Papers, 1914, V. 5.
Bill 212:- The Bill was divided into fourteen clauses; clauses 1
and 2 were for the creation of a Minister for Posts and Railways;
clauses, 3-, 4 and 13 provided for the State acquisition of Railways;
clauses 5 to 12 dealt with the practical control and management
of the State Railways. The minister of Potts and Railways was to
have the powers of the Post masters-general as well as control of
the State railway system. He was to have the power of giving
three months' notice to the owners of any railway of his intention
to purchase. The purchase price of any railway would be twenty
times the average annual profits, of the three years preceding
the date of purchase, as determined by the Board of Trade in its
annual returns relating to the railways of the United Kingdom.
For the purchase of railways, the Treasury would create a new
capital stock (to be called "guaranteed three and a quarter per
centum State railway stock" ). The stock would be redeemable at
the rate of one hundred pounds sterling for every one hundred
pounds of stock by annual drawings, commencing within three years
of the issue of the stock, by means of a sinking fund of one-half
of one per cent or such sum as might be sufficient to redeem the
entire loans within sixty-three years. The business of operating
and maintaining the State railways was to be in charge of a rail-
way Board of four members. Two of the members were to be ap-
pointed by the Minister for Posts and Railways, one by the Board
of Trade and one by the Treasury. The Minister for Posts and
Railways might, if he thought fit, appoint two more members. The
Bill proposed to create a Railway Council of twentv-four members
one from each county Council, whose area is wholly or partly
served by railways owned or operated by the State, each countv
borough Council whose area is wholly or partly served Dy railways
owned or operated by the State; six from the Associated Chambers
of Commerce and Chambers of Trade, six from the Associated Cham-
bers of Agriculture and twelve from the Trade Unions Congress.
Their duty was to consider and advise, subject to the approval
of the Minister of Posts and Railways, with respect to all questions
of general improvements, reductions or increase of charges, wages,
the creation and amendment of by-laws and regulations together
with questions of general management.
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of railway rates. It may be asked whether railway nationalization
will solve the railway problem in England. Of course the present
problem of regulating railway rates will probably disappear after
nationalization; the difficulty of regulating railway rates will
appear in another form. But is railway nationalization the best
way out of the difficulty for the best interest of the country,
taking all things into consideration? It seems to the writer that
immediate nationalization of railways is not desirable and may
not be practical, mainly for two reasons. And certainly it is
not. to be to the best interest of the country for at least a good
many years to come. In the first place, the great European war-
has increased enormously the financial burden of England and of
the world. The demand for capital will be very large after the
war. If nationalization of railways was found impracticable be-
fore the war mainly for financial reasons, the same reasons will
undoubtedly make it unadvisable for England to attempt nation-
alization in the near future. In the second place, England will
need, to a greater degree than ever before, all the individual
initiative and private enterprise that every citizen can render
for her reconstruction after the war. The railway system can
contribute more to the important work of national reconstruction
by leaving it in private hands, with the co-operation of the gov-
ernment, than by the government shouldering the whole responsi-
bility of its management. The supremacy of England was built up
upon industrial freedom and individual liberty. Much may be said
in favor of railway nationalization in this or the other country
but it may not work well in England, with the characteristics of
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the English people, such as they are.
The only alternative policy for the solution of the railway
problem as it has been suggested by various writers, is to en-
large the sphere of State control. The greatest difficulty in
the regulation of railway rates is to devise a proper method that
will give railway companies the desirable degree of freedom in
revising charges and adjusting facilities along business lines
without giving rise to the apprehension that this power might be
abused. The utility of a railway rate depends on its dynamic and
cosmopolitan nature; its regulation must, therefore, be living,
not dead, and dynamic, not static. The regulation must be com-
prehensive and rates can only be fixed after taking all matters
into consideration. The regulation of railway rates should be
vested in a machinery possessing the same nature and character-
istics, in a body of persons who can comprehend intelligently the
changing requirements of traffic and the necessity of rate ad-
justments. There should be constant supervision over the powers
of rate-making but not detailed prescription of hard and fast
rules. Every effective effort to regulate railway rates in gen-
eral will arrest the decline of rates and produce inelasticity
in rate-making. Railway companies must necessarily be given large
powers to revise their charges; they must be permitted to con-
solidate or to co-operate more intimately for the purpose of se-
curing greater economy in railway working. But these powers can
not be given, unless there is a larger power which can control
the actions of the railway company so as to secure the adequate
protection of the public. The only way to bring this about is to
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constitute a strong executive department with a body of experts
in railway business and to grant to this department large and
arbitrary powers of positive regulation.
This recommendation for the establishment of a permanent and
effective controlling Board is the central feature in almost every
report that has been made by the Committees and Commissioners on
railways from 1837 to date. The following words of the Select
Committee of 1846 on this subject are no less true then than they
1
were now.
"The system of Railways and Canals is now become so extensive,
and their relations amongst themselves are so complicated that
no enactments passed by Parliament for their government and regu-
lation can provide for all contingencies, or be perfectly carried
into effect, unless by the aid of some more efficient machinery
than any which exists at the present moment. After mature con-
sideration your Committee have come to the conclusion that it is
absolutely necessary that some Department of the Executive Gov-
ernment, so constituted as to command general respect and confi-
dence, should be charged with the supervision of Railways and
Canals with full power to enforce such regulations as may from
time to time appear indispensable for the accomodations and gen-
eral interest to the public."
The constant failure of Parliament to appreciate this recom-
mendation and to act accordingly had made one doubt whether such
an executive department with large powers for the regulation of
railways will ever be established in England by the sanction of
1. Second Report, 1846, P. V.
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of Parliament. Yet already, the present war has made the consti-
tution of such an executive department much easier to realize,
for much valuable knowledge which has been acquired by the gov-
ernment in the co-operative operation and management of railways
during the war can no doubt be used to guide the future policy of
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state control in railways.
1
1. At the outbreak of the war most of the railways were taken ov|r
by the government under the Regulations of the Forces Act, 1871.
By the order in Council of August 4, 1914, the control was exer-
cised through an Executive Committee composed of government repre-
sentatives and of general managers of railway companies, The com-
pensation agreed upon in September, 1914, was the sum by which the
aggregate net receipts for the period during which the government
were in possession of them fell short of aggregate net receipts
for the corresponding half of 1914 were less than the net receipts
for the first half of 1913, the sum payable was to be reduced in
the same proportion. This sum, together with the net receipts of
the railway companies taken over, is to be distributed among those
companies in proportion to the net receipts of each company dur-
ing the period with which compensation is made.
Extensive power was given to the Railway Executive Committee
and the Board of Trade. They possess power to r educe facilities
and to increase charges. A recent Order in Council will illus-
trate the extent of power conferred.
"7B- (1). The Board of Trade may, for the purpose of making
the most efficient use of railway plant or labor, with a view to
the successful prosecution of the war make orders for all or any
of the following purposes, namely :-
(a) for enabling the Board of Trade to take possession of any
private owner's wagons and house those wagons in such manner as
they think best in the interest of the country as a whole, on such
conditions as to payment, use, and otherwise as may be provided
by the order.
(b) for enforcing the prompt loading or unloading of wagons,
by making failure to load or unload in accordance with the order
an offense.
(c) for curtailing any statutory requirements as to the running
of trains or affording other facilities on certain lines or at
certain stations or for requiring the disuse of any such time or
stations, in cases where its curtailment or disuse appears to
the Board of Trade to be justified by the necessity of the case.
(d) for restricting or prohibiting certain classes of traffic
(including the carriage of passengers' luggage) on railways either
absolutely or subject to any conditions for which provision is
made by the order :-
(e) for modifying any statutory requirements with respect to
the maximum amount of passenger fares.
a. 34 and 35 Vict. C. 86.
b. Railway News, August 9, 1916. P. 241.
c. Ibid, Dec. 16, 1916. P. 703.
40
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The department might be the enlargement of the Railway De-
partment of the Board of Trade but made independent of the Board.
It is the opinion of the writer, however, that it would be better
to constitute a new one with large powers of control over railways,
canals and postal service and other agencies of communication.
The powers of the Railway Department of the Board of Trade can
be transferred to this new department. As to the additional powers,
it is impossible for the writer to specify without further study
made actually in England. The subject is so delicate that it
may require a separate inquiry by a special Parliamentary select
Committee. But judging from the results of Parliamentary regu-
lation of railway rates, it is the opinion of the writer that
adequate power should be given to the new department for the
regulation of railway rates. The power may be generic and not
specific; it may be along the line for the regulation of through
rates. The power of the railway companies in fixing rates must
not be interfered. Railway companies should have free power in
fixing and revising rates subject to the general supervision of
the new department. The new department may be given power to ac-
cept or refuse rates purely on commercial and national consider-
ations, after taking into full account both the interests of the
shippers and the carriers. 'Power may also be given to the de-
partment to enable it to obtain full knowledge of the working
conditions of every railway company. Members of the department
should be experts in railway business and should be trained in
the national and world knowledge of commerce and industry. The
department being armed with such powers and composed of such
i...
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members, would probably be in a better position to regulate more
intelligently and to protect more efficiently the interests of
both the railway company and the public. Whenever any conflict
of interest occurred, the department could recommend or decide
in a comprehensive way and from the standpoint of the nation a
wise policy for a railway company to pursue. Railway companies
may be allowed large powers; rates may be permitted to be in-
creased; the right to make differential and preferential rates
may be granted; but if they are not in the interests of the, pub-
lic, or some trader or shipper is thereby injured, the depart-
ment can take action at any time to remedy the situation.
As a further precaution and in the interests of the more ef-
ficient protection of the public, the Railway and Canal Com-
mission might be authorized, in addition to the present powers,
to decide all complaints of undue charges on broad commercial
considerations, and not in any narrow or technical manner. This
was actually recommended by the Departmental Committee of 1911
but its critics asked "how a law court is to deal with commer-
cial considerations." 2 This criticism may be remedied in two
ways. In the first place the law provides already that one of the
two lay Commissioners must be of experience in railway business;
this requirement might be made- to apply to both. In the second
place the new department could render direct assistance or in-
formation to the Commission, as it would possess full knowledge
not only of the working conditions of the railway company but
also of the transportation needs of the country.
1. Report, 1911, P. 23.
2. Economist, 1911, P. 1002.
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With the large powers of the new department and the additional
power of the Railway and Canal Commission, the interest of the
public would be properly protected. Railway companies would be
left free to revise their charges and to develop their business
in whatever manner they thought most advantageous to their own
interests and the welfare of the country. Regulation would not
be mechanical as in the case of legislative enactment, but dynamic
with alert attention to the necessary frequent adjustment of the
railway rates to business vivissitudes , without which power no
railway company can exist and serve truly the welfare of the
public
.
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Appendix I
(A) Part 1. Goods and Minerals
Great Eastern Railway Company, Midland Railway Company, etc
(Rates and charges) Order Confirmation Act, 1891.
1
Rates in respect of Merchandise comprised
in Classes A,B,C, 1-5.
Maximum rates I'or Conveyance
In
respect of
merchandise
comprised in
the under
mentioned
classes
.
A
B
C
1
2
3
4
5
For Consignments except as otherwise provided
in the schedule.
For the first
20 miles or
any part of
such distance
Per ton per
mile
d
1.15
1.40
1.80
2.20
2.65
3.10
3.60
4.30
For the next
30 miles or
any part of
such distance
Per ton per
mile
d
0.90
1.05
1.50
1.85
2.30
2.65
3.15
3.70
For the next
50 miles or
any part of
such distance
Per ton per
mile
d
0.45
0.80
1.20
1.40
1.80
2.00
2.50
3.25
For the re-
mainder
of the
distance *
Per ton
per mile
d.
0.40
0.55
0.70
1.00
1.50
1.80
2.20
2.50
1. Great Eastern Railway C®. ; Midland Railway Co., etc
Analysis, 1892, V.70, (CB807) p. 133.
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Appendix I - continued.
(B) Part I - Goods and Minerals.
London and Northwestern Railway Company (Rates and Charges)
Order Confirmation Act, 1891. 1
(a) Rates in respect of merchandise comprised in Class A.
Scale I. - Applicable to such portions of the railway as are not
herein-after specially mentioned.
Maximum Rates for Conveyance
For the first : For the next : For the next : For the remain-
20 miles or : 50 miles, or : 50 miles, or : der of the
any part of : any part of : any part of : Distance
such distance : such distance : such distance :
Per ton per : Per ton per : Per ton per : Per ton per
mile : : mile : mile : mile
d : d : d : d.
0.95 0.85 : 0.50 : 0.40
Scale II - Applicable to the railways herein specially mentioned,
Maximum Rates for
Conveyance
Sirhowy
South Staffordshire:
Dudley to Wichnor, and Branches
to Bescot, Dudley
Port, Cannock, and Leighwood
Wednesbury to Tipton and James Bridge
Norton Branch and Extension
Littleworth Extension
Merthyr, Tredegar, and Abergavenny:
Abergavenny to Nantybwch, Merthyr Exten-
sion and Cwm Bargold Branch
Nantyglo and Blaina
Per ton per mile
d.
.875
1.25
1. Analysis, 1892, V. 70, p. 148-150
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Maximum Rates for
Scale II. Continued. Conveyance .
Per ton per mile
a.
Brynmawr and Bl aenavon : )
Brynmawr to Blaenavon and Abersychan )
Extension )
Whitehaven Junction: )
Whitehaven to Maryport )
Cockermouth and Workington )
The Dawlais and Merthyr Railway, Jointly )
owned by the company and the Bacon )
and Merthyr Tydfil Junction Railway )
Company. ) 1.25
The Nantybwch and Rhymney Railway jointly )
owned by the company and the Rhymney )
Railway Company. )
The Charnwood Forest Railway, worked by )
the Company. )
South Leicestershire: )
Nuneaton to Wigston )
Mold Junction to Mild and Coed Talon )
Carnarvon to Lauberis )
The Mold and Denbigh Junction Railway )
worked by the Company. )
Carnarvon Junction to Afonwen Junction )
Nantlle Branch )
Chester and Holyhead )
Bangor and Bethesda )
|
Stockport Junction to Buxton )
Cromford and High Peak )
Buxton and High Peak Junctions )
Ashbourne and Euxton ) 2 »°
Lancaster and Carlisle, including Ingleton,)
Morecambe, and G-lasson Dock Branches )
Scale III. - Applicable to the Cannock Chase Railway.
For the whole or any portion of the Cannock Chase Railway,
the Company may charge a maximum rate of 9d per ton, except with
regard to merchandise passing along and from the railway secondly
described in and authorised by the Cannock Chase Railway Act,
1860, on to the Littleworth Tramway, and not having passed along
any part of the railway firstly described in the said Act,
for which merchandise they may charge a maximum rate of 4.50 d
per ton.
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(b) Rates in respect of merchandise comprised in classes
B,C, 1,2,5,4, and 5.
Scale I - Applicable to such portions of the railway as are not
herein-after specially mentioned.
In
respect of
merchandise
comprised in
the under
mentioned
classes
Maximum Rates for Conveyance
For Consignments except as otherwise provided
in the schedule.
For the first
20 miles or
any part of
such distance
For the next
50 miles or
any part of
such distance
For the next
50 miles or
any part of
suchdistance
For the
remain-
der of the
distance
B
C
1
2
3
4
5
Per ton per
mile
d
1.25
1.80
2.20
2.65
3.10
5.60
4.50
Per ton per
mile
d
1.0
1.50
1.85
2.50
2.65
3.15
3.70
Per ton per
mile
d
O.80
1.20
1.40
1.80
2.00
2.50
3.25
Per ton
per mile
d
0.50
0.70
1.00
1.50
1.80
2.20
2.50
(c) Rates in respect of Merchandise comprised in Class B.
Scale II. - Applicable to the railways herein specially mentioned,
Maximum rate per
ton per mile
Whitehaven Junction
Whitehaven to Maryport
Cockermouth and Workington
1.50
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Appendix I - continued.
(C) Maximum Station and Service Terminals
The following terminals 1 were common to all the Railway Rates
and Charges Orders Confirmation Acts of 1891 and 1892 except where
special exceptions were made.
T*-i <m ; Maximum Terminals
respect oi
merchandise :
comprised in :
the under ;
mentioned :
classes :
Station :
Terminals:
at each :
end :
Service Terminals
Loading Unloading 3 Covering: Uncovering
Per ton
j
Per ton ' Per ton ' Per ton : Per ton
:
s d ' s d ' s d
'
s d 5 s d
A : 3 :
B : 6
C : 1 : 3 3 ! 1 : 1
1 ! 1 6 : 5 : 5 : 1.50 : : 1.50
2 : 1 6 : 8 : 8 : 2 :: 2
3 : 1 6 : 1 : 1 : 2 : 2
4 : 1 6 : 1 4 : 1 4 : 3 : 3
5 : 1 6 : 1 8 : 1 8 : 4 : 4
•
1. Analysis, V 70. 1892 P. 131.
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Appendix I - Continued
(D) Special Charges. 1
The services for which special charges could be made are:-
1. Services rendered by the company at or in connection with
sidings not belonging to the company.
2. The collection and delivery of merchandise outside the
terminal station.
5. Weighing merchandise.
4. Any services rendered in connection with the detention of
wagons or the occupation of any accommodation, before or after
conveyance beyond a reasonable period.
5. Loading or unloading, covering or uncovering merchandise
comprised in Class A or Class B of the classification.
6. The use of coal drops.
7. Special services on a wharf.
Charges for the use of wagons not included in the maximum
rates for conveyance were not to exceed the following sums:
s. d.
For distances not exceeding 20 miles 4-i per ton.
For distances exceeding 20 miles but
not exceeding 50 miles 6 .
For distances exceeding 50 miles but
^
not exceeding 75 miles 9 .
For distances exceeding 75 miles but .
not exceeding 150 miles 1
For distances exceeding 150 miles 15 " .
1. Analysis p. 105-104
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Appendix II
Part II - Animals.
The following Scale is common to all the Railway Rates and
Charges Orders Confirmation Acts of 1891 and 1892 with the ex-
ception of the Scotish Railway Acts and the Irish Railway Acts.
Description.
1. For every horse, mule or
other beast of draught or
burden.
2. For every ox, cow, bull
or head of neat cattle.
5. For every calf not ex-
ceeding 12 months old,
pig, sheep, lamb, or other
small animal.
4. For every small animal of
the several classes above
enumerated conveyed in a
separate carriage by dir-
ection of the consignor,
or from necessity.
5. For every truck contain-
ing any consignment by the
same person of suchnumber
of oxen, cows, neat cattle
calves, sheep, goats or pigs
as may reasonably be car-
ried in a truck 13 ft 6inch.es
in length insidemeasurement
6. Same as No. 5 only 15 ft
6 inches in length in-
side measurement.
7. Same as No. 5 only 18 ft
in length, inside
measurement
Rates for Convey-
ance per mile.
P>
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Pi
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1
6
9
1
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s d
4
3
01.50
1
6
9
1
CD
to
u •
o3 P
^ PJ
O CD
H pj
o3 bOP »H
O CO
PS
o
o
Ph
CD
ft
s d
2 6
2 6
2 6
5
5
50
5
1. Analysis, P. 196.
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Part III - Carriages. 1
This Part of the Maximum Rates and Charges is common to all
the Railway Rates and Charges Orders CorfirmationActs of 1891& 1892.
Description.
Rates for Convey-
ance per mile.
p •
o?-i <d
CQCtJ O
P<S3p a
CQ>>P
*s3 cq
«h id
CDO.d
PCQ
CD CO
OH Cm
faS o
P
w CDO oJO
CO PUS3
03
P !>>P
« P3 co
CD 0S«H
S3 'd
0) O^J
A oP CO ^
CD (0
S-.H
For every carriage
of what ever descrip-
tion not included in
the classification,
and not being a car-
riage adapted and
used for travelling
on the Railways and
not weighing more
than one ton, carried
or conveyed on a
truck or platform.
For every additional
quarter of a ton
which such carriage
may weigh.
For the use of a cov-
ered carriage, truck
for the conveyance of
any such carriage
-p
u CD
a o
P<s3
cC
t»P
S3 ra
Cj-H
UOA
o
CO J3
cd w
!h H
O -HCm
fa So
3.30
1.3
u
CD
•O
S3
•H
oS
8
p
CO
CD «H
CD
P
o
fa
CD
P
<P.
O
P
OS
H
OS
S3
S S3
<D CDP
^3
o
OS
CD
s d
3.20
1.25
1
Service terminal.
S3
•H
•a
cS
o
h3
S3
•ri
oJ
O
rH
S3
!=>
to
S3
•H
S-i
CD
>
O
o
An additional charge of 10 s.
1. Analysis, P. 199.

- 290 -
Appendix IV
Part IV - Exceptional Class. 1
This Part of the Maximum Rates and Charges is common to all
the Railway Rates and Charges Orders Confirmation Acts of 1891
and 1892.
Description Charges
For articles of unusual length, bulk or weight,
or of exceptional bulk in proportion to
weight.
For articles requiring an exceptional truck
or more than one truck, or a special trairu.
For locomotives, engines and tenders, and
railway vehicles running on their ownwheels
For any wild beast or any large animal not
otherwise provided for
For dangerous goods
For specie, bullion, or precious stones
Such reasonable
sum as the com-
pany may think
fit in each case.
For any accommodation or services provided
or rendered by the company within the „
scope of the undertaking by the desire of
a trader and in respect of which no pro-
visions are made by this schedule.
Such reasonable
sum as the com-
pany may think
fit in each case.
1. Analysis, P. 200. The above provisions would not apply
to prices of timber weighing less than four tons each but for
all such timber when requiring for two or more wagons for convey-
ance a minimum charge might be made as for one ton for each wagon
used, whether carrying part of the load or used as a safety wagon
only.
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Part V. - Perishable Merchandise.
This Part of the Maximum Rates and Charges is common to all the
Railway Rates and Charges Orders Confirmations Acts of 1891 and 1892.
2
Division I.
PJ
o
•HP
ft
•H
U
o
CO
©
P
Milk
Rate for Conveyance
© o
O OJ
d
cu bQ
P £
CO HH 'O •
<D W
0) ©|>>OH
q M «h
etJ <D g
P
o o
fa g
Per
Im-
perial
gallon
d
0.50
Per
can
1.50
to
CD
© H
O H
PO
CO 0}
ctf ©
©
f-, O
O «
fa 0)
H
nd
<D
CD
O CO
W CD
taO ©H
a p
O
p
Per
Im-
perii
gallor
d
0.60
per
can
2.00
CO
CD bO©H PJ
O «HH
aJ CDPO CD
com a
•H «
-d bO©
pvri P
d-d O
aJO)
CD
U op
fa ©.O
Per
Im-
perial
gallon
d
0.70
Per
can
2.25
CO
CD hOH £
•H H
£*o
CD CO
lO CD CD
£> OH
bO© g
!>sHPO
£ "d oo
CD £H
CD
O P
CD ,0
Per
Im-
perial
gallon
d
0.90
Returned Emp
Per
can
2.50
bO
CO
©HH
CD £
o
rtO'dw
ctSO ©G>
P H CDH
CO OH
•HI bO«g
•d £ ©H O
^•dpu:
£ © CH
ctf © £
o
£ XP
O © 3
fa ,Q
Per
Im-
perial
gallon
d
1.00
y Cans
Per
can|
3.00
©
o o
S to
cci HP
co b0 •H fj CO
«d H ©
n3 H
>> © H
S © £
O
©
o
fa
Per
Im-
perial
gallon
d
1.20
Per
can
3.00
p
as
H
H
•
© ^d
P bO
© H
o d
•H o Cj
P o
Cti ©P
CO
Per
can
d
1.50
Service
terminal
Per
can
d
1.00
0.50
bO
H
05
OH
£p
Per
can
d
1.00
o.50
1. Each railway company was required to afford reasonable facil-
ities for the expeditious conveyance of perishables, any ques-
tion as to the facilities being decided by the Board of Trade.
Where a consignment of milk was less than 12 gallons, the company
would be entitled to charge as for 12 gallons, and where a con-
signment of perishables in Division I and II was less than one
hundredweight, the company was entitled to charge as for one
hundredweight, with a minimum charge of one shilling.
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Division II and III. 1
Description.
Rate for Conveyance.
•p •
02 Cd O
P. £p CO
CO t>3 -P
U £ M
cd «H
•X3CM
CD
-P
O
co
CD CO
•H Cm
S O
Division II.
Butter (fresh) Cheese
(soft) cream, eggs, fish
(Char, Grayling, Lob-
sters, Mullet red, Oys-
ters, Prawns, Salmon,
Soles, Trout, Turbot,
White bait) Fruit
(Hothouse fruit) Game
(dead) Meat (fresh)
Poultry (dead) Rabbits
(dead) Vegetables (hot-
house) .
Division III.
-Fish and Fruit, (ex-
cept as provided in
Division II.)
Per
Cwt
per
mile
0.60
0.40
p •
H ©
o a o
to & £
cd
t» -p•p
CD cd
O
CO
+5 CO
CD
U H
fc6 o
Per
Cwt
per
mile
0.45
0.30
-p •
u oO CO O
lo (X G
cd
•p t>i -p
CD cd
O
CO
•H
t3
CD
-P
,3
o
CO
CD
g o
Per
Cwt
per
mile
0.24
0.15
© CD
•H
cd
i
o
cd
-P
CO
CD «H
Pi
CD
P
u
o
-p
o
W1
per
mile
0.10
0.12
p
cd
H
cd
P"
•H •
CD CD
P
O
•H
-P
cd
•P
o
cd
CD
Per
Cvrt
0.75
Service
terminal
•
cd
o
Per
Cwt
to
•H
cd
oH
Per
Cwt
0.75 0.75
0.75 0.50 0.50
1. Analysis, P. 202.
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Part VI. - Small Parcels
by Merchandise Train. 1
This Part of the Maximum Rates and Charges is Common to all the
Railway Rates and Charges Orders Confirmation Acts of 1891 and
Description.
Author
-
orized
Addition-
al charge
per
Parcel
Per
ton
Per
ton.
For small parcels
by merchandise
train not exceed-
ing in weight 3
hundredweight
.
(In addition to i
the maximum
rates for con-
veyance and the
maximum station
and service ter-
minals)
s d
5
*>
6
7
8
9
10
1 u
1 2
1 4
1 6
Whenthe Maxi-
mum tonnage
charge does
not exceed
When the Max-
imum tonnage
charge exceeds
s d
20
>
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
but
does j
not "
exceed
i
s d
r-
300
40
500
60
700
800
90
100
1. Any small parcel (other than a parcel of mixed groceries) con-
taining articles belonging to different classes of the class-
ification was to be charged with the maximum conveyance charge
applicable to the highest of such classes. When a consignor de-
clined to declare the nature of the contents of the small parcel,
the company might charge for the small parcel as if it was wholly
composed of articles comprised in class 5 of the classification.
2. Analysis, P. 203.
i
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.
In respect of empties returned by the line of the providing
company, the charges including the station and service terminals
were not to exceed the following rates:
1
For any distance not exceeding 25 miles 5 d per cwt.
For any distance exceeding 25 miles but
^ n
not exceeding 50 miles 4 d
For any distance exceeding 50 miles but
^ ^
not exceeding 100 miles 8 d
For each additional 50 miles or part of
50 miles 3 d
The minimum weight to be 56 pounds with
a minimum charge of 3 d.
In the case of returned empty sacks and bags, they were not
to be charged more than half the above rates with a minimum charge
of 4d, and in the case of carboys or crates they might be charged
double the above rates.
Charges for returned empty fish packages were not to exceed
the following rates:
For any distance not exceeding 50 miles 4 d. Per cwt.
For any distance exceeding 50 miles but n
not exceeding 100 miles 5 d.
For any distance exceeding 100 miles but
^
not exceeding 150 miles 7 d. •
For any distance exceeding 150 miles but
^ n
not exceeding 200 miles 8 d.
1. Analysis, P. 102-108.
II
I
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Appendix VII. - Continued.
For any distance exceeding 200 miles but
not exceeding 250 miles 9 d. Per ewt.
For any distance exceeding 250 miles but w
not exceeding 500 miles 10 d.
For any distance exceeding 300 miles 11 d.
1
.
The minimum weight to be 56 pounds with a minimum charge of 4d.
The return of an empty wagon would not be charged provided
the companies had the service of conveyance in connection with the
use of the wagon.
When merchandise was conveyed for an entire distance which
did not exceed from three to six miles, the charges might be made
as for three or six miles respectively.
For any quantity of merchandise less than a wagon load, which
the company was obliged to carry in one wagon, the company might
charge as for a reasonable minimum of wagon load.
A fraction of a quarter of a hundred weight or of a ton might
be charged a quarter of each.
A fraction of a quarter of a mile was to be charged as a
quarter of a mile.
For a fraction of a penny, the company might demand a penny.
Weight would be determined according to the Imperial avoid-
upois weight.
Stone was to be charged at actual weight. When the actual weigit
couldnot be ascertained, fourteen cubic feetmightbe chargedas onestone.
When timber was consigned by measurement weight, forty cubic
feet of oak, mahogany, teak or other like heavy timber, fifty cubic
feet of poplar, fir, or other like light timber and sixty-six cubic
feet of deals, battens and boards might be charged for as one ton.
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1. The following tables illustrate the differences between the
proposals of the railway companies, the traders and the Board of
Trade in the maximum conveyance rates:
Table I.
Railway Companies Cumulative Scale as being Equivalent
of the Normanton Scale
Class
C
1
2
3
4
5
C
1
2
3
4
5
For 1st 20
miles
For next 30
miles
For next 50
miles
For remainder of
distance
2.40d
2.80
3.00
3.30
3.90
4.50
1.30d
1.70
2.50
2.80
3.40
4.00
l.lOd
1.60
1.80
2.40
3.00
3.30
0.40d
1.20
1.70
2.20
2.60
2.75
Table II
Traders Cumulation Scale
Class Fo^ 1st 20 For next 30 For next 50 For remainder of
miles miles miles distance
l^d
If
2
2i
3
3*
lid
if
l}
2
2*
3
1 d
It
4
2f
1
2
Table III
Board of Trade Cumulative Scale
Class For 1st 20
miles
For next 30
miles
For next 50
miles
For remainder of
distance
C 1.80d 1.50d 1.20d 0.60d
1 2.20 1.85 1.40 0.90
2 2.65 2.30 1.70 1.35
3 3.10 2.65 1.75 1.65
4 3.60 3.15 2.20 1.80
5 4.30 3.70 3.25 2.30
Provisional Order Bills Report, Part 1, 1891, v. 14. PP LV, LVI.
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The following tables 1 will illustrate the modifications that
took place in the maximum rates as they passed through the Board
of Trade and the Joint Committee of the two Houses:
Table I
London and North Western Company's Proposed Maximum
Rates, 1889.
Conveyance Rates [Station Terminals
j
Service Terminals
per ton per mile j Each End per ton j Each end per ton
Classes
co w ; w
CD CD CD Cm
rH H \ tri \ O
•H «H : «H
S i £ H
CD CD
O O O 'do
OJ 03 03 £ £
•H CO
• P P Ki P
-P X X £ w
CO CD CD CD iH
<H £3 S K
CD
o3 co
-P O
<aj EH
CD
P
O
o
<J Eh
CD
50
Jh
cd co
P O
< EH
P
O CO
f>s O
o3 P
OSp p
A
B
C
1
2
3
4
5
d d d
2 l| li
2 2 2 l"2t
3 2i 2
31 o3 qJL
3i 3i 3
4 Sf 9ft
s d s d
See below
s d s d
2
2!
3
5 4|4 31
1
1 3
2
2
2
2
2
9
1
1 6
1 6
1 6
1 6
1 6
9
1 6
1 6
2
2 9
3 6
6
1
1 3
1 6
2
2 6
Class A - General Scale
Excepting Slack--
Up to 50 miles Id per ton per mile.
Exceeding 50 miles, fd per ton per mile.
Slack--
Up to 50 miles, 7/8d per ton per mile.
Exceeding 50 miles, 3/4d per ton per mile.
Station Terminals
at each end.
Large Towns
,
8d per ton.
Other Stations,
6d per ton.
1. Modern Railway Working, PP. 136-137.
*Large towns: London, Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham Service
terminals include loading and unloading, covering and uncovering.
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Table II.
Board of Trade Proposals, 1890
T
Conveyance Rates per ton per mile
Classes
CO
CD
rH
•H
8
o
ftP
21
to
50
miles
1
A 90 0.85
B 1.25 1.15
C 1.70 1.60
j
1 2.20
:
i
2.05 !
2
;
2.65 2.50
3 ; 3.00 2.85
4 3.65 3.45
5 4.30 4.05
CO
CD
r-t
OO
O
P
lO
o
o
bO
•H
-d
CD 03
CD CD
O rH
W g
i 1
GO Service Terminals
H rH C
CO O
1
a p
fi•H
CD fn
f-. CD fi ft CD
bOCD ft CD ft
ft bO
bOrfj •H
fn flbO •H a
O CD a •H CD O
•H •H GO fn > P
*j O CD O
CD O cO £ rH > $4 o U
+3 CO o o O O O C CD
CO CD r-3 p P P O P P ft
d
0.70
1.00
1.45
1.80
2.20
2.70
3.30
3.75
d
0.60
0.85
1.15
1.55
2.00
2.35
2.90
3.40
s d
6,
I
,0 9;
1
1 6
1 6
1 6
s d s d
3 3 | 1.0 1.0
5 5 1 . 50 1 . 50
6 6 2.0 2.0
80 8 2.0 2.0
16 10 10 3.0
1 6 1 3 1 3 4,0
3.0
4.0
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Table III
Joint Committees' Proposals as Included in the Order
Confirmation Act, 1891.
CO
CD
co
CO
as
rHO
Conveyance Rates per ton per mile
CO
o
p
CO
rH
•H
fa
CO
CP
o
to
P
X
<D
25
CO
CD
O
LO
P
K
CD
25
Cm
O
U
CD CD
rrj O
•H CO
as P
S «
CD «H
CO
rH C r
Qj OCP
I
£ h
K CD
;
cd a
EH
cj
!
CDo
p rd
crj O
P cd
c/2 CD
f
Service Terminals
CD
bp !
•H
as FJ
O O \
J P ,
rH
rH CD
CD rH Qt
P. CD
a bO
bO Pi
bD •H
•H rH
•H CD
crj >
O CD o
rH $3 > C o s
C O o o C o
P P O P {3 P
A
B
C
1
2
3
4
5
d
1
d d d s s d s d d d
0.95 0.85 0.50 0.40
1.25 1.00 0.80 0.50 6 >
f
"
|
_
1.80 1.50 1.20 0.70
[ t
o 3 3 1.0 1.0
2.20 1.85 1.40 1.00 i
1
6 5 1.50 1.50
2.65 2.30 1.80 1.50 1 6 8 8 2.0 2.0
3.10 2.65 2.00 1.80
1
h 6 1 1 2.0 2.0
3.60 3.15 2 . 50 2.20 i 6 1 4 1
J
4 3.0 3.0
4.30 3.70 1 3.25 2.50 1 6 1 8 1 8 4.0 4.0
Notes:—Class A: These tolls are not applicable to certain portions
of the Railway, provision of trucks not included.
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Vita.
The writer was born at Chin Chow, Auhui, China, November 6,
1886. His preparatory work was done first in the Chinese grade
schools and later in the academy of the University of Nanking at
Nanking, Kiangsu, China. From 1901 to 1905 he attended the Uni-
versity of Nanking, a union missionary university, taking the A.
B. degree with honors. From 1905 to 1914, except 1911-1911, he
was engaged in the educational work in the various universities
and colleges throughout China. Among the most noted ones of mod-
ern China. He taught in the University of Nanking at Nanking,
1905-1906; Nanyung University at Shanghai, 1908-1911; and Tsing
Hua College at Peking, 1912-1914. He was also an editor of China's
Young Men, 1908-1911, a quarterly English publication of the Na-
tional Young Men's Christian Association of China, Japan and Ko-
rea. From 1911 to 1912 he was connected with the Provisional
Government at Nanking, as an assistant secretary in the Board of
Foreign Affairs and later as chief secretary in the Bureau of
Foreign Affairs at Nanking. In the summer of 1914 he was secre-
tary to the Director of the Educational Mission to the United
States of America. From 1914 to 1915 he did graduate work in the
Transportation Department of the University of Illinois, writing
a thesis on "Low Charges in the Development of Freight and Pass-
enger Traffic," and taking the A. M. degree in June, 1915. In
America he was elected as chairman of the Chinese Students' Al-
liance and Chinese Students' Christian Association, mid-West
section, each for one year in 1915-1916.
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Publications: -He translated and edited in Chinese, McPher-
son and Henderson's Elements of Chemistry, Remsen's Organic Chem-
istry, Traveller's Guide, his Master's thesis, etc.

